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This thesis examines the interaction between sustainable development and structural 
transformation as development policy goals and outcomes, with particular reference to low-
income countries. This entails simultaneously examining two overlapping policy agendas, 
both aimed at moving away from an exclusive focus on economic growth. The first is a 
global normative agenda to promote sustainable development as a multi-dimensional 
concept, combining indicators of economic growth, income inequality and environmental 
sustainability. The second is a context-dependent national agenda to achieve structural 
transformation, incorporating geographical and sectoral changes in resource allocation and 
use in order to reduce dependence on the current international division of labour. 
 
First, an overarching framework for integrated analysis of these two policy agendas, referred 
to as the Inclusive Sustainable Development (ISD) framework (Chapter 2), is developed. 
The focus is then narrowed to explore short and long-term interactions between economic 
growth and inequality by applying Granger causality tests to a balanced panel dataset for 
143 countries (Chapter 3). A smaller dataset, comprising 29 countries in Africa, is then 
employed to investigate the correlations between a larger set of indicators of sustainable 
development and structural transformation (Chapter 4). The outcomes suggest that a 
compartmentalised approach—grow first, redistribute and clean up later—reduces the 
potential for long-run structural transformation. These results are further supported by the 
use of structural equation models to estimate trade-offs and synergies between the pursuit of 
economic growth, increased income equality, environmental sustainability, and indicators of 
structural transformation (Chapter 5). It emerges that a strategy of incorporating 
environmental initiatives into Africa’s structural transformation goals outperforms one that 
prioritises economic growth, while a strategy favouring social development goals may be 
most effective in the context of structural transformation. Key components of an integrated 
strategy include investment in renewable energy, the development of human capital and 
financial inclusion, which are examined in Chapter 6. 
ix 
 
Overall, the outcomes of the thesis suggest that the structural transformation of low-income 
countries can benefit from an integrated approach to development planning, set out as a 
model for inclusive sustainable development. Realising this potential depends on sustained 
investment in national planning capability to integrate, prioritise and sequence policy 
interventions aimed at structural transformation in line with the three dimensions of inclusive 
sustainable development. The thesis is concluded with a summary of the research findings 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AAAA  Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
ADF  Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
AfDB  African Development Bank 
AFRISTAT  Economic and Statistical Observatory for Sub-Saharan Africa 
AUC  African Union Commission 
CSIS  Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
ECA Economic Commission for Africa 
EKC Environmental Kuznets Curve 
ESCWA Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
EU European Union 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FfD  Financing for Development 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GGGI Global Green Growth Institute 
GNI  Gross National Income 
HIPC  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome 
ICRG  International Country Risk Guide Database 
ICT Information and Communications Technology 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IGEMF Integrated Green Economy Modelling Framework 
ILO International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPoA Istanbul Programme of Action 
IRENA  International Renewable Energy Agency 
xi 
IRF  Impulse Response Functions 
ISD Inclusive Sustainable Development 
LIS  Luxembourg Income Study 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals 
MDRI  Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
ODA  Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAGE Partnership for Action on Green Economy 
PCSD Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development 
PQLI  Physical Quality of Life Index 
R&D  Research and Development 
SDGs  Sustainable Development Goals 
SEM  Structural Equation Modelling 
SHaSA  Strategy for the Harmonization of Statistics in Africa 
STATAFRIC  Pan-African Institute for Statistic 
SWIID  Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
TBLDC  Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries 
UN United Nations 
UN-OHRLLS  United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least 
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small 
Island Developing States 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNDP-HDI United Nations Development Programme Human Development 
Indicator 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
UNSD  United Nations Statistics Division 
xii 
UNU-IAS  United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of 
Sustainability 
UNU-WIDER United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research 
VAR  Vector Autoregression 
VEC  Vector Error Correction 
WDI World Development Indicators 
























The thesis is concerned with how economic growth, equality/inclusion and environmental 
sustainability goals are, should be and can be jointly managed through the process of 
structural transformation, with particular reference to low-income countries. To achieve this 
objective, I explore the contemporary policy mix for transition to sustainable development 
that many developing countries are confronted with: (1) a global normative agenda moving 
away from traditional patterns of economic growth and toward a greater emphasis on 
sustainable development; and (2) a context-dependent national development policy agenda 
that entails the achievement of a more radical structural transformation that goes beyond 
economic growth based on the current international division of labour. The normative focus 
between these two strategies raise questions concerning how the prioritisation of the three 
dimensions of sustainable development (i.e. economic growth, equality and environmental 
sustainability) affect outcomes in terms of structural transformation. 
 
Realising this research objective of providing a normative focus between these two strategies 
entails theoretical and empirical analysis of country change processes driving inclusive 
sustainable development—trade-offs and synergies among economic, social and 
environmental aspects. An intermediate step towards this is to revisit the issue of economic 
inequality and growth interactions in the long- versus short-run based on two-way causality. 
This component of the research illustrates the complexity of the larger project of the 
relationship between all three dimensions of sustainable development and structural 
transformation. 
 
For the thesis, a mixed methods approach is employed. While comprising just four specific 
research publications (along with introductory, overarching framework and concluding 
3 
parts), it also draws on ten of my research publications, including five book chapters and 
five journal articles. These have been selected to address one overarching question, namely 
what is the nature of the relationship between ‘inclusive sustainable development’ and 
‘structural transformation’, with particular reference to low-income countries? Addressing 
this question requires examination of development experiences as well as policy options that 
envisage inclusiveness, equality, and sustainability. 
 
1.1. Thesis background 
 
Over the past half a century, the world has experienced rapid changes. Indeed, during this 
time, the world economy is estimated to have expanded four times, which can be translated 
to mean continuous annual average growth of over 3 per cent worldwide.1 But behind this 
trajectory, ideas about development have been in a state of constant flux, with influential 
thinkers driving a never-ending evaluation of development discourse—incorporating 
theories of modernisation, endogenous growth, globalisation and neoliberalism, among 
others.2 
 
The upward trend in aggregate economic growth has also been associated with diverse 
experiences depending on the context and the level of development (see Figure 1.1).3 For 
 
1  According to data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(2018b), the aggregated real GDP volume is estimated at US$ 19 trillion (at constant prices in 2010) for 1970 
and US$ 77 trillion for 2016. On the basis of these two estimated volumes, the size of the world economy has 
expanded by 408 per cent and compound annual growth rate is 3.04 per cent over the 47 year period. The same 
data source is used for the subsequent analysis on developed versus developing economies. 
2  e.g. Nurkse (1953), Lewis (1954), Solow (1956), Hirschman (1958), Prebisch (1959), Rostow (1960), 
Kuznets (1973), Romer (1990), Giddens (1991), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Stiglitz (1996), Aghion and Howitt 
(1998), Sachs (2006), Lin (2012), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), Piketty (2013), Milanovic (2016) 
3  As there is no one single established convention for the designation of ‘developed countries’ versus 
‘developing countries’, this comparative analysis in the introductory chapter is based on UNCTAD’s dataset 
and its classification for economic groups (UNCTAD, 2018b). 
4 
instance, economies of developed countries have expanded over the same period at about 
three times bigger in gross domestic product (GDP). In terms of per capita GDP, this group 
reached US$ 44,074 in 2016, which is more than four times greater than the world average 
of US$ 10,133. Their contribution to global economic growth was about 60 per cent in 2016, 
although this had shrunk by 18 percentage points, from 78 per cent recorded in 1970. 
 
Figure 1.1. Historical improvement of economic growth: developed versus developing 
countries, 1970-2016 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNCTAD (2018b) 
 
Likewise, many developing countries have also made remarkable progress in sustaining 
positive growth over the last five decades, while also improving their performance in social 
indicators such as health and education. Real GDP volume in developing countries increased 
by 655 per cent between 1970 and 2016, which is more than three times the global increase 
over the same period of 211 per cent. These economies are increasingly referred to as 






















































Developing (GDP volume, left scale) Developed (GDP volume, left scale)
Developing (GDP growth rate, right scale) Developed (GDP growth rate, right scale)
World (GDP growth rate, right scale)
5 
developed countries in the Global North. 4  Measured by GDP volume on average, the 
difference between the two groups decreased from 3.6 to 1.5 times over the period 1970-
2016. 5  Hence, such catching-up or economic convergence across countries has been 
observed in the trajectory of global development since the 1970s (Maddison, 2008). 
 
It should however be noted that the growth performance within the developing countries has 
been very heterogeneous (see Figure 1.2). Among the developing countries, Asian countries 
have sustained the greatest economic growth record with a 6 per cent in average over the 
period 1970-2016. This averaged growth rate is nearly twice greater than those of Africa and 
Latin America (3.5 per cent and 3.2 per cent, respectively). Such Asia’s remarkable 
performance may have largely been attributed to the development trajectories of the four 
Asian Tigers (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) who realised a radical 
growth while attaining a manageable level of inequality (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Parente, 
2001). 
 
Figure 1.2. Heterogeneous growth performance of developing countries: Africa, Latin 
America and Asia, 1970-2016 
 
4  It is resulting in the convergence of the living standards of what some consider to be two different 
worlds (Korotayev and Zinkina, 2014). This is based on the general assumption that income growth leads to 
improved living standards. There were, however, a number of exceptions, for instance, despite income growth 
in India, living standards (as measured by access to toilets or cooking fuel) have not improved much—i.e. the 
differences between income and multi-dimensional measures of poverty. 
5  Like the previous analysis, UNCTAD’s classification for economic growth and its dataset are applied 
to this analysis. 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNCTAD (2018b) 
 
Underpinning aggregated progress in the developing world, particularly African and Latin 
America has been a grow first and redistribute later strategy as a dominant development 
paradigm,6 which has left open questions regarding intra- and inter-generational equity. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, where economic growth has been nearly 4 per cent on 
average over the period 1990-20127, about 70 per cent of jobs are considered vulnerable, 
with youth and women’s labour market participation still being very low (ECA et al., 2016). 
Moreover, extreme poverty (classified as living on US$1.25 per day or less) decreased by a 
mere 14 per cent over the period 1990-2012, with 109 million people being added to the 
extremely poor group (people living in extreme poverty) during the same period.8 This 
 
6  This development paradigm is underpinned by the Kuznets hypothesis that the level of inequality is 
likely to initially go up as industrialisation takes hold. Detailed theoretical and empirical discussion on this is 
presented in Chapter 2 (theoretical) and Chapter 3 (empirical), respectively. 
7  Like the previous analysis, the UNCTAD’s dataset is applied. 
8  Based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) (2018), in terms of a poverty 
headcount ratio at US$ 1.90 per day, this region reduced it by 13 percentage points from 54 per cent to 41 per 
cent over the period 1990-2014, while the world as a whole registered a reduction of 24 percentage points from 
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7 
vulnerability of the labour force, together with persistent levels of poverty, suggests that 
much of the benefit of economic growth has been concentrated within small groups of the 
population within the abovementioned economies. Many households have been compelled 
to pursue agricultural businesses, despite declining farm sizes due to rising rural population 
densities. Meanwhile, Africa has recently experienced a prolonged era of de-
industrialisation, which is evidenced by the decline and subsequent stagnation in 
manufacturing value-added at around 11 per cent of GDP from 2012, while the service 
sector’s value-added has increased since 2009 (see Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3. Sectoral contributions to GDP in Africa 
 
Source: Armah and Baek (2015) 
 
A dominant economic development school of thought attributes relative underdevelopment 
in developing countries to a lack of structural transformation or the failure of such countries 
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8 
industrial ones, particularly regarding the manufacturing sector.9 This school emphasises 
that structural transformation efforts should target moving away from traditional views of 
development and make labour-intensive export-led industrialisation a possibility. 
Accordingly, many African countries have identified the structural transformation agenda as 
a development priority in their national development plans. In fact, many of them have 
prioritised such an agenda in a continental development strategy called Agenda 2063, 
formulated by the African Union Commission (AUC) (2015). 
 
While structural transformation often lays the foundation for high and sustained economic 
growth, it is still keenly debated as to whether it can bring about inclusive growth and 
prosperity for all. This piecemeal approach to dealing with a strategy favouring economic 
growth that is not sufficiently inclusive could stem largely again from the aforementioned 
de-industrialisation trend, whereby developing economies, particularly African countries, 
have skipped the transition to manufacturing sector-driven economies and have instead, been 
transformed to service sector-driven ones (with lower marginal productivity) (McMillan and 
Rodrik, 2011). Such a transformation pathway has often been characterised by the fragility 
and vulnerability associated with informal activities (Nissanke, 2019). In particular, this 
abnormal path of structural transformation couple with de-industrialisation has largely been 
observed in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa over the past four decades. 
 
What makes matters worse, is that the structural transformation approach is also likely to 
result in the deterioration of the environment, unless concerted action is taken to ensure 
environmental sustainability (UNCTAD, 2012). According to the WDI (2018), the rising 
rates of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in Sub-Saharan African countries, have 
correlated with rising per capita GDP over the past half-century, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.475 (see Figure 1.4). This correlation implies that as long as per capita GDP 
continues to grow, so too will greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
 
9  e.g. McMillan and Rodrik (2011), Lin (2012), Timmer (2017), Frankema and van Waijenburg (2018) 
9 
Figure 1.4. The growth trend of carbon dioxide emissions and per capita GDP: OECD versus 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1961-2014 
  
Source: Baek (2019) 
 
In a more analytical sense, the average growth rate of per capita emissions in member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) over 
the 1980s and 1990s was greater than that of Sub-Saharan African countries, but the trend 
has completely reversed between the two groups since 2000.10 It can be interpreted that Sub-
 
10  Averaged 1980-1999 growth rate of per capita greenhouse gas emissions in OECD countries is -0.253, 
while growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is -1.225, which translates into a 0.625 gap in averaged growth rates 
between the two groups. However, the figures averaged for 2000-2014 are -0.847 in OECD countries and 0.378 
in sub-Saharan Africa, which implies that OECD countries have reduced their per capita level of emissions, 
whereas Sub-Saharan African countries have increased theirs (mainly due to their industrialisation efforts). 
The gap in averaged growth rates since 2000 between the two groups has widened to 1.225. In addition to 
comparison analysis in terms of per capita greenhouse gas emission, the emission elasticities with respect to 
economic growth can be calculated for sub-periods and they can further be compared between the two groups. 
Emission elasticities of economic growth for the period 1961-1999 is 1.47 and 0.32 for OECD countries and 
Sub-Saharan African countries, respectively, implying that OECD countries have greater responsiveness of 
their economic growth performance to an increased emission level than that of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
However, these positive elasticities of both groups turn into negative emission elasticities for the period 2000-
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10 
Saharan Africa has been able to sustain economic growth over recent years through more 
radical emissions of carbon dioxide than that of the advanced group. Given the relatively 
low share of manufacturing contribution to the GDP of many African countries, carbon-
driven economic expansion, the early stage of which was rapidly driven by the urbanisation 
process 11  has substantially been based on a narrow range of primary commodities, 
particularly natural resources12, including fossil fuels and metallic minerals (Schoneveld and 
Zoomers, 2015). The current growth pattern in much of Africa may be environmentally 
unsustainable in this regard. 
 
Structural transformation strategies, whilst maintaining environmental conservation, are 
closely associated with the normative idea of sustainable development (Castro, 2004; Hull, 
2008). Initially pioneered by the Brundtland Commission, the concept of sustainable 
development has emerged in relation to recent environmental challenges, prompting a 
rethink of the development paradigm. Agenda 21, the outcome document from the Earth 
Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, called for the integration of environmental and 
developmental concerns. Subsequently, in 2012, the Rio +20 Conference urged member 
states of the United Nations (UN) to increase their mainstreaming of sustainable 
development at all levels (UN, 2012). This normative idea was later institutionalised in 2015, 
in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (hereinafter referred to as the 2030 Agenda) 
 
development idea that carbon emissions are no longer effective in deriving the pace of economic growth in the 
21st century. 
11  “History and experience show that urbanisation and industrialisation are closely associated in a 
mutually beneficial manner—but not in Africa. African countries must leverage the force of urbanisation to 
drive and enable industrial development, re-establishing the link between urban growth and industrial growth” 
said Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa in the launch event 
of the Economic Report on Africa 2017 (ECA, 2017a) in New York on 8 December 2017. 
12  The relationship between natural resources-rich and economic growth remains highly controversial, 
especially in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, where several countries (e.g. Nigeria and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) have suffered from the misuse of natural resources, which has hindered economic growth, 
so-called resource curse. Others (e.g. Botswana) have benefitted from effective use of their natural resources 
to become upper middle-income countries (Siegle, 2009). 
11 
(UN, 2015), which encouraged governments and other actors to address economic, social 
and environmental sustainability goals simultaneously and consequently, also the synergies 
and trade-offs between them.13 
 
The implication of this global normative discourse is that structural transformation should 
also be pursued in a way that is anchored by its simultaneous effects on the three components 
of inclusive sustainable development. Integrating pursuit of these two overlapping policy 
agendas, both aimed at moving away from an exclusive focus on economic growth, raises 
the following important questions. What combinations of economic, social and 
environmental sustainability can feasibly be achieved in the course of structural 
transformation? How can trade-offs and synergies between economic, social and 
environmental goals best be incorporated into policy choices? These are important and 
practical, but also, complex questions that need addressing in a comprehensive and 
consistent way. The broad purpose of this thesis is to contribute towards doing so. 
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
The central objective of the thesis is to address the following overarching research question. 
 
Overarching question:  What is the nature of the relationship between ‘inclusive 
sustainable development’ and ‘structural transformation’, 
with particular reference to low-income countries? 
 
Acknowledging its complexity, this overarching question is broken down into a set of five 
sub-questions. They focus attention on distinct but interconnected theoretical and empirical 
analysis of country change processes driving inclusive sustainable development—trade-offs 
and synergies across the economic, social and environmental dimensions. An intermediate 
 
13  It comprises 17 goals, 169 targets, and 230 indicators that are able to capture sustainable development 
with regard to economic, social and environmental dimensions. 
12 
step towards this objective is to revisit the issue of interactions between two of the three 
normative components: economic inequality and growth. Two sub-questions are framed at 
this level. 
 
Sub-question 1:  Is the inequality-growth nexus dominated by long-run or short-run 
relationships, and one-way or two-way causal relations? 
 
Sub-question 2:  What is the historical and empirical relationship between inequality 
and growth at the country level? 
 
Addressing the above two sub-questions, allows for the chief principal focus of investigating 
how efforts to advance the three dimensions of sustainable development affect the process 
of structural transformation. This part of the research is concerned with scientific observation 
at the country level through batteries of indicators, with correlations between them being 
amenable to statistical analysis. For the sake of systematic analysis, this research exercise is 
divided into the three separate sub-questions below. 
 
Sub-question 3:  How do efforts to promote inclusive sustainable development as a 
multi-dimensional concept influence a country’s structural 
transformation outcomes? 
 
Sub-question 4:  How do empirical trade-offs and synergies between economic growth, 
social inclusion and environmental conservation affect structural 
transformation outcomes? 
 
Sub-question 5:  What policy measures maximise the synergies to promote structural 
transformation in line with inclusive sustainable development? 
 
1.3. Scope of the study 
 
13 
The unit of analysis is set at the national level, and the scope of the thesis is restricted to the 
development strategies of low-income countries in the world economy over the next few 
decades. The performance of these countries remains highly important, not least given the 
depth and breadth of poverty within them. Restricting the scope of the thesis in this way has 
the analytical advantage that individually they are unlikely to be capable of influencing 
global policy processes, thus permitting a clear distinction between nationally endogenous 
and globally exogenous factors, as follows. 
 
First, the normative idea of inclusive sustainable development is shaped largely at the global 
level, but considered exogenous to the national level. 
 
Second, the regional or meso-level is neglected here as a means by which national and global 
level policy processes interact (Haughton and Counsell, 2004). In contrast, Grabel (2017) 
sheds light on meso-level institutional governance as a source and accelerator of interaction 
between global and national level policy making. 
 
Third, the time dimension between short-run and long-run is another point to consider. While 
the normative force of inclusive sustainable development can be considered fully exogenous 
in the short-run, the possibility of it becoming endogenous to the national context increases 




I employ a mixed methods approach that combines national level theoretical analysis and 
cross-national level modelling exercises, the results of which are assessed against the 
overarching framework set in Chapter 2. The descriptions of the methodological approaches 
are embedded in each of the research chapters, covering modelling techniques, including the 
Granger causality test (Chapter 3), panel data econometrics (Chapter 4) and structural 
equation modelling (Chapter 5). Finally, qualitative analysis is used to address the normative 
sub-question five (Chapter 6). 
14 
 
1.5. Defining the key terms 
 
This section introduces and defines six key terms that are central to the thesis, these being: 
(1) economic growth; (2) environmental quality; (3) sustainable development; (4) inequality 
reduction; (5) inclusive sustainable development; and (6) structural transformation. All 
these terms are also explained and explored in more depth in Chapter 2. 
 
The notion of (1) economic growth is mostly used to refer to the process by which a country 
produces more products and services by utilising economic and natural resources in a more 
efficient manner (Todaro, 2014). In effect, measuring economic growth provides useful 
information about the size of the quantitative expansion of an economy so as to be able to 
compare the level and stage of a country’s development (Giddings, Hopwood and O’Brien, 
2002). GDP (measured by total cost of goods and services sold in an economy within a year) 
or gross national income (GNI), especially their per-capita terms, are used as the most 
convenient and objective proxy indicators, becoming the overriding goal of the 
policymaking over the past decades. Yet, the emphasis on efficiency of production often 
leads to the concentration of capital into the hands of a few capitalists. Such a distorted 
consequence is invariably accompanied by exacerbating unequal distribution between 
capitalists and workers unless a timely policy intervention is prioritised. Furthermore, an 
efficient approach to transforming natural resources into goods and services could also cause 
a depletion of resources and environmental degradation (Dasgupta, 2013). In particular, the 
case of natural resources being overused beyond the earth’s regenerative capacity could 
restrain continuous economic activities and production.  
 
Given its potential demerits, the idea of economic growth has radically expanded to take into 
account several other modern terms (e.g. inclusive growth, equitable growth, sustainable 
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growth) that include concern beyond the material aspects of development.14 In this regard, 
the concept of economic growth that is more relevant to the 21st century context should be 
understood as economic performance, according to the extent to which the essential needs 
of people are balanced both socially and economically through the efficient use of natural 
resources, within ecological limits.15 
 
(2) Linking environmental quality to economic growth is a one proposal initially attempted 
by the Club of Rome16, which was concerned with the negative impact of rapid population 
growth and industrial development under a finite supply of natural resources. This 
environmental concern was some time later aggravated by Meadows et al. (1972)17, who 
warned that if the world’s population continued to grow at the current pace, and if 
industrialisation, the pace of pollution as well as food production practices and the use of 
 
14  Using per capita GDP remains controversial in terms of reflecting a country’s development level or 
status. For instance, it only provides limited information since going to war increases GDP and destroying 
infrastructure and re-building it also increases GDP. Partly due to this, there have been proposed a number of 
indicators that can address such limitation, e.g. the Genuine Progress Indicator and ‘Beyond GDP’ under the 
System of Environmental-Economic Accounts. 
15  The meaning of ‘ecological limits’ was also postulated by Kate Raworth’s (2017) framework of 
Doughnut Economics, with the terms, ‘ecological ceilings’ or ‘planetary boundaries.’ 
16  The Club of Rome is an organisation of individuals who share a common concern for the future of 
humanity and strive to make a difference, especially being concerned about the impact of rapid population 
growth and industrial growth based on a finite supply of resources. 
17  Their book, The Limits to Growth, shares concerns about the predicament mankind is facing in line 
with the Club of Rome. Immediately after their publication, academics, regardless of their being on the left or 
right wing of the political spectrum, voiced criticism. Later, the book received fierce criticism from 
entrepreneurs and even from advocates of capitalism. However, over time, as the environmental challenges 
have intensified, governments, civil society organisations and even academics have arrived at the affirmative 
regarding the chief normative claim of the book. Sometime later, an updated revision (Meadows, Randers and 
Meadows, 2004) was published, which propelled environmental considerations into the centre of the 
development discourse. In 2008, Graham Turner’s (2008) A Comparison of The Limits to Growth with Thirty 
Years of Reality concluded that changes in industrial production, food production and pollution are all in line 
with the book’s predictions of economic and social collapse in the twenty-first century. 
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resources remained unchanged, the planet would reach its limit for growth within the next 
100 years. It was indeed sensational enough not only to lead to national reactions (Furuseth 
and Cocklin, 1995)18, for it also influenced the global debate over development strategies. 
 
The degree to which environmental considerations impact on the discussion on economic 
growth strategies greatly depends on how central the environment is on a nation’s agenda of 
socioeconomic development.19 The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) can bring us some 
useful insights at this stage (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; López-Menéndez, Pérez and 
Moreno, 2014). In essence, it explains that higher greenhouse emissions are inevitably 
accompanied by the industrialisation process, especially in the initial stage of development. 
Subsequently, curbing such emissions is possible as the industrialisation (coupled with an 
increase in income level and thus, more investment on technology) progresses to advanced 
technology, particularly in regard to the use of renewable energy. In fact, the level of 
economic development may not even be so salient nowadays, because newly developing 
countries could decouple large amount of the emissions from their growth process through 
 
18  For example, strengthened environmental laws, campaigns for legislation on the environment and 
institutional change through the creation of cabinet-level environmental departments. 
19  The socioeconomic development and the environmental quality nexus, for instance, relates to 
agricultural land, forests and water quality, all of which could have serious implications to other socioeconomic 
activities. Agricultural land remains a critical endowment that is environmentally sensitive in the sense that 
environmental conservation policies strictly prohibiting the discharge of industrial waste would lead to more 
arable land and reduced forest cover compromises the planet’s carbon sinks, thus undermining adaptation to 
climate change (Foody, 2003). Hence, maintaining forest areas is essential for sustaining the earth’s ecosystems 
affecting: the dynamics of species diversity, genetic diversity and biodiversity; and potentially the frequency 
of floods and drought caused by extreme climate conditions (Zander and Kächele, 1999).  
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directly benefitting from various technology transfer mechanisms, including the Technology 
Facilitation Mechanism20 and the Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries.21 
 
When these theoretical and practical ideas are endogenised into national policymaking 
processes, they trigger, through government policies and collective action among individuals 
and institutions, a country’s new change processes that take into account various aspects of 
environmental quality. As a result of such developments, national initiatives for 
environmental concern was institutionalised in the 2015 Paris Agreement that called on all 
governments to put forward their nationally determined contributions (i.e. reducing carbon 
emissions) to mitigate and adapt to climate change, potentially contributing to their 
development process economically and socially, while maintaining the earth’s ecological 
capability. 
 
By conflating the two aforementioned development approaches, (3) the normative idea of 
sustainable development has emerged prominently in the global development discourse. 
This idea is a contested concept depending on whether the environment is considered as a 
means or an end to development. From an economic view, Pearce et al. (1990) held that 
“sustainable development involves maximising the net benefits of economic development, 
subject to maintaining the services and quality of natural resources over time,” while 
environmentalists put more emphasis on environmental conservation and protection. 
Furthermore, Conway and Barbier (1988) viewed it as a human-centred concept, focusing 
on human capability and progress, arguing that “sustainability is the ability to maintain 
productivity, whether of a field, farm or nation, in the face of stress or shock.” Whilst it is 
 
20  The Technology Facilitation Mechanism is designed to facilitate multi-stakeholder collaboration and 
partnerships through the sharing of information, experiences, best practices and policy advice among 
government, civil society, the private sector, the scientific community, the UN entities and other stakeholders 
(UN, 2015, para 70). 
21  The Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries has been designed to strengthen the 
knowledge capacity of the least developed countries, thus fostering the development of their national and 
regional innovation ecosystems (TBLDC, 2017). 
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clear from the debates about sustainable development that there is no one single philosophy, 
it is generally accepted people can have their own interpretation of it (Giddings, Hopwood 
and O’Brien, 2002). Without a doubt, it must be a much broader concept than merely any of 
single dimension of development. Given this situation, sustainable development may not 
always be inclusive or equitable. 
 
For sustainable development to be inclusive, effort towards (4) inequality reduction is 
essential. Inequality refers to the extent of variance in the level of a variable across a defined 
population (e.g. individuals, groups, sectors, nations and regions) and can be applied to 
multiple dimensions, such as social status, education opportunities, health outcomes, or 
degree of wealth.22 Notwithstanding the multi-dimensions of inequality, income inequality 
is the most widely used proxy indicator in measuring the degree of an unequal situation, 
which is essentially linked to the methodological individualism underpinning neo-classical 
thinking in capital accumulation.23 Income inequality largely appears to relate to the process 
of capital accumulation in economic growth and hence, to an income measure of 
development.24 However, a broader definition needs to be set out in order to adopt more 
holistic measures of development (Stewart, 2014).  
 
Notably, in his book, A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduced the concept of an 
acceptable range of wealth and social gap 25  in a society and warned that it would be 
 
22  In its multi-dimensional conceptualisation, horizontal inequality (inter-group distribution within 
countries) and vertical inequality (inequality among individuals within a country) are the focus (Østby, 2008; 
Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). 
23  This is mainly because income data is relatively easier to access for inequality analysis than other 
forms. Even the Gini coefficient, which is empirically derived from the Lorenz curve and several other similar 
measures (e.g. UNU-WIDER, LIS and SWIID) is publicly available for a researcher for comparisons of income 
inequality across various countries (Solt, 2016). 
24  The level of household’s income tends to indirectly correlate, to some extent, with other dimensions 
of inequality, such as education attainment, socioeconomic status, political influence, living standards, and 
even the level of happiness (Graham and Felton, 2006).  
25  For example, unequal access to education opportunities and difficulties in social mobility. 
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confronted with social conflict, corruption, bad governance, and social movements, if the 
level of social inequality exceeded this range.26 Equally importantly is the relation to the 
environment. Environmental inequality is deeply exposed to the vicious circle of 
environmental vulnerability that could have a significant impact on the social exclusion or 
social marginalisation of the poor. For example, the poorest are likely to be the most 
vulnerable to environmental risks (e.g. various unexpected disasters and polluted areas), 
whereas the richest are capable of protecting themselves from such risks. Thus, considering 
environmental inequality in addition to economic and social dimensions is important for 
capturing the multi-dimensional context of inequality. 
 
By integrating inequality reduction initiatives into the sustainable development concept, I 
propose it should be named as (5) inclusive sustainable development, one that takes into 
consideration both economic and environmental development in an inclusive fashion. In fact, 
there is a useful reference point, namely the triple bottom line, first coined by John Elkington 
(2018), an influential scholar who decomposed the normative idea of sustainable 
development into the social, environmental and economic spheres. This normative concept 
was institutionalised into 17 Sustainable Development Goals (hereafter referred to as 
SDGs),27 recognising that global environmental problems must be tackled globally by both 
the developed and developing world. It also emphasises that an ideal approach to sustainable 
development is to integrate economic, social and environmental aspects, whilst also 
recognising their interlinkages, so as to pursue sustainable development effectively in all its 
dimensions. In line with such thinking, inclusive sustainable development can be defined as 
a long-term development aspiration to guide countries’ balanced pursuit of economic 
prosperity, inclusive growth and environmental sustainability, without compromising the 
ability of future generations to be able to pursue the same goals. 
 
26  This idea is theoretically mirrored in the so-called difference principle—each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. 




The final key term, (6) structural transformation, is new development thinking identified 
by a majority of developing countries (Baek, 2019). This can be defined as a process by 
which the relative importance of different sectors and activities of an economy change over 
time.28 Its central idea focuses on sectoral shifts from agriculture to industry and services, 
underpinned by differences in inter-sectoral productivity (Elliott, 1998; Herrendorf, 
Rogerson and Valentinyi, 2013). Hence, under this lens it is often assumed that economic 
growth is a necessary and overriding condition for development. From a more dynamic 
perspective, it can also be understood in relation to the need for an economy to be flexible 
enough to adapt its national context to the recent accelerating pace of change in the global 
environment effectively (Killick, 199529; Hassink, 2010; Hu and Hassink, 2019). In this 
aspect, structural transformation can accelerate the process of achieving economic 
sustainability that can be understood not just in terms of ‘economic growth’ but also in that 
of ‘increasing resilience’ and ‘reduced volatility’ (Nissanke, 2019). 
 
Similar to the concept of sustainable development, its multiple normative features are 
proving to be obstacles to reaching a clear single consensus on its concrete definition. Each 
developing country has its own development priority (and different strategies towards 
structural transformation) given differences in their initial conditions and the status quo of 
their economy. Incorporating their context-dependent features, many developing countries 
have already mainstreamed structural transformation aspiration into their national 
development plans, each of the structural transformation measures are monitored and 
 
28  In this thesis, “structural transformation” is assumed to equate with “structural change” as used by the 
World Bank or “structural adjustment”, as referenced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite this 
assumption of the thesis, it is useful to note that the United Nations uses this term to target for the outcome of 
structural transformation, while the World Bank notes it with more focus on the process and the IMF does 
focus on the policy interventions.   
29  He argues that economies of Eastern Europe and Africa have undergone economic crisis due to their 
lack of flexibility, while the four Asian Tigers (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) have 
structurally transformed their economies owing to their higher adaptability. 
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evaluated based on their development outcome framework (Committee for Development 
Policy, 2018). 
 
Recognising such a wide variety of concerns and considerations, structural transformation 
can be defined both as a process- and outcome-driven context-dependent national 
development priority that is utilised for incorporating geographical and sectoral changes in 
resource allocation, while accommodating for global economic and environmental 
constraints in a flexible manner. 
 
1.6. Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis is based on ‘alternative format’ guidelines. This has enabled me to incorporate 
ten of my research publications, including five book chapters (Baek, 2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 
2018d; 2018e) and five journal articles (Baek, 2017; 2019; Armah and Baek, 2015; 2018; 
2019). One book chapter and three journal articles are chosen to be the research chapters, 
having been selected on the basis of their relevance to the overarching research question. 
More specifically, the thesis is organised into three parts as follows. 
 
PART I consists of Chapter 1 (this introductory chapter) and Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 2 is primarily designed to provide a consistent overarching framework to 
explain how the self-contained research publication-based chapters to follow, namely 
Chapter 3 through Chapter 6, relate to each other. In it, a theoretical research goal by 
synthesising the trinity nexus of economic growth, inequality and environmental 
sustainability into normative development frameworks is attained. 
 
PART II comprises four research chapters, which provide in-depth analysis, of both 
empirical data and theoretical formulation, for addressing the five sub-questions. 
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Chapter 3, entitled “Inequality and economic growth interactions”, examines the 
causal relations between country-level economic growth and inequality based on 
short- and long-run Granger causality tests. This particularly benefits from an 
empirical investigation of 143 countries, which further allows for the identification 
of some distinct styles of the dynamics existing in modern society. In so doing, how 
much scope there is for a wide typology is questioned and instead, it is concluded 
that a cluster analysis of countries displaying different combinations of causal links 
might be more fruitful. This chapter thus relates to the two sub-questions, “Is the 
inequality-growth nexus dominated by long-run or short-run relationships, and one-
way or two-way causal relations?” and “What is the historical and empirical 
relationship between inequality and growth at the country level?” 
 
The above empirical analysis provides the platform for the principal objective of the 
thesis of studying the relationship between structural transformation and inclusive 
sustainable development in Africa, as the leading case group. In each chapter, a 
distinct modelling exercise is performed according to different sets of initial 
assumptions on the nature of the relationship between inclusive sustainable 
development and structural transformation. The aim is to incorporate associated 
trade-offs and synergies among the multi-dimensions of sustainable development as 
well as its normative/policy standpoint. Since the nature and extent of these trade-
offs and synergies among them have so far received little research attention,30 the 
focus is exclusively on these systematically interconnected stories, all of which are 
explored through Chapters 4, 5 and 6 (corresponding to each of the three sub-
questions, as below). 
 
In Chapter 4, entitled “Can pursuit of the SDGs promote structural transformation 
in Africa? An empirical analysis”, panel data econometrics is employed to assess the 
 
30  e.g. Luke (2005), Aloi and Tournemaine (2013), Saboori and Sulaiman (2013), Spaiser et al. (2017), 
Baloch et al. (2018) 
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empirical relationship between the economic, social and environmental sustainability 
and structural transformation in order to address the third sub-question, “How do 
efforts to promote inclusive sustainable development as a multi-dimensional concept 
influence a country’s structural transformation outcomes?”  
 
Chapter 5, entitled “Prioritising interventions for sustainable structural 
transformation in Africa: A structural equation modelling approach” benefits from 
structural equation modelling to investigate their structural effects, such as trade-offs 
or synergies and how each of the multi-dimensional contributions is transmitted into 
structural transformation process. Hence, this chapter tackles the fourth sub-question, 
“How do empirical trade-offs and synergies between economic growth, social 
inclusion and environmental conservation affect structural transformation 
outcomes?” 
 
Unlike the two previous chapters, Chapter 6, entitled “Three interventions to foster 
sustainable transformation in Africa”, focuses on fulfilling a normative research 
objective of providing policy implications regarding how to leverage synergies in 
pursuit of structural transformation and thus, addresses the fifth sub-question, “What 
policy measures maximise the synergies to promote structural transformation in line 
with inclusive sustainable development?” 
 
A matrix of sub-questions and corresponding research chapters is summarised in Table 1.1, 
whilst a detailed explanation on the rationale and background, where necessary, is provided 
on the preface page of each research chapter. 
 
Table 1.1. Matrix of sub-questions and research chapters 
 
 
Overarching research question: 
 
What is the nature of the relationship between ‘inclusive sustainable 




Sub-Q1 Sub-Q2 Sub-Q3 Sub-Q4 Sub-Q5 
Chapter 3 √ √    
Chapter 4   √   
Chapter 5    √  
Chapter 6     √ 
 
PART III contains Chapter 7, which summarises the key research findings, discusses the 
scholarly contributions, provides policy implications and concludes with suggestions for 
further research.  
 
The overall structure of the alternative format thesis is presented in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2. Overall structure of alternative format thesis 
Thesis structure Publication type % contribution by the candidate 
PART I.     Towards sustainable structural transformation 
Ch1. Introduction Excerpts from book chapter 
(Baek, 2018a) and journal 
article (Baek, 2019) 
100% 
Ch2. Overarching framework 
 
Excerpts from book chapters 
(Baek, 2018b; 2018c; 2018e) 
and journal article (Baek, 
2017) 
100% 
PART II.    Research chapters 
Ch3. Inequality and economic growth interactions 
 
Book chapter (Baek, 2018d) 100% 
Ch4. Can pursuit of the SDGs promote structural 
transformation in Africa? An empirical analysis 
Journal article (Armah and 
Baek, 2015) 
Formulation of ideas (50%); Quantitative 
work (90 per cent); Writing (50%) 
Ch5. Prioritising interventions for sustainable structural 
transformation in Africa: A structural equation 
modelling approach 
Journal article (Armah and 
Baek, 2019) 
Corresponding author 
Formulation of ideas (50%); Quantitative 
work (100 per cent); Writing (50%) 
Ch6. Three interventions to foster sustainable 
transformation in Africa 
Journal article (Armah and 
Baek, 2018) 
Corresponding author  
Formulation of ideas (50%); Quantitative 
work (80 per cent); Writing (50%) 
PART III.   Overall discussion and conclusions 
Ch7. Conclusions   
Notes: ‘% contribution by the candidate’ is evident by Statement of Authorship, attached in Appendix 2 regarding the co-authored journal articles 





2. Overarching framework 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overarching framework for understanding and 
linking the concepts introduced in Chapter 1 along with explanation of the connections between 
the chapters to follow. Having presented this framework, each of its three components (comprising 
Boxes 1, 2 and 3) is elaborated upon by linking them to the contributions of other scholars. It is 
thus demonstrated how the framework builds on and is a synthesis of relevant wider literature. In 
so doing, this also helps to clarify the scope and limitations of the thesis as a whole. The original 
contributions of this work are also provided—an issue that is picked up and further reviewed in 
the conclusion (Chapter 7). 
 
2.1. Introduction and overview 
 
This section introduces the key components and their interactions, as conceptualised in the 
Inclusive Sustainable Development (ISD) framework, with accompanying discussion on its 
limitations. 
 
Normative frameworks adopted by national governments to inform country specific development 
strategies are presented in Box 1, including: (a) a process- and outcome-driven context-dependent 
development framework that is utilised for incorporating geographical and sectoral changes in 
resource allocation, while accommodating for global economic and environmental constraints in 
a flexible manner and: (b) a long-term development aspiration to guide countries’ balanced pursuit 
of economic prosperity, inclusive growth and environmental sustainability , without compromising 
the ability of future generations to be able to pursue the same goals. These two normative 
frameworks provide the range of development strategic options to national governments 
(depending on their development priorities and national contexts). These two development 
objectives could further be reconciled/embedded into the one unified process of structural 
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transformation that is both inclusive and sustainable (Nissanke, 2019) as the two objectives are 
presented with dashed line. 
 
Systematic interactions take place between normative frameworks and country change processes 
(Box 2), which are defined as the specific processes of (c) economic, (d) social and (e) 
environmental change, measured through three sets of indicators: economic growth, income 
inequality and environmental quality, i.e. (f) Box 1↔Box 2. This interaction is materialised 
through institutions and influential individuals. Meanwhile, the normative frameworks are, of 
course, influenced by exogenous drivers of change (Box 3), including (g) global debates on 
development strategies, (h) global process of technological change and (i) initial socioeconomic 
conditions, i.e. (j) Box 3→Box 1. Exogenous drivers of change also influence country change 
processes, i.e. (k) Box 3→Box 2. Global debates are, however, not significantly affected by change 
processes nor the normative development framework of individual countries or governments of 
(small) low- or middle-income countries. Hence, arrows flow out from Box 3, but not into it.  
 
Yet, a limitation of my exclusive focus on the two normative ideas is that it may not reflect 
comprehensive policy dynamics and hence, the work needs to be extended to address the 
challenges of: balancing macroeconomic stability with structural transformation (Nissanke, 2019); 
mainstreaming the three dimensions of sustainable development into national planning 
frameworks (Fischer et al., 2015); and mutually reinforcing the role of institutions in supporting 
sustainable transformation (Osman et al., 2012), among others. Furthermore, there are additional 
areas that could be worth revisiting in line with the ISD framework. That is, the regional 
intervention on national development framework. This could be a quite important area, because 
regional intervention would not only affect the linking up of national policies with the normative 
goals around sustainable development and structural transformation and vice versa, for it would 
also speed up the process of interactions between the national and global dimensions (Haughton 
and Counsell, 2004; Grabel, 2017).31  
 
31  Grabel (2017) shed light on the lens of meso-level institutional governance as a raw material of change at the 
global and national levels. Her essential claim is that incoherence and discontinuity in global financial governance 
caused by the global crisis would have been productive rather than noise, as they provide more policy space for 
socioeconomic development of the national institutions. Despite her Hirschmanian mindset, for this thesis, a strong 
28 
 
Furthermore, the ISD framework assumes the technological effect for country change processes to 
be exogenous, reflecting most cases for low-income countries, where technological advancement 
is likely to be adopted from outside a country’s borders, rather than being developed during their 
own country’s change processes. Nonetheless, assuming the role of technological progress as an 
exogenous variable may be not the case for some low-income countries, e.g. Ethiopia becomes 
one of the global frontrunners in clean technology (UNEP, 2015). Given such an outlier case, the 
initial set scope of study may restrain the ISD framework’s explanatory power on the complex 
dynamics in play. However, endogenising it into the framework would render empirical work far 
more complex (even impossible).  
 
Overall, filling all these gaps to advance the ISD framework is worthy of study, but they are beyond 
the scope of the present thesis. It should also be recognised that such research would be built upon 
a completely different set of literature compared to that covered in this work. Sticking to the initial 
scope of analysis for this thesis allows for the focus to be on my chief aim of informing a broad 
concept of inclusive sustainable development during the process of structural transformation in a 





distinction between the global and national levels is drawn, which can thus downplay regional drivers of development 
strategy and ethnological change that may not be exogenous to country influences. 
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(d) Income inequality 
(c) Economic growth 
Positive: Incentive/enabling 
Negative: Constraint 
Positive: Redistribution with 
extractive institutions  
Negative: Redistribution with 
inclusive institutions  
Positive: Pollution halo 
Negative: Scale effect 
Positive: Green growth 
Negative: Pollution haven 
Positive: Free riding behaviour 
Negative: Environmental vulnerability 
Positive: Willingness to pay 
Negative: Tendency to overexploit 
Box 2. Country change processes of socioeconomic and environmental 
development, measured through three sets of indicators: economic growth, income 
inequality and environmental quality 
Box 3. Drivers of change 
treated as exogenous 
(g) Global debates 
over development 
strategies 






Box 1. Normative frameworks adopted by national governments to inform country specific development strategies 
(a) Structural transformation 
a process- and outcome-driven context-dependent national 
development priority that is necessary for incorporating 
geographical and sectoral changes in resource allocation, 
while accommodating for global economic and 
environmental constraints in a flexible manner 
(b) Sustainable development 
a long-term development aspiration to guide countries’ 
balanced pursuit of economic prosperity, inclusive 
growth and environmental sustainability, without 
compromising the ability of future generations to be 





2.2. Normative frameworks 
 
This section discusses the two normative frameworks adopted by national governments to inform 
country specific development strategies (Box 1 of Figure 2.1). Accordingly, the section is started 
by tracing the origin of the idea of structural transformation back to the classical development 
economics literature, and then, there is exploration as to how this has been expanded over time to 
incorporate thinking about equity and environmental sustainability. 
 
2.2.1. Precursors to structural transformation theory 
 
Traditional notions of structural transformation emphasise sectoral shifts from agriculture to 
industry and services. While there is broad consensus that structural transformation is associated 
with economic growth and development, there has been considerable debate about the drivers of 
such transformation. Therefore, understanding the significance of reshaping economic structure 
and sectoral composition should be placed at the core of my overarching framework. However, 
this entails systematically addressing the theoretical foundation of a country’s development 
process (or ‘modernising economic system’), which inevitably calls for tracing the origin of the 
idea of structural transformation back to the classical development economics literature. 
 
Nearly eight decades ago, Fisher (1939) and Clark (1940) cast light on a particular pattern of 
national development and postulated it as a transformation paradigm, whereby as the economy 
advances, the major production activity shifts from the primary (i.e. the extraction of raw materials 
through agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining sectors) to the secondary (i.e. industrial 
production through manufacturing and construction sectors) and then, finally, to the tertiary (i.e. 
the provision of education and tourism services). One of the early users of the term, structural 
transformation, Simon Kuznets (1955) cited it as one of the six central characteristics in the 
process of modern economic growth, when observing how certain patterns regarding the 
reallocation of economic activity across agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors naturally 
take place. Since then, structural transformation has often been equated with a modernisation 
process (Islam and Iversen, 2018). 
 
31 
Arthur Lewis (1954) articulated such processes in a different way. He particularly focused on the 
structural shift of the labour force between sectors and named it as the dual-sector pattern. 
According to his model, agricultural and industrial sectors generally coexist when an economy 
undergoes rapid industrial development through benefitting from low cost farming. However, as 
the rural labour force continues to flow into the cities, certain challenges arise there when the 
labour force from the rural area becomes exhausted, thus reaching a turning point.32  A structure 
comprising high cost, but low efficiency, then becomes deeply embedded in a society, thereby 
resulting in a slowdown in economic growth. Lewisian thought was consistent with various 
traditional schools of thought, including Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1953), Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), among others.33 
 
Of the many prior works, Hirschman (1958) is worth revisiting in terms of thinking of structural 
transformation as a dual-sector process. In his version, so-called unbalanced dual-sector growth, 
he introduced the concept of forward and backward linkages where the former linkage is created 
through investment in a project that encourages another investment in subsequent stages of 
production, while the latter one is realised by a project itself encourages investment in facilities 
 
32  This is the transitioning moment, namely the Lewisian turning point, where society passes through a turning 
point of labour force from the status of ‘excess’ to ‘shortage’ or, in other words, structural discrepancy between the 
demand and supply of the labour market is associated with a sharp rise in wages. 
33  The big-push pattern, initially advocated by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and advanced further by Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny and most recently emphasised by Nissanke (2019), is worth revisiting. This pattern’s advocates 
assert that a significant amount of investment, particularly in the early phase of a country’s development, should be 
made in a rapid and timely manner to deal with the persistent poverty level of developing countries. During a similar 
period, another influential thinker was Ragnar Nurkse (1953), who introduced the theory of the vicious circle of 
poverty. According to this model, the lack of capacity for capital formation in underdeveloped countries leads to a 
higher poverty rate, which in turn, can lead to challenges for effective capital formation. This bi-directional causality 
can be explored through three channels: high interdependence between income and capital, causality between poverty 
and health, and close linkages between poverty and education. As per his argument, the vicious circle of poverty would 
perpetuate the poverty level of developing countries and thus, how to stem this vicious circle becomes a fundamental 
challenge for these countries. Despite these influential ideas, coordination failure among various industrial policies or 
complementary activities cannot be underestimated. Unless a massive and coordinated policy efforts supported by the 
optimal allocation of resources are accompanied, it often leads to market failure that could cause poverty traps 
particularly in least developed countries (Matsuyama, 1997; Glavan, 2008). 
32 
that enables the project for success. Based on such linkage dynamics, he claimed that those projects 
that can best create linkages should be the ones for massive investment consideration. In other 
words, a special effort to foster a particular industry (or sector) has to be made, because it could 
create a leading industry that generates a chain reaction for other industries, termed the domino 
effect. He elaborated it based on a positive circulating process repeated by lead versus pull between 
industries. This circulating pattern will intensify a chain of interactions between leading and 
chasing sectors and will, thus, raise the level of industrial competitiveness. Since then, this 
unbalanced sector model34 has become dominant in structural transformation modelling. 
 
For instance, Baumol (1967) incorporated two sectors of progressive versus non-progressive 
interactions with a particular consideration of the effect of technological changes. His propositions 
stated that labour productivity increases cumulatively at a compounded rate of growth in the 
progressive sector, while in the non-progressive one its rate is constant. From his modelling 
exercise, he concluded that sustaining balanced growth in the reality of an unbalanced productivity 
trend would result in zero economic growth. This modelling result clearly indicates that sectoral 
productivity should be continuously balanced, depending on a country’s stage of transformation. 
This could further reflect that managing trade-offs between sectors is an essential area of 
policymaking, where inclusive and/or equitable policy interventions come into effect.   
 
A similar policy implication can also be derived from the modelling exercise undertaken by 
Matsuyama (1992), who focused his attention on the role of agricultural productivity. He 
hypothesised that (1) income elasticity of demand in the agricultural sector is less than unitary, (2) 
labour productivity in the industrial sector increases largely driven by learning-by-doing 
externalities35 and (3) that productivity in the agricultural sector was exogenous to his model. The 
empirical findings supported a negative relationship between agricultural productivity and 
 
34  The unbalanced school of thought was initiated notably by Hirschman’s model (1958) and Baumol (1967), 
being later followed by Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria (1997), Park (1998), Laitner (2000), Caselli and Coleman 
(2001), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002), among others. 
35  Matsuyama’s model neglects the existence of a learning-by-doing effect on the agricultural sector and thus, 
his analysis fails to incorporate the impact of technological progress on agricultural productivity. 
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economic growth and hence, allocating more labour force to the manufacturing sector (rather than 
agricultural) tends to accelerate the pace of economic growth. 
 
In more recent years, modelling a transition process with a particular focus on industrialisation 
from the agricultural to manufacturing sector has become predominant. Park (1998), for instance, 
endogenised factors (e.g. land, unskilled labour force, and capital stock) as well as goods (e.g. 
agricultural, manufacturing and new capital goods) in one model, and stressed the crucial role of 
the size of the capital-producing sector for economic growth. Various studies with similar 
emphasis on the role of manufacturing industry as an engine of economic growth (while also 
emphasising the importance of an increase in agricultural sector productivity) have been conducted, 
but with a different focus on what catalyses such a role, e.g. the household saving rate (Laitner, 
2000) or different income elasticities of demand across sectors (Caselli and Coleman, 2001). These 
unbalanced pattern modellers were able to provide empirical evidence that sectoral contributions 
to GDP vary across sectors. This is why the pace of economic growth also varies by country and 
hence, the importance of country-specific sectoral analysis and looking at in particular in terms of 
cross-sector growth rates and trade-offs cannot be overestimated. 
 
2.2.2. More recent structural transformation theories 
 
In recent years, a new wave of modelling structural transformation has emerged by incorporating 
services into the theory.36 Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), for instance, attempted to build a 
three-sector framework, in which structural transformation is driven by income effects, while 
assuming the real interest rate remains constant. With a similar framework, Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007) applied to their model the concept of the growth rates of sectoral total factor productivity 
as a driving force of structural transformation. They found the convergence of employment into 
two sector types, those producing capital goods and those generating the lowest rate of growth in 
productivity. Its long-run simulation predicted that the share of the agricultural sector is decreased 
 
36  e.g. Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Foellmi and Zweimüeller (2008), 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), Boppart (2014) 
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and that the share of the manufacturing sector is increased at first and then declines later, while the 
services employment share increases. 
 
A study conducted by Foellmi and Zweimüller (2008) also supported such a sectoral shifts 
phenomenon. These researchers assumed hierarchical preferences on the demand side, meaning 
that households tend to consume according to a hierarchy of needs (hierarchy function), which 
characterises their willingness to shift from high priority to low priority products and vice versa. 
Within their theoretical modelling framework that adopts Engel’s consumption cycle,37 they found 
that the rich are likely to demand newly invented products, while the poor tend to consume 
necessities only. However, as income grows, the poor start demanding more luxuries, inducing a 
market shift towards product innovation. As their modelling simulation continues on, the results 
firmly confirmed the agricultural-manufacturing-services sector transition. This modelling that 
focuses on sectoral differences in income elasticities of demand could eventually reach the broad 
consensus that structural transformation is a continuous process via sectoral shifts from agriculture 
to industry and services, essentially claimed by the studies focusing on sectoral differences in 
productivity growth (Duarte and Restuccia, 2010; Ungor, 2017; Timmer, 201738). 
 
Despite its theoretical and empirical value, the agricultural-manufacturing-services sector 
transition advocates may, however, be exposed to a critical limitation, especially when the 21st 
century context is taken into account. The bulk of the models reviewed have focused on 
endogenous interactions within a country, thereby elaborating the structural transformation 
process within a relatively closed economy. Often, the sectoral transition has been forced by 
external factors other than the outgrowth of industrial development dynamics developed internally. 
This oversight may be partly due to, on the one hand, for the sake of simplicity in their modelling 
 
37  The introduction of new goods is integrated in the sense that starts with luxury ones with high income 
elasticity and ends with necessities with low-income elasticity. 
38  Marcel P. Timmer invoked a broader definition as being composed of the following features: relative decline 
of low-productivity agriculture and low value added extractive activities; a relative increase in manufacturing and 
high-productivity services; a decline in the relative share of agricultural employment in the GDP; a rural-to-urban 
migration that stimulates the process of urbanisation; and the rise of a modern industrial and service economy. 
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exercise or on the other, in relation to time of the development of their sectoral models (the global 
economy was considered ‘closed’ in the mid-to-late 20th century).  
 
Especially the latter point would be serious given the fact that in the 21st century the structural 
transformation process must have been accompanied by aggressive globalisation forces, possibly 
resulting in an unexpected direction of transformation. Unlike the past transformative trajectory 
that most developed countries underwent, the experiences of, for instance, many African countries 
has been associated with agriculture to the service sector transition (Figure 1.2), as the emergence 
of newly invented technology goods and services has been robust since 2000, as a result of 
globalisation. This has created differences in the potential expansion of demand particularly on the 
high-tech services industry and sectors, inducing somewhat distorted sectoral transition in many 
of these countries. 
 
It is however critical to differentiate between a sectoral transition dynamic to high-tech 
productivity services sector and a transition to the services sector largely characterised by the 
fragility and vulnerability associated with informal activities. The former transition can be 
considered a contributing factor to productivity-enhancing structural transformation, whereas the 
latter one could affect the pattern of productivity-reducing structural transformation, which has 
historically been observed in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa over the past four decades 
(Nissanke, 2019). Integrating these different transition dynamics to their urbanisation discourse, 
Gollin, Jedwab and Vollrath (2016) attempted to differentiate between the two different processes 
of urbanisation: (1) urbanisation to “production cities” where manufacturing sector activities play 
a key role in industrialising cities; and (2) urbanisation to “consumption cities” where non-tradable 
services are dominating cities’ activities. Observing a sample of 116 developing countries over the 
period 1960-2010, they concluded that the urbanisation process to the consumption cities tends to 
be prevalent among countries whose economy is heavily dependent on natural resource exports. 
This result is also consistent with the development trajectory largely characterised by the 
productivity-reducing transformation in developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In short, factors distorting structural transformation process can be summarised as follows. The 
rapid pace of globalisation has, indeed, increased competition in the consumer products and 
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services market and also enabled flows of capital and human resources without borders.39 It has, 
thus, let some countries benefit from cheap resources (e.g. labour force), thereby increasing their 
productivity and fostering sectoral shifts in an efficient fashion, while a completely opposite state 
of affairs has been the case for others (Mills, 2009; Guidetti, 2014). Moreover, globalisation can 
also intensify societal relations, which link distant localities so that some economic events in rural 
areas can significantly be influenced by events that occur in other areas or even in other countries 
(Giddens, 1991). This implies reciprocal influences of certain tendencies and simultaneously a 
localisation or urbanisation process, which may deviate from the traditional pathway of structural 
transformation. 
 
2.2.3. Calls for sustainable structural transformation 
 
In a globalised world, the integration of the economy with social, cultural and environmental 
structures raises strong concerns on the environmental sustainability of structural transformation. 
In essence, the global community is increasingly demanding that the transformation process 
(sectoral transition) is environmentally sustainable. Understanding such a global call should, 
however, entail exploring how an idea of structural transformation incorporating the concerns of 
sustainability has developed over time. 
 
Reflected in the EKC, the notion of grow first and clean later has been prevalent in past decades 
(Baek, 2019). Radical economic transformation actually led to a drop in the unemployment rate 
and to material abundance, a benefit that was considered to overwhelm concern about 
environmental degradation from a substantial increase in carbon emissions. As a result, most 
 
39  For instance, Araujo and Lima (2007) explore the connection between sectoral composition in trade and the 
difference in income elasticities of demand. This approach is based on Multi-Sectoral Thirlwall’s law, which states 
that the equilibrium growth rate corresponds to the ratio between its income elasticity of demand for exports and that 
of imports, multiplied by the growth rate of external demand (Romero and McCombie, 2016). The empirical result 
from Araujo and Lima’s research is that the rate of economic growth can be accelerated through shifts in the sectoral 
composition of trade dynamics. In line with this central idea, Araujo (2013) further advances modelling specification 
by endogenising technical change and insisting that a country producing final goods with higher income elasticity of 
demand would result in higher technological advancements and thus, faster economic growth than one producing 
goods with lower elasticity of demand. 
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countries were convinced that there would be ‘no problem’ regarding resource depletion. This was 
largely influenced by the work of the unlimitedness advocates, who were mostly growth-oriented 
scholars with the belief that the Earth would overcome its limitations by some means or other and 
that, for instance, resource depletion and environmental degradation (exogenous to their growth 
models) could be resolved by technological advances.40 They believed that, even the challenges of 
non-renewable resources (related to climate change) and food shortages could be settled by the 
natural effect of diffusion of alternative energy innovation.41 
 
On the other hand, the limitedness advocates, initiated by the Club of Rome, warned that if the 
world’s population continued to grow at the current pace, and if industrialisation, the pace of 
pollution, food production practices, and the use of resources remained unchanged, the planet 
would reach its limit for growth within the next 100 years. Whilst admitting the possibility that 
technological advances may prolong this end point, they insisted that technology could not be the 
fundamental solution. Turner (2008), for instance, claimed that even three to four decades after the 
most influential book in this doctrine, The Limits to Growth was first released, the trend analysis 
adopted in the book was still valid since the level of environmental pollution and ozone depletion, 
as warned, continue to be massively challenging issues today.  
 
With these global environmental challenges, humanity needed to rethink the traditional 
development paradigm and the concept of sustainable development emerged as a result (Hull, 
2008). Under this lens, greater environmental considerations in addition to economic and social 
interests in the development process are demanded. Now, it has become a concept that is 
comparable to democracy and globalisation, which is found everywhere (Castro, 2004). In essence, 
it is widely perceived that global environmental problems must be tackled by the developed and 
 
40  e.g. Myers and Simon (1994), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Lomborg (2001), Hanson (2008) 
41  We are now living in a society in which technological innovation (information and knowledge) can spread 
within minutes all across the world. Thus, diffusion of technology has firmly entered the arena of policymaking. This 
diffusion can help an individual country prepare strategy or policy that is relevant to its present socioeconomic 
conditions. Most sensationally, futurist Ray Kurzweil (2005) popularised the idea of technological singularity. In his 
book, he argues that through the law of accelerating returns, technology is progressing towards a singularity to create 
superintelligence. In this regard, this school of thought seems to believe that ‘there is no impossibility’ on the basis 
that technology will bring us more than we can currently imagine. 
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developing world together.42 For instance, advanced countries seem already on track in terms of 
structural transformation, but their continuous transformation process in a sustained fashion 
remains uncertain. For them in this regard, sustainable development appears to be not merely a 
desired goal of development, but rather, a prerequisite for their competitive and continuous 
transformation process (Langhelle, 2000). 
 
Meanwhile, developing countries could be attracted by being able to set their own development 
directions in line with their own environmental and geographical conditions. African countries, for 
instance, could take geographical advantage in producing renewable energies given their vast 
untapped water resources and abundant sunshine (Collier and Venables, 2012; Simon, 2013). In 
addition, fragile economies, particularly those of Arab countries, could also benefit from the 
sustainable development initiative as it calls for good governance and strengthened global and 
regional cooperation to stabilise geopolitical tensions (such as worsening refugee crises and shaky 
investor confidence) (ESCWA, 2018). As for both developed and developing countries, this global 
goal could assist them in utilising their environmental resources efficiently to contribute to their 
own transformation processes and reinforcing their taking responsibility for the environmental 
challenges, with the overall aim of enhancing their international standing by making policy in a 
self-conscious manner. 
 
Against this background, the normative concept of structural transformation now being changed 
to focusing on: pursuing more than the material aspects of life (i.e. beyond economic growth); 
 
42  Today, the hegemony of global economic development has already shifted from the global North (responsible 
for 40 per cent of global GDP) to the global South (nearly 60 per cent of GDP). Such a shift would appear to have 
also been reflected in the competing discourse of Ecological Modernisation versus Sustainable Development. 
According to the WDI (2018), Western-Advanced Nations constitute about 40 per cent of the global GDP: the United 
States with 24.3 per cent; Germany with 4.5 per cent; the United Kingdom with 3.9 per cent; France with 3.2 per cent, 
Italy with 2.4 per cent; Spain with 1.6 per cent; the Netherlands with 1.0 per cent; and others with less than 1.0 per 
cent. Whilst Non-Western-Advanced Nations represent about 60 per cent of the global GDP: China with 14.8 per cent; 
India with 2.8 per cent; Brazil with 2.4 per cent; South Korea with 1.9 per cent; Mexico with 1.5 per cent; and others. 
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innovating the process of schooling and allocating human capital 43 ; and incorporating the 
environment at the centre of production and consumption patterns. In particular, the capacity of 
accommodating uncertainties44 has also become an additional element of the normative concept 
(Killick, 1995; Hassink, 2010; Hu and Hassink, 2019). The work of Killick deserves a revisit, for 
instance. He elaborated that structural transformation is defined in relation to the need for an 
economy with a flexible structure in order to be adaptable. This definition was empirically 
supported by the cases in which the economies of Eastern Europe and Africa have undergone 
economic crisis due to their lack of flexibility, while the four Asian Tigers (i.e. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) have structurally transformed their economies owing to their 
higher adaptability. This role can be further mainstreamed into a policymaking capacity to 
transform. The stance of policymakers should be flexible enough to anticipate and then accelerate 
structural transformation through: removing any of newly emerging obstacles that would block the 
needed changes in sectoral structure of economy; and adapting in a timely manner to the changing 
imbalance in the allocation in human capital between urban and rural areas. 
 
2.2.4. Tensions between structural transformation, sustainability and social 
inclusion 
 
In the light of this global call for sustainability to be placed at the centre of policymaking, the 
importance of a normative idea of sustainable development to be integrated into a country’s 
structural transformation process can be recognised. A large number of scholars, however, remain 
concerned about potential conflict (compatibility) between reality and the normative aspect. 
Mindful of this, in this section, there is now assessment as to whether structural transformation 
can be an initiative that provides greater space to encompass environmental conservation, social 
inclusion and the interaction of the multi-dimensions of sustainable development. In this regard, 
addressing the following three interrelated concerns should be a prerequisite: Do the efforts to 
 
43  Through this process innovation, national human capital is accumulated in a way that drives the differences 
in the rate of technical progress. Doing so will, in turn, shape sector-specific strengths, thereby inducing structural 
transformation. 
44  The uncertainties can be related to power shifts, economic growth, social development, differentiation and 
specialisation as well as adaptability to a new environment. 
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advance the process of structural transformation necessarily bring economic growth?; Do these 
efforts inevitably cause social problems, such as a widening of inequality?; and Is the process of 
structural transformation necessarily correlated with the destruction of the environment? 
 
With respect to the first concern, there is broad agreement among scholars that structural 
transformation defined according to a two- or three-sector model is positively related to economic 
growth.45 This doctrine explains that structural transformation stimulates growth by reallocating 
resources from low- to high-productivity activities. Other scholars have also suggested that the 
manufacturing sector promotes growth, because it embodies technology and innovation, which 
fuel the productivity and development process (Shen, Dunn and Shen, 2007). The alternative view 
is that export-led development strategies on the principle of comparative advantage stimulate 
growth, which could over time cause structural transformation by accelerating transition out of 
agriculture into industry and services (Swiecki, 2017; Teignier, 2018). 
 
The empirical studies conducted on this relationship have, however, yielded mixed results. For 
instance, structural transformation in South Korea has been associated with the role of international 
trade in accelerating the transition from agriculture to industry and services (Sposi, 2019). Also, 
Ungor (2017) found that differences in sectoral productivity growth rates accounted for the 
different sectoral reallocations in Latin America and East Asia. Moreover, Cortuk and Singh (2011) 
assessed this relationship in India for the period 1951-2007, employing the Granger causality test, 
and they found that from 1988 onwards, there was a significant positive impact from structural 
transformation to growth. Their empirical results strongly support the general consensus that 
Indian radical economic growth observed over the last two decades has been as a result of such 
transformation processes. However, other studies using Granger causality analysis have found that 
the causal relationship is country-specific, implying that there may be no universal relationship 
between the two variables (Elliott, 1998; Mijiyawa, 201746). 
 
45  e.g. Lewis (1954), Hirschman (1958), Kuznets (1973), Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Herrendorf, Rogerson 
and Valentinyi (2013) 
46  A cross country analysis of 53 African countries found a U-shaped relationship between income growth and 
the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP. The increase in per capita GDP is accompanied by a decrease in the 
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The second concern is also at the heart of the social development discourse over the past decades. 
It is, indeed, still debated as to whether the structural transformation process can bring about social 
development, with a particular focus on inequality and human development. In reality, 
unfortunately, the transformation process is not always accompanied by inclusive growth and 
prosperity for all, but rather, it often coexists with rising inequalities and slower-than-anticipated 
pace of poverty reduction (ECA et al., 2016). This is partly because transformation is mainly 
concerned with the reallocation of economic activities towards higher productivity sectors and not 
a pro-poor growth intervention that is associated with increasing incomes and employment 
opportunities for the poorer segments of the population.47 Hence, it is not always the case that a 
sectoral shift to the productive sector benefits the lower end of the distribution (Caliendo et al., 
2018). Of course, there is a possibility to link them (social development and structural 
transformation) together towards positive results of both, e.g. doubling efforts to reduce the skills 
gap in human capital in order to match the skills required in both the agricultural and higher 
productivity sectors. 
 
Empirically, a large number of studies have suggested that the development outcomes depend on 
the nature of the transformation. For instance, Dastidar (2012) found that where structural 
transformation was characterised by a transition from agriculture to industry, inequality levels did 
not increase in developing countries. On the other hand, inequality was found to increase in those 
developing countries experiencing an agriculture-service transformation. In the latter case, the 
increase in inequality was more pronounced when the initial levels of inequality are already higher 
than average. This argument can be supported by a logic developed by Nurkse (1953) claiming 
that the level of inequality influences the size and composition of the aggregate demand, often 
thereby reducing the market for manufacturing production, assuming that importing of 
manufactured goods remains unchanged. In a similar vein, more recently, scholars have 
 
manufacturing share of GDP until a threshold of US$943 (current value), while beyond this level incomes are 
positively associated with the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP. 
47  Whilst sectoral transition from agriculture directly to services could make the African experience unique, the 
job creating effect, especially for the poor from this prevailing transition, has been relatively limited, as the 
manufacturing sector has the greater potential for employment creation. 
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highlighted the misallocation and underutilisation of resources as outcomes of inequality that could 
delay the transformation process (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017). 
 
Last but not least, environmental concern in the process of structural transformation has to sit at 
the forefront of the public policy agenda. However, the theoretical evidence on the environmental 
drivers of structural transformation is scant compared to that of the above economic and social 
drivers. Nevertheless, the EKC would appear to provide some insights on this concern. According 
to it, industrial transformation initially causes higher emissions of greenhouse gases (mostly in 
case of developing countries); however, net emissions eventually drop (mostly in case of 
developed countries) as the increase in income level leads to technological advancements 
associated with curbing such emissions. Its empirical validity, however, depends on the 
environmental good in question 48 , although many empirical studies appear to support this 
perspective.49 
 
On the other hand, the green growth advocates50 have rejected the story of developing countries 
argued by those of the EKC. Instead, they have absorbed the insight on the case of developed 
countries and then, applied the case to developing countries too. Simply speaking, their central 
argument is that with current technological innovations, newly developing countries can decouple 
greenhouse gas emissions from their transformation processes. The past experiences of Norway 
and Sweden suggest that countries can achieve high levels of human development, while attaining 
low levels of per capita carbon dioxide emissions (Bhattacharjee and Iftikhar, 2011). Other studies 
 
48  For instance, while carbon dioxide emissions hardly declined with levels of development, sulphur dioxide 
emissions diminished by 74 per cent among EU countries due to factors such as fuel-switching to low-sulphur fuels, 
including natural gas and the impact of EU directives relating to the sulphur content of certain other fuels (Armah and 
Baek, 2018). 
49  Empirical support the EKC—e.g. Pao and Tsai (2010; 2011), Arouri et al. (2012), Hamit-Haggar (2012), 
Saboori and Sulaiman (2013), Al-mulali et al. (2013), Kivyiro and Arminen (2014) 
No empirical evidence of the EKC—e.g. Luzzati and Orsini (2009), Iwata, Okada and Samreth (2012), Babu 
and Datta (2013), Onafowora and Owoye (2014) 
50  UNEP, a front runner for this greening strategy advocacy defined the green growth as “growth in income and 
employment should be driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance 
energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services” (UNEP, 2011, p.16). 
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(Collier and Venables, 2012; Simon, 2013; UNEP, 2015) have further claimed that, relative to 
other continents, the potential for greening the economy is highest in Africa. This is based on the 
assumption that Africa would willingly jump from fossil fuels to green energy, if it were to benefit 
from the diffusion of green technology. This would put the continent in a position to leverage 
synergies between environmental quality and structural transformation. In fact, some African 
countries, including Ethiopia, are already among the global frontrunners in this area. 
 
These views have also been mirrored in empirical accounts. Several researchers (Ladislaw, Leed 
and Walton, 2014; Alfredsson et al., 2018) have contended that structural transformation strategies 
under a business-as-usual scenario would leave a considerable environmental footprint, which 
would inversely hinder continuous transformative activities. Naudé (2011) attributed such 
environmental degradation to a country’s carbon-intensive process of structural transformation, 
while proposing environmental-friendly strategies that focus on transferring labour away from 
environmentally-harmful agricultural industries. The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) for 
environmental conservation was also studied by Zhang and Zhou (2016). Using China’s provincial 
panel data, they found mixed results as to whether FDI-driven transformation reduces emission 
levels, whereas unequivocal evidence was found that urbanisation programmes radically increase 
that levels. In this context, most of the recent research efforts 51  have come out increasingly 
standing against the de-growth policy option (Levallois, 2010) or traditional views on trade-offs 
between the environment and structural transformation, instead being aimed at exploring the 
potential synergy effects.52 
 
Indeed, the aforementioned three potential tensions could stem from distinction of the two 
normative agendas between structural transformation and sustainable development: the idea that 
 
51  On similar lines, whilst recent empirical findings have so far supported the theoretical hypothesis of trade-
offs between transformation and environmental degradation, they have also highlighted the mediating role of policy 
in this relationship. For instance, the work of Moscona (2018) centred on the role of the Green Revolution in 
influencing transformation through increases in agricultural productivity in India and found an empirical evidence that 
such increased productivity drives growth in income and employment in the agricultural sector but impedes 
urbanisation process and employment growth in the manufacturing sector. 
52  The traditional transformational process (i.e. a Western-centric development strategies) is often accompanied 
by a depletion of resources and environmental degradation (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Dasgupta, 2013). 
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structural transformation tends to focus on technical standpoints of sectoral compositional change 
of output and/or employment within national boundaries, whereas the sustainable development 
idea goes beyond such a sectoral perspective by taking into consideration multi-dimensions of the 
national development process in an open economy. While these two could share some 
commonality in that both are aimed at moving away from an exclusive focus on economic growth, 
they also reinforce the responsibility of all relevant stakeholders to integrate both agendas into 
national development plans. The responsible actors are, therefore, able to develop pathways 
effectively through which structural transformation can be best achieved, while balancing potential 
trade-offs and synergies between economic growth, social inclusion and environmental 
conservation. In this context, realising these potential synergies would greatly be conditioned by 
balancing country change processes, which can be effective in reconcile holistically these two 
development objectives into the one unified process of sustainable structural transformation. Such 
holistic development idea can play in downgrading the aforementioned three potential tensions 
and make them rather imaginary. 
 
2.3. Country change processes 
 
This section explores country change processes of socioeconomic and environmental development 
in relation to internal dynamics that could reinforce sustainable development more inclusively 
(Box 2 of Figure 2.1). Understanding such change processes is critical as this could play an active 
role in filtering out development areas that seem not to be salient to national priorities, whilst 
simultaneously contributing to the formulation of national strategies. In this regard, this section 
focuses on the empirical grounds for country change processes, primarily concerned with scientific 
observation through batteries of indicators, with the correlations between them being amenable to 
statistical analysis. 
 
There is a useful reference in this regard, namely the triple bottom line, first coined by John 
Elkington (2018), who contextualises the normative idea of sustainable development into the social, 
environmental and economic value. Referring to this, I wish to examine a three-dimensional 
concept, combining indicators of economic growth, income inequality and environmental 
sustainability with their trade-offs and synergy effects. Specifically, three potentially interacted 
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areas (trinity nexus) in country change processes are: (i) economic growth versus inequality, (ii) 
inequality versus environmental quality and (iii) environmental quality versus economic growth. 




Table 2.1. Literature review on bidirectional causality for the economic growth-inequality-environmental quality nexus 
 
Causality From Inequality to Economic growth From Economic growth to Inequality 
Positive Incentive hypothesis: Income inequality provides incentives for more 
effort in order to gain more, thereby contributing to an engagement in 
a wide range of economic activities on the basis that inequality itself 
can be not only a stimulus for people trying to secure a better education 
and job, but also, act as a source of motivation for entrepreneurs to 
invest more. 
Redistribution with extractive institutions hypothesis: Growth 
causes widening inequality due to an exclusive economic structure ex-
ante, where the top income groups received a substantial portion of 
income from wealth and equity compensation while the situation is 
intensified due to redistribution practices ex-post which were neither 
inclusive nor pro-poor. 
Negative Constraint hypothesis: High-level of inequality cannot provide 
sufficient educational opportunities to the low-income segment of 
society, thereby preventing opportunities for social mobility and 
undermining the efficient allocation of resources, while economic 
growth can be spurred by redistributing capital from rich to credit-
constrained poor. 
Redistribution with inclusive institutions hypothesis: Growth 
provides the impetus for material well-being to mitigate the problem of 
inequality on the basis of inclusive growth process ex-ante and/or 
effective retrospective policies such as fiscal transfers and safety nets 
for redistribution ex-post. 
 
Causality From Environmental quality to Inequality From Inequality to Environmental quality 
Positive Free riding behaviour hypothesis: Free riding behaviour may 
dominate, particularly taking into account the public goods nature of 
the environmental problem. This can be the case for the global 
corrective actions against climate change where the temptation to free 
ride tends to be high among relatively poorer countries, given the fact 
that the poorest half of the world’s population is estimated to be 
responsible for only 10 per cent of carbon emissions in total. 
Willingness to pay hypothesis: Rich people’s behaviour and personal 
choices are more environmentally friendly than those of the poor as the 
rich will be more concerned about the future as their life expectancy is 
longer than that of the poor, thereby being more willing to pay for 
environmental conservation programmes as a result thereof. 
Negative Environmental vulnerability hypothesis: The poor group of a 
population is likely to be exposed to climatic and other hazards as well 
various unexpected disasters and polluted areas, whereas the rich are 
capable of protecting themselves from them. 
Tendency to overexploit hypothesis: The poor group tends to 
overexploit natural capital (often non-renewable resources), while the 
rich group also tends to prefer, often with greater political power, a 
policy that involves exploiting the environment in order to invest the 




Causality From Economic growth to Environmental quality From Environmental quality to Economic growth 
Positive Pollution halo hypothesis: Economic growth supported by foreign 
investors will have positive effects on the environmental quality in the 
host country, because multinational investors are often likely to have 
cleaner technologies underpinned by technology spillover effect. 
Green growth hypothesis: A country can sustain its economic growth 
by doubling its efforts in the use of renewable energy and thus 
environmental protection policy can be a driving force to sustain an 
economy by creating synergies effect with the process of economic 
growth.  
Negative Scale effect hypothesis: The economic growth process could exert 
serious pressure on the environment, particularly carbon dioxide 
emissions, the effect transmitted through trade liberalisation force that 
likely increases economic activity thus energy use. This free trade 
dynamic further influences the mix of a country's production reflected 
by a comparative advantage over others. 
Pollution haven hypothesis: The use of carbon dioxide emissions 
would result in advancing the industrialisation process in a sense that 
an increase in carbon dioxide emissions derived from a lack of 
environmental regulation will attract inward FDI from foreign 
investors who want to avoid costly regulatory compliance.  
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2.3.1. Economic growth versus inequality 
 
In connection with the first nexus in country change processes, the seminal work of Simon Kuznets 
(1955) needs to be revisited. His hypothesis was that there is an inverse relationship between 
economic growth and inequality, which became known as the inverted U-shaped curve or simply 
Kuznets Curve. He argued that inequality is likely to increase initially as industrialisation takes 
hold. These change processes are driven by the transfer of labour from the low-wage, low-
inequality agricultural sector to a relatively high-wage, high-inequality, industrial sector. This 
hypothesis, however, still remains controversial,53, which largely stems from two reasons: the 
existence of four competing schools of thought is one; and the other is related to the different views 
on the direction of causality running from inequality to economic growth, or vice versa. These two 
in question are important as they are greatly influencing the basis for policymakers to target 
effective redistribution of wealth to promote economic growth: trickle-down versus trickle-up 
oriented interventions or other policy options. 
 
Briefly describing the four competing schools of thought, I first present the positive relationship 
advocates,54 who hold that income inequality provides incentives for more effort in order to gain 
more, which implies that inequality in a society is the outcome of the free choice of individuals, 
according to their appetite for risk, or that redistribution depends on the preferences of a society. 
They claim that as a result, inequality will encourage intense competition that will eventually 
stimulate economic growth. This school of thought further insists that inequality may also 
contribute to an engagement in a wide range of economic activities on the basis that inequality 
itself can be not only a stimulus for people trying to secure a better education and job, but also, act 
 
53  Various empirical studies found support for Kuznets’s hypothesis (e.g. Papanek and Kyn, 1986; Chang and 
Ram, 2000), while more recent ones could not provide robust support for the hypothesis (e.g. Barro, 2000; Herzer and 
Vollmer, 2012). Especially, Barro (2000) somewhat agreed that the effect of income inequality is different contingent 
on the state of development. However, by using the panel data, the opposite of the inverted U-curve was found, in that 
inequality in poor nations (defined by per capita GDP below US$ 2,070) retards economic growth, while inequality 
in rich nations (defined by per capita GDP above US$ 2,070) stimulates growth. 
54  e.g. Friedman, 1953; Rebelo, 1991; Deaton and Paxson, 1997; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Partridge, 1997; Li 
and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000; Bell and Freeman, 2001 
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as a source of motivation for entrepreneurs to invest more. According to this line of reasoning, it 
is believed that a society as a whole may be better off with inequality than with equality.  
 
A contrasting school of thought55, on the other hand, argued that the negative impact of inequality 
on economic growth activities inevitably predominates. This school’s view is that inequality 
cannot provide sufficient educational opportunities to the low-income segment of society, thereby 
preventing opportunities for social mobility and eventually hindering the development of human 
capital. In a more comprehensive manner, Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) investigated social 
problems in 23 countries with different levels of economic inequality, and found that the more 
unequal the country was, the worse it performed in various dimensions of society, which 
substantially hinders economic activities. Meanwhile, Berg and Ostry (2013) also identified some 
negative consequences of income inequality through exploring the differences in the sustainability 
of economic growth between Asia and Latin America. They attributed such consequences to the 
difficulty in investing in education for the poor, which would likely result in a middle-income trap. 
In his book, The Great Escape, Angus Deaton (2013), the author of which being awarded the 2015 
Nobel Prize for Economics, also popularised the notion of the negative impact of inequality on 
growth. He acknowledged that inequality may be both a by-product of growth and an incentive for 
growth, but stressed that high levels of inequality could stifle growth when inequality derives from 
rent seeking. In addition, high-levels of inequality could undermine the efficient allocation of 
resources, aggravate corruption, and promote favouritism, as the rich protect their vested interests. 
 
In particular, greater attention should be paid to the study conducted by Bourguignon (2004). In it, 
he supported the negative relationship hypothesis with focus on political economy channels. The 
first channel was explained by the role of credit market that redistributing capital from rich to 
credit-constrained poor contributes to an increased efficiency and investment, ultimately spurring 
economic growth. Embracing the median-voter principle, he also claimed that the more unequal 
societies are, the greater redistribution will be, then such redistribution through taxation distortedly 
 
55  e.g. Stiglitz, 1969; Feldstein and Horioka, 1980; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; 
Clarke, 1995; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Perotti, 1996; de La Croix and Doepke, 2003; 
Bourguignon, 2003; 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Razmi and Ashrafzadeh, 2012; Berg and Ostry, 2013; Lee 
and Son, 2016 
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disincentivises to save and invest, thereby retarding the pace of growth. He further expanded his 
discussion of the inequality-growth nexus into the triangle interaction by incorporating poverty 
dimension into it. His policy emphasis mainly focuses on the goal of reducing poverty in the setting 
of national specific characteristics on the growth-enhancing, inequality-reducing distribution 
policies and their causalities mentioned above. 
 
Meanwhile, a large body of literature in the sphere of the reverse causal relationship running from 
economic growth to inequality56 supports the negative impact by providing empirical evidence 
claiming, in essence, that growth provides the impetus for material well-being to mitigate the 
problem of inequality on the basis of the two conditions: (1) sharing opportunities that generates 
higher job-creating potential in the inclusive growth process ex-ante; and (2) effective 
retrospective policies such as fiscal transfers and safety nets for redistribution ex-post. Such 
desirable phenomenon has been frequently cited by policy advisors, who subscribe to the trickle-
down effect (e.g. Basu and Mallick, 2008; Akinci, 2017). Especially, policymakers who design 
ex-post redistribution mechanism should take into account the three classes of income distributions 
for their fiscal policy mix, that are (a) primary income distribution before tax and subsidies, (b) 
secondary income distribution after deduction of taxes and inclusion of transfer payments, and 
finally (c) tertiary income distribution after taking imputed benefits from public expenditures. If 
not, unequalising force in growth process could predominate in a society, which leads to discussion 
on the final hypothesis. 
 
The literature investigating a positive causality from economic growth to inequality has also 
received a fair amount of attention.57 Rubin and Segal (2015), for instance, observed an upward 
trend in inequality in the United States during the post-war period (1953-2008) and attributed its 
rampant inequality to an exclusive economic structure ex-ante, where the top income groups 
received a substantial portion of income from wealth and equity compensation, both of which are 
sensitive to economic growth. These authors further claimed that the situation arose due to 
 
56  e.g. Psacharopoulos et al., 1995; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000; Kakwani and 
Pernia, 2000; Krongkaew and Kakwani, 2003; Adams, 2004; Basu and Mallick, 2008; Ogün, 2010; Akinci, 2017 
57  e.g. Cutler and Katz, 1991; Blank and Card, 1993; Weriemmi and Ehrhart, 2008; Rubin and Segal, 2015; 
Milanovic, 2016 
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redistribution practices ex-post which were neither inclusive nor pro-poor. Additionally, in his 
influential book, Branko Milanovic (2016) argued that the recent phenomenon of widening 
inequality in wealthy countries, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, can be 
attributed to radical technological advances and labour mobility, underpinned by the effects of 
globalisation. Moreover, he conceptualised such rising inequality as an N-shaped relationship 
between national income per person and inequality, which is also regarded as a ‘second Kuznets 
curve’ or ‘Kuznets waves.’ 
 
In conclusion, these four different theoretical foundations may have caused contrasting or 
sometimes contradicting assertions, which is why no consensus has yet emerged for the economic 
growth-inequality nexus within a country.  
 
2.3.2. Inequality versus environmental quality 
 
The complicated analysis could also apply to the second nexus in country change processes, which 
pertains to the relationship between inequality and environmental quality. The importance of this 
relation has stimulated a large amount of empirical research, but their empirical evidence is 
somewhat dissimilar. Drabo (2011) surveyed 31 econometric-driven studies on this nexus and 
concluded by summarising that 10 studies supported a positive impact of inequality on 
environmental quality and the opposite direction (negative) was found in a further nine, while in 




58  Despite the empirical complexities, some consensus on the negative relationship in the inequality-health 
status nexus has been reached (Mayer and Sarin, 2005) based on four theoretical principles: absolute income 
hypothesis (Khanam, Nghiem and Connelly, 2009); relative income hypothesis (Wilkinson, 1996); psychosocial 
hypothesis (Adamson, Ebrahim and Hunt, 2006); and the neo-materialism hypothesis (Lynch et al., 2000). 
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On the one hand, the negative relationship advocates,59 pioneered by James K. Boyce (1994; 2007), 
contended that widened inequality increases environmental degradation60, because the poor group 
tends to overexploit natural capital (often non-renewable resources). Meanwhile, the rich group 
also tends to prefer a policy that involves exploiting the environment in order to invest the returns 
abroad. Boyce (2007) also sought to integrate political inequality into this hypothesis, arguing that 
rich people are more likely to have political power (in the form of making decisions) over the poor, 
thus tending to gain disproportionate benefits from economic activities at the expense of the 
environment and hence, being in favour of environmentally damaging projects. This hypothesis in 
terms of unequal power dynamics has further been supported by the median-voter principle that 
the greater the inequality the less environmental R&D spending is likely to be (Magnani, 2000) 
and that a smaller pollution tax collection is expected to be set by the majority-elected 
representatives (Marsiliani and Renstrom, 2000). Boyce et al. (1999) examined the interactions 
between power distribution and the environment, with a particular use of data on voter 
participation and found a positive relationship, i.e. greater power inequality is associated with 
greater environmental degradation. 
 
With the aim of linking this nexus to health, Drabo (2011) investigated how environmental quality 
can be considered a mechanism through which inequality affects health. The findings showed that 
there is a negative causality running from inequality to health, while such negative consequences 
can be mitigated by institutional effectiveness. Drabo’s findings are somewhat consistent with 
more recent empirical research conducted by Markandya et al. (2018), whose modelling results 
showed that low carbon policy intervention can strongly be associated with health benefits for both 
rich and poor. Compared to other countries, the net benefits are larger for India and China. 
 
 
59  e.g. Boyce, 1994; 2007; Torras and Boyce, 1998; Magnani, 2000; Marsiliani and Renstrom, 2000; Dorling, 
Barford and Wheeler, 2007; Drabo, 2011; Laurent, 2014 
60  There have been various measures of environmental quality examined to support negative casualty. As a 
proxy indicator, biodiversity has been greatly used to explore a causal relation between economic inequality and 
biodiversity loss (e.g. measured by the portion of species threatened) (Holland, Peterson and Gonzalez, 2009). 
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There have been, on the other hand, strong opponents who believe that inequality can 
accommodate environmental protection measures. 61  This school of thought has particularly 
adopted the perspective that rich people’s behaviour and personal choices (the way of consumption 
and the use of renewable energy) are more environmentally friendly than those of the poor. Under 
this assumption, this school contends that if rich people were to take a unit of income from the 
poor, the demand for environmental conservation will increase (Hökby and Söderqvist, 2003; 
Baumol and Oates, 2012). This line of reasoning is also consistent with the logic that the rich will 
be more concerned about the future as their life expectancy is longer than that of the poor, thereby 
being more willing to pay for environmental conservation programmes as a result thereof (Scruggs, 
1998). In addition, the concept of the ‘marginal propensity to emit’ was introduced by Ravallion, 
Heil and Jalan (2000), who insisted that the poorest would have a higher albeit marginal propensity 
to emit than the wealthiest, because a low-emission good requiring high technology is likely to be 
expensive and thus, highly likely to be consumed by the rich group rather than the poor. 
 
Reverse causality also exists in the sense that an environmental crisis (or environmentally 
unsustainable growth) in itself increases inequality. Arguably, the poor group of a population is 
likely to be exposed to climatic and other hazards as well various unexpected disasters and polluted 
areas.62 That is, the poor are vulnerable to environmental risks, whereas the rich are capable of 
protecting themselves from them. Admitting this reasoning would further imply some vicious 
circle of environmental vulnerability that could have a significant impact on the social exclusion 
or social marginalisation of the poor. In fact, the relationships between the environment and 
poverty have been the one of the most attractive research topics since the adoption of 2030 Agenda 
and the Paris Agreement in 2015, both of which particularly prioritise the impact analysis from 
climate change on social development dynamics. Narloch and Bangalore (2018) studied its 
multifaceted relationship using the combination of geo-spatial data and household survey in 
Vietnam and their empirical results clearly showed that poorer households are confronting greater 
environmental risks although to varying degree between rural and urban areas. This is fairly 
consistent with the study conducted by Scott (2006) who further brought the dimension of children 
 
61  e.g. Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Scruggs, 1998; Ravallion, Heil and Jalan, 2000; Heering, Mulatu and 
Bulte, 2001; Hökby and Söderqvist, 2003; Baumol and Oates, 2012 
62  e.g. Dasgupta and Maler, 1995; Scott, 2006; Barbier, 2012; Stewart, 2014; Narloch and Bangalore, 2018 
54 
into the table. Her main argument was that the concept of the environment should be defined as 
beyond bio-physical setting in a sense that people are associated with each other and their 
surroundings. In this context, the chronically poor group who tend to be highly relied on access to 
natural resources for their lives are most exposed to environmental changes where most of whom 
likely pass on their environmental vulnerability to their children. 
 
However, this negative relationship running from the environmental quality to inequality (the 
resilience capability hypothesis) is not always the case when applying the logic of the tendency to 
overexploit hypothesis, albeit in a reverse direction, into it. Such tendency regardless of the poor 
or the rich may be intensified especially when more natural resources available to be converted 
into capital are in place. Relative to the poor group, the rich could be able to do the conversion 
activities (from the environment to capital) massively by superior capability of seeking economies 
of scale in exploitation or extraction. Free riding behaviour may dominate in this circumstance, 
particularly taking into account the public goods nature of the environmental problem.63 The line 
of reasoning could be expanded further to the global corrective actions against climate change 
where the temptation to free ride tends to be high among relatively poorer countries (Aggarwal 
and Dupont, 2005), given the fact that the poorest half of the world’s population is estimated to be 
responsible for only 10 per cent of carbon emissions in total, according to an Oxfam report (2015). 
 
2.3.3. Environmental quality versus economic growth 
 
Like the above two, the third nexus in country change processes could also be explored under four 
conflicting hypotheses.64 First, there is the scale effect hypothesis, under which it is contended that 
the economic growth process could exert serious pressure on the environment, particularly carbon 
dioxide emissions.65 In this school of thought, this effect can most be transmitted through trade 
 
63  e.g. Whitten and Bennett, 1999; Aggarwal and Dupont, 2005; Barrett, 2007; Carbone, 2007 
64  It should also be noted that there have been a number of empirical studies that find no significant relationship 
between economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions (e.g. Soytas et al., 2007; Zhang and Cheng, 2009; Salahuddin 
and Gow, 2014). 
65  e.g. Jalil and Mahmud, 2009; Lotfalipour et al., 2010; Hamit-Haggar, 2012; Kohler, 2013; Ozturk and 
Acaravci, 2013; Hwang and Yoo, 2014; Kivyiro and Arminen, 2014 
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liberalisation force that likely increases economic activity thus energy use. This free trade dynamic 
further influences the mix of a country’s production reflected by a comparative advantage over 
others, which in turn reshapes a country’s energy mix. Considering this hypothesis, Kivyiro and 
Arminen (2014) and many other scholars (e.g. Lotfalipour et al., 2010; Hamit-Haggar, 2012; 
Ozturk and Acaravci, 2013; Hwang and Yoo, 2014) have investigated the causal links between 
carbon dioxide emissions and economic development, widely employing the Granger causality-
based error correction model approach. The majority of these studies have provided empirical 
support of statistically significant positive causality running from economic growth to carbon 
dioxide emissions (in other words, negative impact of economic growth on environmental quality), 
while also recognising that causality relationships vary greatly between countries.  
 
There have been, on the other hand, studies claiming a reverse causality running from 
environmental pollution to economic growth, such that the use of carbon dioxide emissions would 
result in advancing the industrialisation process, which has been termed the pollution haven 
hypothesis.66 The hypothesis is based on the economic logic that an increase in carbon dioxide 
emissions derived from a lack of environmental regulation will attract inward FDI from foreign 
investors who want to avoid costly regulatory compliance. For instance, Al-mulali et al. (2013) 
studied the long run relationship between growth and carbon emissions in Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, where they found 60 per cent of the tested countries had a positive bi-
directional long run association, whilst recognising that the other 40 per cent delivered mixed 
results. Similarly, Xue et al. (2014) examined the relationship between carbon dioxide emissions 
and the economic growth of nine European countries, based on the Granger causality test and risk 
analysis on the impacts of the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions on growth. They found strong 
negative causality from the level of emissions to growth performance in all the tested countries 
and perhaps more importantly, their results indicated that the impact of emission reduction on 
growth varies by country, which further confirms that the sign and direction of causality depends 
on each country’s experience in terms of growth and the sectoral composition of growth. 
Regarding which, the greatest negative impact is observed in Italy, followed by Portugal, whilst 
the lowest impact is estimated in Sweden as well as the United Kingdom. 
 
66  e.g. Dietzenbacher and Mukhopadhyay, 2007; Menyah and Wolde-Rufael, 2010; Pao and Tsai, 2010; Azlina 
and Mustapha, 2012; Al-mulali et al., 2013; Xue et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2018 
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Meanwhile, the win-win advocates have put forward strong enough evidence to make an important 
contribution to the environmental development discourse. Within this school of thought, there are 
two hypotheses: the green growth hypothesis and the pollution halo hypothesis.  
 
The former is associated with the green economy, whereby a country could sustain its growth by 
doubling its efforts in the use of renewable energy and thus environmental protection policy can 
be a driving force to sustain an economy by creating synergies effect with the process of economic 
growth. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is notably leading such Green 
Economy Initiative to inform the optimal pathway towards environmentally sustainable 
development (UNEP, 2011) with the introduction of an environment mainstreaming toolkit, 
namely the Integrated Green Economy Modelling Framework (IGEMF) (Partnership for Action 
on Green Economy, 2017), followed by the Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) 
introduced from OECD (2019), among others. In an empirical front, Lim, Lim and Yoo (2014) 
examined the short- and long-run causality between carbon emissions and economic growth in the 
Philippines for the period 1965-2012 and concluded that economic growth continues without an 
increase in carbon emissions, based on identified uni-directional causality running from emissions 
to growth. Moreover, Sebri and Ben-Salha (2014) investigated the causal orientation between 
growth and renewable energy in the BRICS countries over the period 1971-2010. Their empirical 
results imply a bi-directional Granger causality between the two and the important role of 
renewable energy in sustaining growth. 
 
Under the latter perspective, 67  it is pointed out that economic growth supported by foreign 
investors will have positive effects on the environmental quality in the host country, because 
multinational investors are often likely to have cleaner technologies, which can be referred to the 
halo effect. The school of thought further claims that foreign firms would transfer the renewable 
technologies to local ones, underpinned by technology spillover effect. This has been the case 
especially for developing countries to which green technologies from advanced nations were 
transferred (Golub et al., 2011), while Eskeland and Harrison (2003) empirically supported this 
 
67  e.g. Ozturk and Acaravci, 2010; Bhattacharjee and Iftikhar, 2011; Pao and Tsai, 2011; Arouri et al., 2012; 
Lim, Lim and Yoo, 2014 
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hypothesis that investment by the United States to several developing countries was accompanied 
mostly by energy efficient and clean technologies. In a broader sense, Pao and Tsai (2011) applied 
the cointegration and causality tests for this relationship in Russia and found that, in the long-run, 
emissions appear to be output inelastic, such that output tends to have a negative impact on 
emissions. Particularly, the most recent empirical study on this theme is worthy of our critical 
review, which was conducted by Ike, Usman and Sarkodie (2020). Employing the Method of 
Moments Quantile Regression with fixed effects, they investigated the effect of oil production 
dynamics on carbon emissions over the period 1980-2010. What they found was that an increased 
oil production is associated with greater level of carbon emissions with strong effect at the lowest 
quantile while only marginal effect at the highest quantile. More interestingly, electricity 
production level appears to increase the emission level while trade likely condenses greenhouse 
emissions across all the quantiles. This final point firmly validates the pollution halo hypothesis 
for oil producing countries. 
 
2.3.4. Interactions between country change processes and normative frameworks 
 
What is the goal of analysis of the trinity nexus? First, in theoretical domain, the new wave of the 
Kuznets Curve or N-shaped relationship between national income per person and inequality, which 
is also regarded as a ‘second Kuznets curve’ or ‘Kuznets waves’ could be further explored based 
on embracing the four competing schools of thought. Similarly, the EKC could also be explained 
by the application of the pollution haven hypothesis and/or scale effect hypothesis for the first half 
of the conceptual time period and of the green growth hypothesis and/or pollution halo hypothesis 
for the second half. In particular, country change processes of the environment versus inequality 
have received relatively less theoretical attention in past literature. In this regard, my hypotheses 
of the tendency to overexploit and resilience capability as well as the willingness to pay and free 
riding behaviour could be used as a basis for extended Kuznets curves. In other words, the Kuznets 
Curve hypothesis (of both the growth-inequality and the growth-environment interactions) could 
be augmented by incorporating the theoretical reviews undertaken in this chapter, while a new 
hypothetical curve on the basis of the environment-inequality nexus could be advanced, which are 
both visualised in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2. Augmented Kuznets Curve hypotheses 
 
 
Another biggest policy implication is that such analysis could shed light on potential tensions 
between the three dimensions of sustainable development and the need for policy consideration of 
such tensions by national institutions and actors. Hence, this interaction analysis could provide 
very useful information when mainstreaming into the national development framework the global 
view of the 2030 Agenda that has located economic, social and environmental sustainability at the 
heart of the development process. For instance, the existing institutional planning architecture that 
was designed in accord with the traditionally prioritised national strategy—grow first and clean 
up later—would be revised with an improved national framework that would allow countries not 
only to achieve accelerated growth, but also ensure that such growth is inclusive and avoids or 
minimises environmental degradation.  
 
Understanding the trinity nexus in country change processes can be a basis for exploring an untold 
story in the contemporary policy mix for sustainability transitions, which many developing 
countries are being confronted with, i.e. Is it feasible simultaneously to achieve economic, social 
and environmental sustainability in the course of structural transformation? and How can there 
be a balance between trade-offs and synergies among economic, social and environmental aspects? 
Unfolding such a story would allow us to assess further how country change processes can filter 
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The question is then about ‘how to filter out.’ In a conceptual sense, country change processes 
influence national development strategies through individuals and institutions who could play an 
active role in deprioritising development areas that seem not to be salient to national development 
goals. The influential individuals, for instance, through government policies and collective action, 
create new change processes according to the creation of ideas for change. Hence, the ideas of 
major actors or individuals, followed by the formation of a reform discourse, play a mediating role 
for creating new institutional changes. Often, the formation of a new institution then weakens the 
legitimacy of the existing change processes and as a result, institutional change can take place.68 
 
A mutual relationship between institutions and actors also plays a key determining role. That is, 
institutions and actors could be perceived to exist on the premise of working with each other (i.e. 
dualism), and not separately (Giddens, 1979). Under this perspective, institutions are therefore not 
separate from human actors. This is especially so in the transition period (of setting national 
development strategies), when the existing change processes are collapsing, and new ones are 
having to be created. It is also recognised that the ideas and actions of major actors are all very 
important within given constraints, namely the path-dependence feature (Campbell, 2004). 
 
In short, country change processes drive adaptive change in national development strategies 
through institutions and actors. The change processes then contribute to the ongoing ones of 
designing an appropriate set of socioeconomic and environmental policies that are conducive to 
sustainable structural transformation. Yet, there is additional layer that influences both Boxes 1 
and 2 set out in the ISD framework. The next section is thus placed to explain how to fill this gap. 
 
2.4. Exogenous drivers of change 
 
I now move on to discussing some of important exogenous drivers of change (Box 3) that 
significantly affect both normative framework and country change processes. Whilst so many 
impacting drivers could be identified, I wish to, given the aforementioned scope of the thesis, 
centre upon (g) global debates on development strategies and (h) global process of technological 
 
68  e.g. Bleich (2002), Campbell (2004), Anderson (2008), Béland (2009) 
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change. They are initially seen from a relatively global dimension, thus being exogenous to country 
change processes and to normative development frameworks and strategies. They are not, however, 
significantly affected by country change processes nor development frameworks and strategies of 
individual countries or governments of (small) low-income countries. Additionally, (i) initial 
socioeconomic conditions of a national context need to be considered as the third driver 
exogenously influencing country change processes and these are discussed before proceeding with 
presentation of the four research chapters. 
 
2.4.1. Global debates on development strategies 
 
In response to the countervailing trends facing most developing countries (discussed in Chapter 1), 
a majority of them have attempted to identify new development thinking, that is, structural 
transformation as a development priority in their national development plans. In 2015, the adoption 
of the 2030 Agenda by the UN General Assembly refocused global attention on the centrality of 
structural transformation to be integrated into the SDGs. The normative framework in this regard 
declares: 
 
“strengthen the productive capacities of least developed countries in all sectors, 
including through structural transformation…adopt policies which increase 
productive capacities, productivity and productive employment; financial inclusion; 
sustainable agriculture, pastoralist and fisheries development; sustainable industrial 
development; universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy 
services; sustainable transport systems; and quality and resilient infrastructure” (UN, 
2015, para 27). 
 
Greatly influenced by this global debate over development aspiration, a normative development 
framework is set and then, adopted by national governments to inform country specific 
development strategies. In essence, the normative framework could provide the range of strategic 
options open to individual country governments. Governments are then taken to have freedom to 
choose between those informed by a normative vision that gives priority to structural 
transformation, and one that seeks to have a balance between economic growth (or prosperity), 
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inequality reduction and environmental sustainability. Alternatively, governments decide to 
integrate the two, which would highly depend on their national contexts.69 
 
Against this backdrop, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and identification of a structural 
transformation agenda as a national priority clearly influences country change processes by 
reinforcing all the responsible and accountable governments and other actors to design more 
effective policymaking and institutions to promote their own development priority. Responding to 
the global force of sustainable development at the national level requires an integrated approach 
to the process of development that simultaneously addresses the multi-dimensions of sustainable 
development by various institutions and policy settings. This implies a need to break institutional 
silos, thus strengthening sectoral (i.e. horizontal) and sub-national (i.e. vertical) coordination 
within and among implementing entities.70 
 
2.4.2. Global process of technological change 
 
The second driver of change is associated with technological possibilities. This can be justified on 
the grounds that it facilitates structural transformation through its effect on productivity of the 
labour force, clean consumption and production processes for environmental conservation. Many 
empirical studies have found that structural transformation is largely driven by the adoption of 
capital-embodied technology (Caunedo, Jaume and Keller, 2018) and that technology promotes 
inclusive development via the diffusion of information and knowledge,71 while minimising the 
 
69  e.g. socioeconomic and environmental conditions and development priorities as well as national institutions 
(largely influenced by the mechanism of path-dependence). 
70  There are potential tensions between SDGs implementing institutions: Economic growth strategies tend to 
be prioritised by the Ministries of Finance, of Economy and of Trade, while social inclusion is most likely pursued by 
the Ministries of Labour and of Welfare, and environmental policies are primarily considered by the Ministries of the 
Environment, of Water, and of Fisheries. 
71  There is a growing awareness that the role of knowledge is critical for economic growth, especially in today’s 
global marketplace. Driouchi, Azelmad and Anders (2006) conducted an empirical investigation into the effects of 
knowledge on economic performance using data of 1995-2001 for several groups of countries: Group of Seven and 
Europe; South and East Asia; Latin America; Middle East and North Africa; and developing countries. The results 
from their modelling exercise are consistent with the prevalent viewpoint that knowledge is an essential driver of 
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potential negative effect of environmental degradation on human development.72 Other empirical 
studies, notably one conducted by Freeman (2015), have further provided evidence that 
technological change decreases the share of labour income, given that national income is split 
between the capital share of income and the labour share of income. As such, since capital is more 
unequally distributed, a higher capital share (i.e. investment in technology) means higher 
inequality. Moreover, robotisation and automation will further reduce labour’s share leading to 
more inequality. 
 
However, there have been two competing views on whether technology should be considered 
exogenous or endogenous to country change processes. One of the most influential works that 
distinguished the technological effects from country change processes is that of Robert Solow 
(1956). His empirical results showed that per capita GDP in the United States doubled from the 
early 1900s to the 1950s, and that the effect of capital on such growth was only 12.5 per cent, 
while the remaining 87.5 per cent was derived from technological change. That his study treated 
technology exogenously would lead to the conclusion that long-term equilibrium growth should 
also be determined outside the economic system. Such an exogeneity assumption was criticised 
notably by Arrow (1962)73 and Romer (1990)74, who introduced the endogenous growth model 
 
growth for all the groups tested. In particular, the results also explain the importance of the timing of investment in 
education and R&D as well as policy interventions for trade and FDI. 
72  e.g. Driouchi, Azelmad and Anders (2006), Chang and Baek (2010), Asongu (2016), Asongu, le Roux and 
Biekpe (2018) 
73  Arrow emphasised that, unlike products that cannot generally be used with other people (i.e. rivalry), 
knowledge does not compete with that of others (i.e. non-rival). However, the fact that knowledge is regarded as such 
does not mean that everyone can use it. Some knowledge can be excludable (i.e. excludability), depending on the legal 
and institutional apparatuses. Accordingly, most of the knowledge accumulated by R&D is highly likely to be 
excludable, thus tending to ensure high returns. Knowledge accumulation is also undertaken in everyday life through 
the learning by doing mechanism, and thus, technological advances based on these learning effects are caused by 
internal dynamic factors within the economy. 
74  Romer demonstrated that there is a mechanism for achieving technological progress within the economy 
without an exogenous technological impact. He argued that endogenous technological progress can be achieved in an 
economy through investment in technology, knowledge accumulation, and technology diffusion. Hence, under this 
theory, the role of R&D as an essential economic activity that can bring technological progress is emphasised. It is 
further asserted that in countries where the level of technology advancement is poor, technology adoption or spillover 
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(with possibilities through the national dynamics of the labour force and the accumulation of 
knowledge, innovation and human capital), after having been involved in the competing discourses 
on a link of exogeneity versus endogeneity of technological change affecting country change 
processes.75 
 
Reflecting the set scope of this thesis, endogenising the technological effect can be difficult for 
low-income countries, compared to advanced nations. Hence, in this study, the focus is narrowed 
to the case where global debate on technological change is the source of some of the most profound 
exogenous shocks through the diffusion of innovation and technology transfer from outside a 
country’s borders. It could thus reshape the policymaking orientation by being promptly adopted 
from outside in order to improve labour productivity, which would further restructure the national 
division of labour. 
 
2.4.3. Initial socioeconomic conditions 
 
With respect to the third exogenous driver of change, initial socioeconomic conditions are arguably 
so. Linking to the above discussion on the premise of institutions and their change processes, this 
driver is interpreted as a country heterogeneity largely shaped by the features of path dependency. 
For example, in the colonised nations of Africa and Latin America, where natural resources were 
 
from the outside can also be a major driver for growth. However, it will be impossible for these countries to connect 
such technology to their economic growth without underlying human capital. Such capital needs to be accumulated 
so that existing knowledge can effectively be utilised. It can further create new knowledge and innovation based on 
existing knowledge, thereby enabling productivity improvement, which is a clear stimulus for growth. 
75  Stokey (1998) emphasised the exogenous role of technical change for environmentally sustainable growth, 
while Aghion and Howitt (1998) claimed that exogenously imposed externalities cannot be the central reason for 
sustainable development. However, the assumption found in these two competing studies in that the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of consumption should be greater than one in order to attain a sustainable pace of growth in the models 
has been criticised by Lopez, Anriquez and Gulati (2007). Furthermore, there have been several empirical attempts to 
model sustainable development with a focus on: endogenous growth model in a two-sector small open economy 
(Eliasson and Turnovsky, 2004); learning-by-doing externalities under well-defined versus ill-defined property rights 
(McAusland, 2005); and optimal endogenous growth with exhaustible resources (Aseev and Kryazhimskii, 2007), 
among others. 
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abundant and climatic conditions were favourable for growing crops, but not for European 
settlement, the colonisers established extractive institutions to benefit their citizens back home 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In particular, in Latin America, where a large number of slaves 
were deployed, conditions were ripe for establishing plantations, which generated extreme 
inequalities in terms of wealth, capital and political power (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). That 
is, these types of institutions were associated with limited economic growth and social exclusion 
leading to significant levels of inequality in these regions. In contrast, in countries where the 
colonisers (i.e. mostly European settlers and their descendants) established institutions that 
promoted property rights for the majority, in the likes of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States, some inclusiveness can be seen in their change processes. In this context, improving 
institutions that enable the right frameworks is essential for promoting inclusive sustainable 
development, where all stakeholders and actors deliver on shared responsibility to make sure that 





















3. Inequality and economic growth interactions76 
 
PREFACE 
Within the ISD framework set out in Chapter 2, full analysis of the relationship between 
sustainable development and structural transformation entails addressing the bi-directional 
causation between the three components of sustainable development. An intermediate step 
towards this is to revisit the issue of economic inequality and growth interactions. This 
component of the research illustrates the complexity of the larger project of the relationship 
between all three dimensions of sustainable development and structural transformation. 
 
The question of how to achieve inclusive structural transformation sits at the forefront of the 
current public policy agenda. For example, it was the main theme of the 2017 UN high-level 
political forum on sustainable development, ‘Eradicating Poverty and Promoting Prosperity in 
a Changing World’ and of the 2017 ‘Africa Regional Forum on Sustainable Development, 
Ensuring Inclusive and Sustainable Growth and Prosperity for All.’ Discussions in these 
political fora were largely based on individual country experiences, including, the recent 
phenomenon of widening inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom (Milanovic, 
2016).77  A substantial number of developing countries have also suffered from widening 
inequality despite a decade of strong growth.  
 
 
76  The title of my published book chapter, “Stylised facts of the changing Inequality-Growth landscape” is 
revised to a more parsimonious one. 
77  Milanovic employed the scattergram analysis of a Gini of disposable per capita income and per capita GDP 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. The scattergram shows that in the United States the Gini index has 
increased constantly from 0.33 to 0.43 since 1960s, as per capita GDP has grown, while in the United Kingdom the 
index has also gone up from 0.27 to 0.38 since 1978. 
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According to the Gini coefficient over the period 2000-2009, on average, Latin America and 
Africa registered 0.522 and 0.439, while Asia, North America and Europe recorded 0.375, 
0.367 and 0.325, respectively (AfDB, 2012). In 2010, six out of the ten most unequal countries 
worldwide were in Africa (Armah et al., 2014). Such high levels of inequality have been proven 
to be less poverty-reducing as the benefits of growth accrue to fewer individuals, hence the 
slower-than-anticipated pace of poverty reduction in the region (ECA et al., 2016). This 
seriously raised doubts about the sustainability of the development trajectories in many 
developing countries. 
 
Against this backdrop, there has been a vast amount of research on the economic growth and 
inequality relationship, along all four of the strands mentioned in Chapter 2. Most have, 
however, focused on the quantitative study of one or a few countries. Some studies78 with 
extensive coverage of countries using a panel data approach have attempted to generalise, but 
these have often yielded ambiguous (mixed or nonlinear) results (Chang, Gupta and Miller, 
2018). There have also been a few attempts to investigate two-way causality on a large set of 
countries. 
 
Very few studies have taken into account the distinction between the long- and short-run 
associations, and the existence of multiple transmission channels (either beneficial or harmful) 
linking the two indicators, or variation in the speed of transmission (Halter, Oechslin and 
Zweimüller, 2014). Regarding which, some inequality-as-enabling mechanisms on growth tend 
to set in quickly, e.g. aggregate saving (Kaldor, 1956), thus stimulating R&D (Foellmi and 
Zweimüller, 2006), whilst some negative transmissions can be rather slow, e.g. expensive fiscal 
policies (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994), thus delaying human capital formation (Galor and Moav, 
2004). 
 
Furthermore, the consequences of inequality for growth may differ depending on the size of the 
economy (Lee and Son, 2016), further accentuating country-level heterogeneity (Rubil, 2015). 
 
78  e.g. Deininger and Squire (1996), Barro (2000), Chen (2003), Galbraith and Kum (2005), Castelló-Climent 
(2010), Jihène and Ghazi (2013) 
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Of the many empirical attempts, Galbraith and Kum (2005) stands out for producing evidence 
to support the hypothesis that inequality is likely to reduce as income level increases, in general, 
but the reverse relationship is observed in many rich countries. More evidence of heterogeneity 
between different income groups and regions is that countries in Latin America and Africa have 
experienced the process of structural transformation, accompanied by widening inequality. 
Their transformation trends clearly differentiate them from the development trajectories of the 
four Asian Tigers (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), which have achieved 
rapid growth, while also maintaining a manageable level of inequality (Sachs and Warner, 
1997; Parente, 2001). Whilst these national (or income grouping) factors have been identified 
by some in the literature, no one has yet incorporated them together with the above two 
academic challenges in mind. 
 
The inequality-growth nexus thus deserves a careful revisit. To this end, in Chapter 3, Granger 
causality tests are employed to examine such interactions, contributing to the existing literature 
by addressing three critical research gaps: the complexity of causality (Chang, Gupta and 
Miller, 2018); the neglected time dimension (Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller, 2014); and 
country or regional heterogeneity (Rubil, 2015; Lee and Son, 2016). Hence, Chapter 3 
addresses the first two sub-questions, “Is the inequality-growth nexus dominated by long-run 
or short-run relationships, and one-way or two-way causal relations?” and “What is the 
historical and empirical relationship between inequality and growth at the country level?” 
 
Answering these two questions feeds theoretically into the comprehensive framework for 
thinking about the ISD framework and its systematic flows: (1) how complex country change 
processes of inclusive sustainable development are as one of the three important potential 
tensions; (2) whether inequality-reducing policy dynamics (country change processes in Box 
2) can be influenced by the institutional feature of path-dependence (initial conditions in Box 
3); and (3) how economic growth interventions (national development strategies in Box 1) 
interact with distribution of income (country change processes in Box 2), although to varying 





In the policy arena, inequality and growth sit at the forefront of a state’s agenda in many countries 
around the world largely because the raison d’être of the modern state is to succeed in attaining 
sustainable economic growth while reducing inequalities. The origin of the Inequality-Growth 
nexus can be traced back to Simon Kuznets (1955) who systematically discussed inequality in the 
course of modernisation. His hypothesis was that there is an inverse relationship between 
inequality and development, which became known as the Inverted U-Curve. Since then, 
investigation on the Inequality-Growth nexus has been of great interest not only to economists but 
also to the field of social science in general. 
 
According to Kuznets’s seminal work, at very low levels of income, inequality must also be low, 
particularly in rural areas, while a little bit higher in urban areas. However, on the whole, most live 
within a reasonable subsistence level. As the process of growth begins, the path to economic 
inequality is driven by changes in sectoral structure. Income inequality increases as people migrate 
from a relatively equal low-income rural sector towards a relatively unequal urban sector that 
offers higher wages. This migration is in line with the transition from a traditional agricultural 
sector to a modern industrial one. Once the majority of the labour force is found in an industry or 
service sector in an urban area, then further movement results in a decrease in income inequality 
as the rural–urban divide becomes less influential. Therefore, the average per capita income 
increases further and income inequality within urban sector remains. 
 
Such prime explanations have motivated a vast amount of empirical research over the past decades 
mainly looking for the Inverted U-Curve within and across countries. Various empirical studies 
found support for Kuznets’s hypothesis (Papanek and Kyn, 1986; Chang and Ram, 2000), while 
more recent studies could not provide robust support for the hypothesis (Barro 2000; Herzer and 
Vollmer, 2012). In particular, Barro (2000) somewhat agreed that the effect of income inequality 
is different contingent on the state of development. However, by using the panel data, the opposite 
of the Inverted U-Curve was found, in that inequality in poor nations (defined by PCGDP below 
US$2070) retards economic growth, while inequality in rich nations (defined by PCGDP above 
US$2070) stimulates growth. 
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The fundamental issues on whether or not to support Kuznets’s hypothesis stem from two reasons. 
The first reason is the existence of two competing schools of thought on the relationship between 
income inequality and growth performance. Meanwhile, different views on the direction of 
causality running from inequality to growth or vice versa is another. Indeed, exploring either the 
positive or negative associationship between the two dimensions is critical when analysing 
whether or not countries may face trade-offs or synergies between inequality and growth. This 
should provide the basis for policymakers to target an effective (re)distribution of wealth to 
promote growth, Trickle-Down or Trickle-Up–oriented interventions79, which depend significantly 
on the causal orientations. These two issues are explored in more detail by reviewing past 
literatures in the next section. 
 
3.2. Literature review 
 
One school of thought 80  holds that the positive relationship between inequality and growth 
predominates over society. According to this idea, income inequality provides incentives for more 
effort in order to gain more, which implies that inequality in a society is the outcome of the free 
choice of individuals according to their appetite for risk, or that distribution depends on the 
preferences of a society. As a result, inequality would encourage intense competition that would 
eventually stimulate growth. This school further insists that inequality may also contribute to an 
engagement in a wide range of economic activities on the basis that inequality itself can be not 
only a stimulus for people trying to secure a better education and job but also, act as a source of 
 
79  Trickle-Down refers to the policy stance that reduces taxes on businesses as a means to stimulate business 
investment, ultimately, in the longer-term benefitting society as a whole. On the other hand, Trickle-Up can be defined 
as the policy effect in which economic growth is best realised by lowering taxes on the (lower) middle class who is 
likely to demand for more goods and services (demand-led growth). Examples are: “broad-based personal income tax” 
intervention that is designed to impose wealthier to pay a greater share of income in taxes than those are less well off 
(Davis and Buffie, 2017); and “pro-poor indirect tax” that is designed to increase taxations on transport while 
decreasing one for food or energy in Mexico (Duclos, Makdissi and Araar, 2013)  
80  For example, Friedman (1953), Rebelo (1991), Deaton and Paxson (1997), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), 
Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), and Bell and Freeman (2001). 
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motivation for entrepreneurs to invest more. According to this line of reasoning, this school of 
thought believes that a society as a whole may be better off with inequality than with equality. 
 
A contrasting school of thought,81 on the other hand, argues that the negative impact of inequality 
on growth activities inevitably predominates. Here, the view is that inequality cannot provide 
sufficient educational opportunities to the low-income segment of society, thereby preventing 
opportunities for social mobility and eventually hindering the development of human capital. In a 
more comprehensive manner, Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) investigated social problems in 23 
countries with different levels of economic inequality and found that the more unequal the country 
was, the worse it performed in various dimensions of society, which substantially hinders 
economic activities. Meanwhile, Berg and Ostry (2013) also identified some negative 
consequences of income inequality through exploring the differences in the sustainability of 
economic growth between Asia and Latin America. They attributed such consequences to the 
difficulty in investing in education for the poor, which would likely result in a Middle-Income 
Trap. In his book, The Great Escape by Angus Deaton (2013) has greatly popularised the idea of 
the negative function of inequality, the author of which being awarded the 2015 Nobel Prize for 
Economics. He acknowledged that inequality may be both a by-product of growth and an incentive 
for growth, but stressed that high levels of inequality could stifle growth when inequality derives 
from rent seeking. In addition, high-levels of inequality could undermine the efficient allocation 
of resources, aggravate corruption, and promote favouritism, as the rich protect their vested 
interests. 
 
In particular, greater attention should be paid to the study conducted by Bourguignon (2004). In it, 
he supported the negative relationship hypothesis with focus on political economy channels. The 
first channel was explained by the role of credit market that redistributing capital from rich to 
credit-constrained poor contributes to an increased efficiency and investment, ultimately spurring 
economic growth. Embracing the median-voter principle, he also claimed that the more unequal 
 
81  For example, Stiglitz (1969), Feldstein and Horioka (1980), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), Clarke (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Benabou (1996), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Perotti (1996), 
De La Croix and Doepke (2003), Bourguignon (2003; 2004), Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), Razmi and Ashrafzadeh 
(2012), Berg and Ostry (2013), and Lee and Son (2016). 
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societies are, the greater redistribution will be, then such redistribution through taxation distortedly 
disincentivises to save and invest, thereby retarding the pace of growth. He further expanded his 
discussion of the inequality-growth nexus into the triangle interaction by incorporating poverty 
dimension into it. His policy emphasis mainly focuses on the goal of reducing poverty in the setting 
of national specific characteristics on the growth-enhancing, inequality-reducing distribution 
policies and their causalities mentioned above. 
 
These two competing views are based on a discussion of the effects of inequality on economic 
growth. I now turn the focus to the causation running from growth to inequality. A large body of 
literature 82  in the sphere of the reverse causal relationship supports the negative impact by 
outlining empirical evidence claiming, in essence, that growth provides the impetus for material 
wellbeing to actually mitigate the problem of inequality on the basis of the two conditions: (1) 
sharing opportunities that generates higher job-creating potential in the inclusive growth process 
ex-ante; and (2) effective retrospective policies such as fiscal transfers and safety nets for 
redistribution ex-post. Such desirable phenomenon has been frequently cited by policy advisors 
who subscribe to the trickle-down effect (Basu and Mallick, 2008; Akinci, 2017) and a pro-poor 
growth intervention that is associated with increasing incomes and employment opportunities for 
the poorer segments of the population (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000). 
 
The literature investigating a positive causality from growth to inequality has also received a fair 
amount of attention.83 Rubin and Segal (2015) observed an upward trend in inequality by focusing 
on the United States during the post-war period (1953–2008) and attributed its rampant inequality 
to a distorted economic structure where the top income groups receive a substantial portion of 
income from wealth and equity compensation, both of which are sensitive to economic growth. 
These authors further claimed that the situation arose due to ineffective redistribution practices ex-
post, which were neither inclusive nor pro-poor. Similarly, in his influential book, Branko 
 
82  For example, Psacharopoulos et al. (1995), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Bruno et al. 1998), De Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2000), Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Krongkaew and Kakwani (2003), Adams (2004), Heltberg (2004), 
Ravallion (2007), Basu and Mallick (2008), Ogun (2010), Ostry et al. 2014, and Akinci (2017). 
83  For example, Cutler and Katz (1991), Blank and Card (1993), Weriemmi and Ehrhart (2008), and Rubin and 
Segal (2015). 
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Milanovic (2016) argued that the recent phenomenon of widening inequality in wealthy countries, 
especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, could be attributed to radical 
technological advances and labour mobility, underpinned by the effects of globalisation. Moreover, 
he conceptualised such rising inequality as an N-shaped relationship between national income per 
person and inequality, which is also regarded as a Second Kuznets Curve or Kuznets Waves. 
 
These four different theoretical foundations may have caused contrasting or sometimes 
contradicting assertions, which is why no consensus has yet emerged for the Inequality-Growth 
nexus in the historical process of development. Given the existence of the four aforementioned 
competing schools of thought, a vast amount of research and publications on this nexus have 
focused on the quantitative study of an individual or a very limited number of country case(s). 
Some studies84 with extensive coverage of countries using a panel data approach have attempted 
to generalise but these have often been rejected because they present different results (mixed or 
non-linear) on the relationship and causality (Chang et al., 2018). There have been few attempts 
made to investigate two-way causality (i.e. bi-directional causal relation) on a large set of countries, 
which are challenged by technical problems and, more critically, complexities behind multiple 
causalities. 
 
The early research here is classified into categories and summarised in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Previous literature on the relationship between inequality and growth 
Relationship Causality Author(s) 
Positive Inequality to 
Growth 
Friedman (1953), Rebelo (1991), Deaton and Paxson (1997), Galor 
and Tsiddon (1997), Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), Forbes 
(2000), Bell and Freeman (2001) 
Growth to 
Inequality 
Cutler and Katz (1991), Blank and Card (1993), Weriemmi and 
Ehrhart (2008), Rubin and Segal (2015) 
Negative Inequality to 
Growth 
Stiglitz (1969), Feldstein and Horioka (1980), Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Clarke (1995), Alesina and 
 
84  For example, Deininger and Squire (1996), Barro (2000), Chen (2003), Galbraith and Kum (2005), Castelló-
Climent (2010), and Jihène and Ghazi (2013). 
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Perotti (1996), Benabou (1996), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), 
Perotti (1996), De La Croix and Doepke (2003), Bourguignon 
(2003; 2004), Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), Razmi and 
Ashrafzadeh (2012), Berg and Ostry (2013), Lee and Son (2016) 
Growth to 
Inequality 
Psacharopoulos et al. (1995), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Bruno, 
Ravallion and Squire (1998), De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000), 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Krongkaew and Kakwani (2003), 
Adams (2004), Heltberg (2004), Ravallion (2007), Basu and 
Mallick (2008), Ogun (2010), Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides (2014), 
Akinci (2017) 
Mix (or Nonlinear Relationship) Deininger and Squire (1996); Barro (2000); Chen (2003); 
Galbraith and Kum (2005); Castelló-Climent (2010); Jihène and 
Ghazi (2013); Milanovic (2016); Baek (2017) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
 
In addition to the causalities in question, much of the literature has not taken into account the 
distinction between the long- and short-run associationship which would have significantly 
different implications in explaining the inequality and growth dynamics. To be more specific, there 
are many transmission channels (beneficial or harmful) of interaction between inequality and 
economic performance. Meanwhile, the speed of transmission running from inequality to growth 
or vice versa can never be the same (Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller, 2014). For instance, some 
inequality as enabling mechanisms on growth tend to set in quickly—for example, aggregate 
saving (Kaldor, 1956), thus stimulating R&D (Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2006). On the other hand, 
some negative transmissions can be rather slow—for example, expensive fiscal policies (Alesina 
and Rodrik, 1994), thus delaying human capital formation (Galor and Moav, 2004). The field of 
research on the nexus with consideration of the time dimension together with multiple causalities 
has, in fact, received relatively little attention. 
 
Besides, the consequences of inequality for growth performance may differ depending on the size 
of the economy (Lee and Son, 2016), which could further vary by regional heterogeneity (Rubil, 
2015). Of the many empirical attempts, Galbraith and Kum (2005) have not only provided 
empirical evidence to support the notion that inequality is likely to reduce as the income level 
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increases in general but they have also discovered a tendency of the reverse relationship for rich 
countries. As an example of ‘within similar income group but different region’, many developing 
countries in Latin America and Africa have experienced the process of development in an 
unexpectedly distorted direction in terms of inequality waves. Their distorted development trends 
can indeed be clearly distinguished from the development trajectories of the four Asian Tigers (i.e. 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) who realised a radical growth while attaining 
a manageable level of inequality (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Parente, 2001). Although these 
regional (or income grouping) factors have been identified by some in the literature, no one has 
yet incorporated them together with the aforementioned issues in mind. 
 
The Inequality-Growth nexus deserves careful analysis particularly to explain a historical process 
of development and growth pattern in general and providing basis of distinctive growth dynamics 
between rich and poor in particular. The focus of this chapter is therefore to explore empirically 
the growth and inequality interactions in long- versus short-run aspects based on bi-directional 
causality. From these analyses, I further attempt to examine possible distinctive characteristics in 
this domain by income groups or regional groups. These two methodological approaches will 
contribute to the existing literature in the field of the Inequality-Growth nexus where three critical 
research gaps, which have been making such nexus analysis complicated, can be identified: the 
complexity of causality (Chang et al. 2018), the neglected time dimension (Halter, Oechslin and 
Zweimüller, 2014), and heterogeneities of the regional (Rubil, 2015) and income groups (Lee and 
Son, 2016). 
 
3.3. Data and empirical regularities 
 
The two variables included in this study are PCGDP and the Gini index (INE). First, PCGDP is 
one of the most widely used indicators for measuring progress towards economic development 
against inequality (Barro, 2000; Frank, 2009; Jihène and Ghazi, 2013; Rubin and Segal, 2015) and 
takes into account population size so as to provide useful information for country comparisons on 
the level and stage of development (Giddings et al., 2002). These annual data are sourced from the 
WDI of the World Bank (2016a). 
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As for an indicator to measure income inequality in income distribution, there are a number of 
inequality data sets available. Deininger and Squire (1996) developed and used new cross-country 
data sets on income and asset distribution to examine the interactions between inequality and 
growth. Then, the UN University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-
WIDER) further advanced this data set by expanding the number of country-year observations of 
the Gini index. However, these data sets may not provide comparable information across countries 
due to differences in terms of the welfare definition employed and employment status, and the 
treatment of various other factors (Solt, 2016a). Also, this data set tends to suffer from 
measurement error and some potential endogeneity problems (Subramanian and Kawachi, 2004). 
In fact, the Luxembourg Income Study could be the only data source available which uses a 
uniform set of assumptions and definitions; however, the coverage of the data set is limited. In 
order to contribute towards making valid comparisons in inequality across countries and over time, 
the Standardised World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) was introduced in 2008, which was 
then expanded considerably since that time to maximise income inequality comparability for the 
broadest possible sample of countries and years (Solt, 2016a). For this reason, the SWIID Version 
5.1 (Solt, 2016b) is used as a proxy indicator for inequality in this study. 
 
Notwithstanding the advantageous, adopting the Solt SWIID data set would require a careful 
assessment of its suitability for purposes of the study. Solt gives estimates of ‘market’ and ‘net’ 
inequality, but it is worth remembering that ‘market’ measures could be distorted by the absence 
of non-market transfer incomes. The other measure of inequality is thus used for this study. 
However, it is true that Solt’s estimates of ‘net’ income in developing countries may be distorted 
by applying imputations drawn from the effect of tax systems in developed countries that may not 
apply to the developing world. Further, inequality measures in sub-Saharan Africa can be high in 
part because a large share of households report no income at all, which raises a question of whether 
the concepts of ‘household’ and ‘income’ are the same as in other parts of the world. 
 
Taking such pros and cons of its use into consideration, I count on its competitive advantageous 
over other data set as my empirical work can effectively be performed to meet the central purpose 
of this research. To obtain a balanced data set between PCGDP and INE, 32 countries were 
dropped from the data sets. Therefore, the number of countries covered in this study is 175 but 
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their time span varies: Lebanon (9 yrs: 1997−2005), Maldives (9 yrs: 2002−2010), Lithuania (10 
yrs: 2004−2013), Djibouti (11 yrs: 1995−2005), Haiti (11 yrs: 1991−2001) … Japan (45 yrs: 
1967−2011), Italy (47 yrs: 1967−2013), Sweden (54 yrs: 1960−2013), the United Kingdom (54 
yrs: 1961−2014), and the United States (55 yrs: 1960−2014).85 Although in the application to 
Granger causality test (discussed in the next section) there is no specific rule written in stone about 
a minimum sample size to be statistically able to estimate model parameters, the larger sample is 
employed, the narrower the bounds are, thereby the more precise the estimates will be possible. 
Summary statistics are presented in Appendix 3A. 
 
Having formulated the balanced data set, it is useful to perform a preliminary analysis of the data 
in order to observe some empirical regularities. In so doing, the scattergram is employed using 
Cartersian coordinates to display the INEs that determine the position on the vertical axis that 
corresponds to the position on the horizontal axis. As presented in Figure 3.1, the scattergram 
analysis on the sample data sets demonstrates some empirical regularities—the negative 
association between inequality and growth in the group of 175 countries. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of logarithmic equation for this group is approximately −2.35. 
 
On the other hand, further analysis by country group provides additional regularities, which are 
behind the −2.35. Interestingly, 18 sub-Saharan African countries, widely considered the poorest 
group, appear to have a positive associationship with the logarithmic coefficient of 2.68. It can be 
inferred that higher growth is realised as income inequality increases and/or vice versa. Similarly, 
the Group of Eight (G8), the world’s most highly industrialised economies, including Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, is characterised 
by the positive relationship with the logarithmic coefficient of .49 although the magnitude of this 
coefficient is smaller than that of the poorest group. 
 
Such empirical regularities observed from the preliminary analysis indeed provide very 
meaningful implications, that include, the world as a whole is approaching an environment where 
the more equal the income (re)distribution is, the greater economic growth is to be realised or vice 
 
85  Many parts of the developing country group are restrained by the limited number of observations, due to data 
unavailability, which would have inevitably biased the sample and the results. 
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versa. Notwithstanding this ideally negative associationship identified in global society as a whole, 
both the poorest and the richest groups of countries are likely to suffer from the undesirable 
circumstances with which societies become more unequal or unfair as their economies grow. 
 
Hypothetically speaking, there is a trend behind a country’s developmental process (or trajectory) 
under the Inequality-Growth nexus: as the process of growth begins from very low levels of 
income, inequality is likely to increase; after reaching a certain developmental stage, a country 
may transform into a society where its growth is translated into benefits for the poor; once shared 
broadly across society, an additional economic benefit has the tendency to be concentrated within 
the rich, which could aggravate an unequal income (re)distribution practice. Such regularities are 




Figure 3.1. Inequality-Income dynamics: global, the Group of Eight and sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the WDI (2016a) and the SWIID Version 5.1 (Solt, 2016b). 
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3.4. Econometric modelling 
 
The econometric method employed in this study to analyse the causality between income 
inequality and economic growth is the Granger causality model, utilised by Eviews 8.0 statistical 
package. The Granger test was developed based on a major principle that presents a definition of 
cause and effect associationship between the two variables. Indeed, Granger (1969; 1988) showed 
that if two variables are individually integrated of order one and cointegrated, then there is the 
possibility of a causal relationship in at least one direction. Because of this definition, the Granger 
causality test has widely been used in research to test causality relationship and direction(s) 
between inequality and various dimensions of development.86 
 
It should, however, be acknowledged that Granger causality test is generally better performed with 
high frequency time-series data. The application of my balanced data set to such test may thus 
potentially misguide test results unless the following data requirements are met (Mariusz, 2015).87 
The application of the Granger causality test requires that all variables are time invariant 
(stationarity) (Assane and Grammy, 2003). Since economic variables often contain unit root 
(possibly in existence due to a random process), this could invalidate statistical inferences and 
estimation processes in the econometric analysis. In order to check whether each variable is 
stationary or not, a unit root test should be performed. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1979) 
is one of the most widely applied econometric methods to identify the order of the integration of 
each variable (Nuruddeen and Ibrahim, 2014). According to the ADF assumption, if variables are 
found to be non-stationary at level but become stationary after the first differencing, they are 
considered reasonable to be used for econometric analysis. Two variables used in the study are 
 
86  e.g. Assane and Grammy (2003), Frank (2009), Razmi and Ashrafzadeh (2012), Jihène and Ghazi (2013), 
Nuruddeen and Ibrahim (2014) 
87  As expected, almost all countries with lower frequency are excluded by Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
stationarity test and unit root test based on robust estimators, which are conducted in the next section. Countries 
include Lebanon with 9 yrs, Maldives with 9 yrs, Lithuania with 10 yrs, Djibouti with 11 yrs, Haiti with 11 yrs, Syria 
with 11 yrs, Papua New Guinea with 11 yrs, St. Lucia with 12 yrs, Cameroon with 12 yrs, Gambia with 12 yrs, 
Mozambique with 13 yrs, Albania with 13 yrs, Yemen with 14 yrs, Bosnia and Herzegovina with 14 yrs, Barbados 
with 15 yrs, etc. 
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converted into a natural logarithm to be tested via the ADF, which allows the results to be 
interpreted in elasticity and to avoid heteroscedasticity (Nuruddeen and Ibrahim, 2014). As for unit 
root test based on robust estimators, the model containing both a constant and a trend is tested first 
since it is the least restricted. If the unit root is rejected, no further testing will take place, but if it 
is not rejected, then the model without a time trend will be tested (Sjö, 2008). The unit root test is 









110   (3.1) 
where Yt, φ, and Δ confers a time series, a linear time trend and first difference operator, 
X0 is a constant, k is respecting the optimum number of lags on the dependent variable, and 
εt is random error term. 
 
If Yt is found to be stationary, then a coevolution between the two variables may exist in the long-
run. To investigate the existence of the long-run relationship (equilibrium), a cointegration test 
should be applied. The econometric framework used for a cointegration test is the Johansen-
Maximum Likelihood Cointegration technique, which is best used to determine the number of 
cointegrating vector(s) (Johansen, 1988; Razmi and Ashrafzadeh, 2012; Jihène and Ghazi, 2013). 
The Johansen method identifies the stationarity of the residue of two linear combinations. This 
method is based on the two likelihood ratio tests—trace test (λtrace) and maximum eigenvalue test 
(λmax). For the test, the order of the lag is determined according to the Schwarz Information 
Criterion, the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion, and the Akaike Information Criterion (Assane 
and Grammy, 2003), while the significance test is based on the test of MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis 
(1999). This multivariate cointegration test is expressed as: 
 
tptptpttt ++++++= −−−−− 122110 ......  
(3.2
) 
where Zt represents a vector of variables that are integrated of order one, that is, I(1); K 
represents a matrix of coefficients; Ψ represents a matrix of parameters; and Φt represents 
a vector of normally and independently distributed error term. 
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If no cointegration is found, then there is no evidence of the existence of long-run associationship 
between the two series. In this case, the Granger causality representation theorem in short-run can 

























321   (3.4) 
where PCGDP represents the per capita GDP, INE represents the income inequality index, 
Пki and Гtj (k = 1, 2, 3; i = 1 … n; j = 1 … m) are the coefficients, ε1 and ε2 are the error 
terms. 
 
The causality test can be performed, based on the null hypothesis that there is no causal flow 














































2 0 , for bidirectional causality between PCGDP and INE 
 
On the other hand, if variables are found to be cointegrated, then there is evidence of the existence 
of a stable long-run equilibrium between the two variables. In other words, once the residue 
appears to be stationary, the Granger test under a Vector Error Correction (VEC) environment 
can be applied to test simultaneously the short- and long-run relationship. A major advantage of 
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the VEC is that long-run effects are distinguished from short-run effects, with the specification of 
the long-run effect drawing on economic theory while allowing the short run to be in 
disequilibrium (Jansen, 1996; Rocha, 2006) and therefore both short- and long-run 

























321   (3.6) 
 
where Δ is a first difference operator, П1, П2i, П3i, Г1, Г2j and Г3j (i = 1 … n and j = 1 … 
m) are the coefficients to the estimated, EC1 and EC2 are the lagged error correction term 
(ECT) derived from the long-run cointegrating relationship, and μ1 and μ2 are the error 
terms. For the VEC model (3.5), H0: П3j = 0 for j = 1 … m is tested against H1: H3j ≠ 0 at 
least one j while for the VEC model (3.6), H0: Г3j = 0 for j = 1 … n is tested against H1: Г3j 
≠ 0 for at least one j. 
 
In addition to the identification of the directions of causality, the signs of the associations between 
the two variables should also be investigated. The normalised cointegration coefficients in the 
long-run equilibrium (or associationship) through the VEC analysis convey useful information on 
the signs of the relationship between the two series although these estimates are not derived from 
structural equations. However, the short-run causality from the VEC and VAR specifications does 
not provide the signs. 
 
Therefore, this study employs the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to interpret the effect of a 
one-unit shock (change in one standard deviation) in one variable on the other (Pesaran and Shin, 
1998; Frank, 2009). In other words, the IRF is systemised to identify the responsiveness of the 
dependent variables (endogenous variable) in the VAR and VEC system when a shock is put to 
the innovation (the error term: ε1, ε2, μ1 and μ2). But for calculating impulse responses, the ordering 
of the variables is important (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). This study thus uses Cholesky (dof adjusted) 
ordering method as suggested by Doan (2007). 
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3.5. Modelling results 
 
Having described the methodologies in the preceding section, this section begins by interpreting 
the results of the ADF unit root test based on model (3.1). With 143 countries, the ADF test results 
found that the PCGDP is non-stationary on their levels in 129 countries with the fact that in 
absolute terms, the computed values are smaller than the critical values at 5 per cent level; however, 
they become stationary after the first difference where the computed values are greater than the 
critical ones at 5 per cent level. As for INE, 117 countries show they are non-stationary on levels 
but become stationary after first differencing. In order to run the next econometric model, both 
inequality indicator and GDP indicator should pass the stationarity test. Therefore, an additional 
33 countries are excluded from further econometric analyses. In other words, 110 pairs of the two 
variables are qualified and hence used for the next test, which is the Johansen Cointegration 
econometrics.88 A summary of the ADF stationarity test results is presented in Appendix 3B. 
 
The two statistics for the Johansen Cointegration test in the VAR system are carried out as 
presented in Appendix 3C. From the λtrace, which is the value of the long-run test based on the trace 
of the stochastic matrix, 20 countries have no long-run cointegrating vector given the results where 
the estimated trace statistics are smaller than the critical value at 5 per cent level. On the other 
hand, the λmax test, which is the test of long-run associationship based on the maximum eigenvalues 
of the stochastic matrix, indicates that the cointegrating vector is not found in 22 countries. Malta 
and Zimbabwe are the countries in which the λtrace test identified one cointegrating vector, which 
is rejected by the λmax test at 5 per cent level of significance. In this case, it is advisable to accept 
the result from the λmax test especially for testing with small samples (Odhiambo, 2005). Hence, 
 
88  The time period used between countries differ, which could provoke some econometric controversy with the 
extent to which Granger causality tests can be compared like-for-like (i.e. a structural break might appear in one series 
and not the other and hence affects the causality relationship differently in the results). Nonetheless, more than four-
fifth of the studied countries have convergence of the period of 1985–2010. Furthermore, this econometric analysis 
covers 110 sample countries (out of 143 data available) that exceed 105 recommended number of the countries that 
can be appropriate to represent the world views (stylized facts) based on 5 per cent margin of error and 95 per cent 
confidence level so that the difference of the time period can be ignored. 
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the Granger causality investigation under the VEC environment is applied to 88 countries where 
the long-run relationship between inequality and growth is found, while the Granger test under 
the VAR system is employed for the remaining countries. 
 
As presented, Appendix 3D summarises the test results of the Granger causality investigation 
under both the VEC and VAR environment. As explained, the countries where cointegration is 
detected are applied to the VEC model (3.5) and (3.6) as in these countries, the two variables are 
in long-run equilibrium state, and short-run dynamics of the variables are seen as fluctuations 
around this equilibrium. The VEC provides information on how such a short-run interacting 
system adjusts to converge to long-run state, which can be confirmed by the sign of the ECT. The 
ECT indicates the average speed of adjustment in the current period to disequilibrium in the 
previous period. In particular, the ECT should be statistically significant and negative sign. 
Otherwise, a cointegrating vector detected from the Johansen procedure does not actually exist in 
the VEC. Furthermore, the signs of the normalised cointegration coefficients (Coeff.) represent the 
signs of causality between the two variables: when the sign of the Coeff. is negative, the two 
variables are positively associated in long-run and vice versa. 
 
Turning to error correction specifications in short-run, Chi-Square Statistics (χ2 stat.) at 5 per cent 
level of significance show the direction of causation (either unidirectional or bi-directional 
causality). Similarly, for the countries where no cointegration is identified from the Johansen 
procedure, the Granger test under the VAR (3.3) and (3.4) is applied based on the test of the χ2 
stat. However, as discussed, the short-run Granger causality test does not provide information on 
the signs of the associations between the two variables, while the IRF test is applied to estimate 
the effect of a one standard deviation shock on the error terms. The results from the IRF (only 
those with statistical significance) are presented in Appendix 3E. 
 
For instance, in Argentina, long-run relationship from the Johansen Cointegration test shows that 
INE has a close relationship with PCGDP with the sign of the coefficient as expected.89 It can thus 
be interpreted that for long-run results, as on average, an increase in INE by 1 per cent will decrease 
 
89  Selection of ARG is unbiased. ARG is selected to describe the results simply because ARG is the first one 
both that is presented in Appendix 3B and that is confirmed with both long- and short-run associationships. 
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PCGDP by 7.89 per cent. But in the opposite direction that an increase in PCGDP by 1 per cent 
affects to decrease INE by .13 per cent is not statistically significant. Also, the speed of adjustment 
indicates that on average, there is a 168 per cent adjustment in the current period to disequilibrium 
in the previous period from short-run influence, which is bi-directional negative causality between 
PCGDP and INE. To sum up, Argentina appears to have negative long-run causality from INE to 
PCGDP with a normalised coefficient of 7.89 and also bi-directional negative causality in short-
run, which contributes to long-run equilibrium with 168 per cent adjustment from disequilibrium 
in the previous period. 
 
Overall, the long-run Granger causality appears to exist in 79 out of 88 countries analysed under 
the VEC system (a cointegrating vector was initially detected in nine countries, including Algeria, 
China, Latvia, Mauritania, Moldova, Norway, Peru, Philippines, and Sierra Leone but none of 
them are found to be statistically significant for the long-run). Moreover, there are 22 countries, in 
which the VAR applied appears to have the short-run Granger causality except Fiji and Zimbabwe 
where no coefficients are statistically significant. To sum up, 104 countries are found to have the 
Granger causality between inequality and growth at least in one direction: 79 countries with the 
long-run or both the long- and short-run causality, and 20 countries with only the short-run 
causality. In addition, all the identified causations in these 104 countries were analysed for the 
signs. 
 
3.6. Framework of 11-clusters analysis 
 
From a total of 104 countries identified for causations, it is useful for all these countries to be 
divided into sub-groups in order to capture the possibility of underlying heterogeneity or 
homogeneity among the sub-groups of countries. For this purpose, this study adopts the latest 
version of the World Bank Country Classifications. According to the classification, countries are 
defined, using the World Bank Atlas method (2016b) by the following: low-income economies 
with per capita GNI of US$1025 or less; lower middle-income economies with per capita GNI 
between US$1026 and US$4035; upper middle-income economies with per capita GNI between 
US$4036 and US$12,475; and high-income economies with per capita GNI of US$12,476 or more. 
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However, the application of these four sub-groups in this study may not be effective due to the 
incomparable and unbalanced number of country samples. Therefore, I modify this classification 
by combining the low and lower income to form one, namely Developing Economies with per 
capita GNI of US$4035 or less and renaming the upper middle income and the high income for 
the Developed Economies (with per capita GNI between US$4036 and US$12,475) and the 
Advanced Economies (with per capita GNI of US$12,476 or more), respectively. From this 
reclassification, the number of countries categorised into each of the three groups is fairly balanced 
for comparisons with 33 Developing Economies, 32 Developed Economies and 39 Advanced 
Economies. 
 
Having classified the three levels of economic development, I needed to conceptualise the 
causality test results of the 104 countries with the 11 cluster groups. Nonetheless, I should admit 
the potential limitation that the cluster analysis would not perfectly reflect and capture the 
homogeneity among countries belonging to each of the cluster group. 
 
First, Group of Incentive (GI) is identified as 13 countries where only unidirectional positive 
causality running from INE to PCGDP can be observed. These countries are characterised by 
inequality as incentivising economic growth. It could inform the implication that the higher (lower) 
inequality becomes, the greater (lesser) growth will be realised. Out of the 13 countries, 7 are 
categorised in the Advanced Economies, which infers that inequality as an incentive mechanism is 
likely a dominating factor in the GI cluster. 
 
Second, Group of Unequal income redistribution with extractive institutions (GU) is clustered with 
22 countries. This cluster shows only unidirectional positive causality from PCGDP to INE and 
hence that growth benefits may not effectively be shared with the poor segment mainly due to 
likely an extractive practice of income redistribution. It could further imply that the greater (lesser) 
growth is, the higher (lower) income inequality will be. Such unequal redistribution feature is 




Third, Group of both Incentive and Unequal income redistribution with extractive institutions 
(GIU) is derived. This GIU cluster shows bi-directional positive causality between INE and 
PCGDP and consist of four countries: Austria, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Tanzania where both 
an incentive mechanism and an unequal redistribution practice coexist. This cluster could explain 
that growth performance tends not to be radical because of its positive causality to income 
inequality while lowering inequality levels may not be targeted due to a strong demand for 
economic growth. In effect, this cluster grouping result may support our empirical regularities that 
the advanced nations (Austria and the Netherlands) would have shared similar features (of 
development trajectory with growth and inequality) with the developing ones (Pakistan and 
Tanzania). Nonetheless, I should not attempt to generalise with four countries only.  
 
Fourth, Group of Constraint (GC) is clustered with 14 countries that can be characterised by only 
unidirectional negative causality running from INE to PCGDP. These 14 countries may share 
commonality that inequality as a constraint mechanism could hinder economic development, and 
in other words, the higher (lower) inequality is, the lesser (greater) amount of economic 
performance will be achieved. Such a constraint mechanism tends to be observed in the Developed 
Economies (8 countries). 
 
Fifth, Group of Equal income redistribution with inclusive institutions (GE) is established by 
unidirectional negative causality from PCGDP to INE. Like the GC, this cluster predominantly 
includes the Developed Economies (12 out of 19 countries) indicating the circumstance where the 
greater (lessor) the economic growth is, the lower (higher) the inequality will be in an economy. 
 
Sixth, Group of Constraint and Equal income redistribution with inclusive institutions (GCE) 
shows bi-directional negative causality between INE and PCGDP. Such interaction is observed in 
two countries: Argentina and Burkina Faso. Based on the bi-directional negative relationship, they 
are not likely to implement policies targeting lower levels of inequality since too strong an 
intervention to lower inequality may also hinder economic performance. However, similar to the 




Seventh, Group of Incentive and Constraint (GIC) consists of five countries: Canada, Chile, 
Senegal, Turkmenistan, and the United Kingdom. The GIC cluster is characterised by both 
unidirectional positive and negative causality from INE to PCGDP, possibly meaning that 
inequality is acting not only as an incentive mechanism for economic growth but also as a 
constraint mechanism: Canada with mixed (both an incentive and a constraint) in short run, while 
an incentive mechanism in long run; Chile with a constraint mechanism in short run, while an 
incentive mechanism in long run; Senegal with an incentive mechanism in short run, while a 
constraint mechanism in long run; Turkmenistan with a constraint mechanism in short run, while 
an incentive mechanism in long run; and the United Kingdom with mixed in short run, while a 
constraint mechanism in long run. In this regard, these five countries tend to prioritise inequality 
mitigating policies rather than growth focus. 
 
The eighth and the ninth cluster groups have substantial convergence regarding the Inequality-
Growth dynamics: Group of Incentive and Equal income redistribution with inclusive institutions 
(GIE) is characterised by bi-directional causality between INE to PCGDP (positive from INE to 
PCGDP and negative from PCGDP to INE); and Group of Constraint and Unequal income 
redistribution with extractive institutions (GCU) is characterised by bi-directional causality 
between INE to PCGDP (negative from INE to PCGDP and positive from PCGDP to INE). The 
GIE and the GCU consist of nine countries and five countries, respectively, all of which are mostly 
found in the Advanced Economies. Both clusters can be characterised with circulating dynamics. 
For instance, in the GIE, as the income inequality level increases, greater economic performance 
is achieved, which in turn causes a lowering in inequality, which further hinders growth, which in 
turn causes greater levels of inequality. For this interaction, an adjustment mechanism may exist 
in preventing some marked deviation from the circulating dynamics. 
 
Tenth, Group of coexisting of Unequal redistribution with extractive institutions and Equal income 
redistribution with inclusive institutions (GUE) includes seven countries which are characterised 
by both unidirectional positive and negative causation running from PCGDP to INE, meaning that 
countries which tend to have an economic structure that both equally and unequally (re)distribute 
its growth experience benefits across their societies. These seven countries are as follows: the 
Czech Republic and Honduras with unequal income redistribution in short run, while equal 
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redistribution in long run; Hong Kong with equal income redistribution in short run, while unequal 
in long run; South Africa with mixed (both unequal and equal redistribution) in short run, while 
unequal redistribution in long run; Thailand with mixed redistribution in short run, while equal 
redistribution in long run; and the Kyrgyz Republic and Sierra Leone with mixed redistribution in 
short run only. 
 
Eleventh, Group of Complexity (GX) is clustered with four countries, which include the countries 
where three characteristics or more (out of the four: Incentive hypothesis, Constraint hypothesis, 
Redistribution with extractive institutions hypothesis, and Redistribution with inclusive 
institutions hypothesis) are captured. Such complex causations are only observed in the Developed 
Economies (two countries) and the Developing Economies (two countries). This could imply that 
the highly advanced countries have less complicated structure in terms of the inequality-growth 
nexus than the other country groups. Detailed analytical information for each of the 104 countries 
on causations is summarised in Appendix 3F. 
 
In analysing the 104 countries based on each of the three groups by income level, the Developing 
Economies are featured with predominantly positive relationship between inequality and growth, 
which accounts for 48.5 per cent (16 out of 33 countries). The next dominant feature for the 
Developing Economies is both positive and negative relations (10 countries), followed by negative 
relationship (7 countries). To be more specific for the positive relationship in 16 countries, an 
income redistribution with extractive institutions practice (GU) is the most common characteristic, 
which is observed in 10 countries, followed by inequality as an incentive mechanism (GI) with 
four countries. 
 
On the other hand, the Developed Economies appear to have a mostly negative associationship 
between the two variables. Its proportion is calculated for 65.6 per cent (21 out of 32 countries), 
followed by both positive and negative relationship (8 countries). Out of 21 countries under the 
negative one, 12 countries likely show an income redistribution with inclusive institutions 
tendency (GE) while 8 countries feature inequality as a constraint mechanism (GC). These two 
cluster groups appear to predominate across countries in the Developed Economies. This result is 
firmly consistent with the recent empirical findings from Vo, Nguyen, Tran and Vo (2019) who 
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employed Granger causality test to explore the inequality-growth nexus for 86 middle-income 
countries. 
 
Like the Developing Economies, the Advanced Economies also appear to be highly associated with 
the positive relationship between the two variables, which account for 51.3 per cent (20 out of 39 
countries), followed by both positive and negative trend (12 countries) and negative tendency (7 
countries). For the 20 countries that show the positive relationship, an income redistribution with 
extractive institutions practice (GU) is a dominant feature, which is observed in 11 countries. In 
addition, inequality as an incentive mechanism (GI) is found in seven countries. 
 
Based on income grouping analysis, it should be noted that the positive relations between 
inequality and growth predominates in the poorest group as well as the richest group, particularly 
income redistribution with extractive institutions practice (GU). This cluster analysis could imply 
that the challenge that greatly belongs to the poorest and richest country group could be that these 
countries are unlikely to redistribute their growth benefits equally across society actors. In contrast, 
the middle-income group tends to be highly associated with the negative relationship, especially 
income redistribution with inclusive institutions tendency (GE). In this respect, the middle-income 
group has a tendency for more equal redistribution with inclusive institutions across their societies. 
All these findings can generally be in line with the N-shaped relationship between national income 
per person and inequality, which is also regarded as a Second Kuznets Curve or Kuznets Waves. 
They are summarised in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. Analysis of relationship and causality by income groups 
  
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: 1 represents the 7 countries characterised for negative associationship between INE and PCGDP with GC cluster (KEN KHM TUN), GE 
cluster (MLI NPL TJK), and GCE cluster (BFA); 2 represents the 10 countries characterised for both positive and negative associationship between 
INE and PCGDP with GIE cluster (ARM LKA NGA), GUE cluster (HND KGZ SLE), GX cluster (EGY VNM), GIC cluster (SEN), and GCU 
cluster (LAO); 3 represents the 16 countries characterised for positive associationship between INE and PCGDP with GU cluster (BDI BGD GTM 
IDN IND MAR RWA UGA UKR ZMB), GI cluster (CIV GHA LSO UZB), and GIU cluster (PAK TZA); 4 represents the 21 countries characterised 
for negative associationship between INE and PCGDP with GE cluster (AGO CHN COL DOM MEX MNE MYS NAM RUS SRB TUR VEN), GC 
cluster (AZE BRA BWA ECU GEO KAZ PAN PRY), and GCE cluster (ARG); 5 represents the 8 countries characterised for both positive and 
negative associationship between INE and PCGDP with GCU cluster (JAM MKD), GUE cluster (THA ZAF), GX cluster (CRI PER), GIC cluster 
(TKM), and GIE cluster (JOR); 6 represents the 3 countries characterised for positive associationship between INE and PCGDP with GI cluster 
(BGR ROU) and GU cluster (BLR); 7 represents the 7 countries characterised for negative associationship between INE and PCGDP with GC cluster 
(FRA HUN IRL SWE) and GE cluster (HRV LVA SVK); 8 represents the 12 countries characterised for both positive and negative associationship 
between INE and PCGDP with GIE cluster (EST ISL KOR NZL PRT), GIC cluster (CAN CHL GBR), GCU cluster (ESP ISR), and GUE (CZE 
HKG); and 9 represents the 20 countries characterised for positive associationship between INE and PCGDP with GU cluster (AUS CHE CYP ITA 
JPN LUX MLT POL SGP TTO USA), GI cluster (BEL DEU DNK GRC NOR PRI SVN), and GIU cluster (AUT NLD)). 
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As for regional groups, my analysis is initially based on the World Bank Regional Classifications 
(2016c) but further simplified into the five regional groups for the analysis purpose: Europe (37 
countries), Asia (23 countries), America (19 countries), Sub-Saharan Africa (18 countries) and 
Middle East and North Africa (7 countries). 
 
Compared to the previous income-grouping analysis, regional analysis provides relatively less 
straightforward results. It is mainly because within a continent, countries are very heterogenous in 
terms of economic structure and performance. If this analysis narrowly focuses on sub-regions that 
may have shared much commonalities across countries, I would have lost an explanatory power 
due to two low number of country representations. Nonetheless, there are a number of distinctive 
features between regions as well as within a region.  
 
First, each of the five regions in general appears to feature both positive and negative 
associationship between inequality and growth, which implies that countries are heterogeneously 
characterised by their special needs and conditions in a region. European countries tend to have a 
predominantly positive relationship, particularly by incentive mechanism (GI), in part as being 
strongly determined by its trend in the highly developed countries (i.e., 27 out of 38 countries are 
under the Advanced Economies category). In America whose majority of countries are Developed 
Economies in this thesis’s classification, the negative relationship is broadly observed. Especially 
for four Latin American countries (i.e., Panama, Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay), all of them that 
appear to be characterised by constraint feature in both long- and short-run associationship. In 
contrast, the positive causation (unidirectional) running from growth to inequality for the United 
States was confirmed by another causality assessments conducted by Assane and Grammy (2003) 
and Chang, Gupta and Miller (2018). Furthermore, some Asian countries are likely featured 
particularly by mix of various clusters (GIE, GUE, GIC, GCU and GX), while others tend to have 
income redistribution with either extractive (GU) or inclusive institutions tendency (GE). This 
regional characteristic in general is in line with their conclusion from Bank, Yang and Greaney 
(2017)’s study, claiming that countries in the Asia-Pacific region appear, based on Granger 
causality test, to likely follow the S-shape curve hypothesis in the long run, which can be the reason 
why mix feature is observed in this regional group. Finally, in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
positive features with regard its income redistribution with extractive institutions (GU) as well as 
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incentive mechanism (GI) are favoured, while Middle East and North African countries are 
relatively evenly spread out in terms of clustering, which would in fact be difficult for generalising 
regional feature given the low representations of countries. Nonetheless, our empirical results 
appear to be consistent with the findings from Jihène and Ghazi (2013) who did similar exercise 
for Middle East countries and particularly showed that bidirectional causality is found in Israel 
and Egypt, that are under the cluster classification of GCU and GX from my analysis. This 




Figure 3.3. Analysis of relationship and causality by regional groups 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: In Europe, eight countries in GI are Norway, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Slovenia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria; eight countries in GU 
are Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine; six countries in GC are Ireland, Sweden, France, Hungary, Georgia 
and Azerbaijan; six countries in GE are Slovakia, Latvia, Croatia, Russian Federation, Montenegro and Serbia. In Asia, six countries in GU are 
Singapore, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh; five countries in GE are Cambodia, Malaysia, China, Tajikistan and Nepal. In America, 
three countries in GU are the United States, Trinidad and Tobago and Guatemala; four countries in GC are Panama, Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay; 
four countries in GE are Venezuela, Mexico, Dominican Republic and Colombia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, four countries in GU are Zambia, Rwanda, 
Uganda and Burundi; three countries in GI are Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Lesotho; three countries in GE are Namibia, Angola and Mali. In Middle 
East and North Africa, a country in GU, GC, GE, GIE, GCU and GX are Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, Israel and Egypt, respectively. 
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3.7. Summary and discussion 
 
This study has explored empirically the long- and short-run relationship between inequality and 
development and their causality orientations, using a more recent and extensively larger data set 
of a 143-balanced country sample. From the analyses, 79 countries (55 per cent of the total country 
sample) appear to have stable long-run equilibrium between inequality and growth by uni- and/or 
bi-directional causality. Additionally, 89 countries (62 per cent in total) are associated with at least 
short-run causations. Overall, countries are classified according to the combination of positive and 
negative one-way and two-way causal relations found to be statistically significant. 
 
These results are noteworthy in that they provide both theoretical and empirical motivations to 
look into how growth affects the redistribution of income and vice versa. One of the most important 
insights gained from this causal-oriented investigation is that the Kuznets hypothesis is still valid 
for contemporary policy debate. More importantly, another upswing curve is identified in addition 
to the ups earlier then the downs later of the Kuznets curve, which implies some new inequality 
and growth dynamics that are likely to have existed for industrialised societies in the postmodern 
period from the 1960s to the present. The findings from the cluster analysis by income groups can 
also be seen consistent with the N-shaped relation hypothesis between national income per person 
and inequality (Milanovic, 2016): in other words, it supports that for many high-income countries, 
growth generally appears to be associated with rising inequality. 
 
More specifically, the cluster analysis explains that: (a) the Developing Economies are likely to be 
associated with a positive relationship between inequality and growth, potentially attributable to 
their income redistribution practice further characterised by extractive institutions; (b) the 
Developed Economies appear to benefit from relatively fair redistribution of income across their 
societies but may simultaneously suffer from the detrimental role of inequality so as to hinder 
productivity growth; and (c) the Advanced Economies likely share a commonality of the inequality 
and growth dynamics observed in the Developing Economies in that growth benefits tend not to 
be fairly redistributed to the poor segments of society and rather concentrated into the hands of a 
few capitalists, which then acts as a source of motivation for capitalists to invest more to gain more. 
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This chapter has further attempted to explore regional distinctive characteristics, yet provided less 
straightforward results, compared to the income-grouping analysis. Nonetheless, there are a 
number of distinctive features to note. As many countries within one continent generally appear to 
be heterogenous (context-dependent) in terms of economic structure and performance, each of the 
five regions is characterised by both positive and negative associationship between inequality and 
growth. Especially a majority of countries (Developed Economies) in America tend to have the 
negative relationship, whereas the positive features with regard its income redistribution with 
extractive institutions as well as incentive mechanism are likely favoured in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Developing Economies). 
 
Our empirical findings on the existence of distinctive features of each of the income groups (Lee 
and Son, 2016) and regional groups (Rubil, 2015) can also be consistent with the competitive 
political economy discourse, particularly the typology of the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) and Welfare Regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Each of the regional groups in 
terms of production systems have been institutionalised by their own unique inequality feature of 
enabling and/or restraining growth. Similarly, the effectiveness (inclusiveness) of the 
redistribution system also implies that unique institutions have been shaped through features of 
institutional complementarities in each country or group of countries. Therefore, each of the 
countries’ or regional groups’ endogenous processes that shall be associated with inequality 
dynamics are likely to affect the process of continuous economic development, eventually 
directing some distinctive developmental paths (i.e. path-dependence) (Schmidt, 2002; Amable, 
2003; Schröder, 2013). 
 
Finally, there are several areas for future research, which can extend this study. Various causal 
links identified with the 11 clusters need to be explained in a more theoretical fashion by allowing 
for the possibility that these identified mechanisms are not mutually exclusive in explaining 
country patterns over time. Additionally, it should clearly be acknowledged that this study is 
largely empirical rather than atheoretical therefore further work would be needed to theorise about 
the possible explanations for what has been observed from this investigation. In addition to these, 
although this chapter contributes to the literature by presenting results of short- and long-run 
Granger causality tests in both directions, differentiating such short- and long-run causality should 
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be further explored as a basis for explaining the complexity of nexus during upswings and 
downswings, which would provide more analytical information on country-specific trends over 
time (Halter, Oechslin and Zweimüller, 2014: Chang et al., 2018). 
 
On the technical side, there are a couple of issues I have encountered during the research, which I 
strongly believe that there would be areas for improvement if properly addressed. First, the limited 
number of observations for the Granger causality tests may have influenced the results, especially 
accounting for the high number of lags that would reduce the degree of freedom. Therefore, the 
robustness of the tests needs to be conducted because the results eventually influence the clusters 
identified. Moreover, the low number of observations is predominantly for developing countries 
(due to data unavailability), which would bias the sample and the results that allow to define the 
clusters. In this regard, my attempt to advance some interesting generalisations that highlight 
diversity of country evidence based on the methodology using the cointegration and error 
correction approach with Granger causality tests can be of great value-added interventions to 
ongoing scholarly communications in this field if such data challenges are substantially resolved. 
 
In conclusion, the causal relationships between country-level economic development and 
inequality still remain a matter of considerable debate and policy interest. Clearly, identifying 
Inequality-Growth characteristics (i.e. the 11 clusters) that are embedded in society would be 
imperative before designing policy related to reducing income inequality and/or stimulating 
economic activities to promote inclusive and sustainable growth (Armah and Baek, 2015; 2018). 
In this context, the methodology and results from this study can provide policymakers with a useful 
guideline on how to address the complexity (long-run versus short-run, positive versus negative 
associationship, unidirectional versus bi-directional causality, etc.) of the Inequality-Growth nexus 
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4. Can pursuit of the SDGs promote structural transformation in Africa? 
An empirical analysis 
 
PREFACE 
This chapter focuses on a more comprehensive and integrated approach to investigating 
inequality, growth and environmental sustainability interactions in the course of structural 
transformation. Potential trade-offs and synergies between these indicators have been 
recognised in previous literature, but little is known about their nature and extent.90  
 
Some empirical studies have attempted to fill this gap. Aloi and Tournemaine (2013) did so 
through building an equilibrium model that considers the human capital accumulation 
hypothesis that pollution is associated with economic growth and negative distributional effects 
via changes in individuals’ health and human capital. The empirical findings suggest that a 
stronger environmental policy could unequivocally lower the level of inequality, because the 
poorer segment of a population is associated with larger marginal benefits from abatement via 
human capital accumulation. These scholars further argued that the willingness to pay principle 
for health and clean environment would increase faster with income and thus, economic growth. 
 
More recently, Baloch et al. (2018) assessed the effect of inequality and growth on 
environmental quality, identifying a long-run relationship between inequality, growth and 
environmental degradation. Their interpretation of this is that the wider the income gap the 
higher are carbon emissions, and the higher the level of economic output the higher the 
associated level of emissions. In this context, they claimed that public investment in education 
is closely related to economic growth, but at the expense of greater income inequality, which 
 
90  e.g. Luke (2005), Aloi and Tournemaine (2013), Saboori and Sulaiman (2013), Spaiser et al. (2017), Baloch 
et al. (2018) 
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could in turn relate to environmental conditions.91 Yet, the researchers appear not to have taken 
into consideration all possible interactions within the nexus.  
 
A study, the main research question of which is more closely aligned to that of the present 
thesis, is Spaiser et al. (2017). This involved analysing the underlying tensions and synergies 
among the social, economic and environmental dimensions of the SDGs using a structural 
equation model. The study categorised the SDGs into three latent constructs representing 
economic goals (1, 2, 3, 6, and 11), social goals (4, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 16) and environmental goals 
(12, 13, 14 and 15). The findings suggest that economic growth-focused strategies will promote 
socioeconomic development, while hindering the achievement of environmental goals. Based 
on the empirical evidence, they concluded that the SDGs will not be achieved as a whole due 
to trade-offs among the goals and targets. One limitation of this comprehensive attempt was its 
breadth of coverage, preventing inference about the relevance of the results to developing 
countries. Hence, explicit links cannot be drawn between their findings and structural 
transformation, an aspect that has so far received little attention in the literature. 
 
Chapter 4 is therefore concerned with how efforts to advance economic, social and 
environmental development will relate to the structural transformation agenda: “What is the 
likely relationship between sustainable development and the process of structural 
transformation?” and “How can developing countries organise their planning and related 
institutions to implement development agendas that will be successful in achieving sustainable 
development through the process of structural transformation?” All of these come under the 
one overarching question: “How do efforts to promote inclusive sustainable development as a 
multi-dimensional concept influence a country’s structural transformation outcomes?”  
 
Tackling such question will explore systematically the ISD framework of: (1) how country 
change processes (in Box 2), measured through three sets of sustainable development 
indicators, appear to be influenced by the normative development objectives, as represented by 
 
91  This causality study was preceded by Sobhee (2004), who attempted to model the impact of economic 
development on environmental degradation for the fisheries sector of Mauritius. 
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the SDGs and structural transformation (in Box 3); and (2) explaining how the two development 
goals can be translated into the normative frameworks (in Box 1) that could be adopted by 






For over a decade, remarkable progress has been made on socio-economic development in Africa, 
with more children enrolled in primary school and steep declines in child and maternal deaths. The 
incidence of extreme poverty has also declined albeit marginally. The positive trends in Africa’s 
social indicators have been underpinned by real GDP growth which averaged approximately 5 per 
cent over the last decade and contributed to significant progress towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs; hereinafter referred to as MDGs). Indeed, despite its relatively low 
initial conditions, the continent was close to attaining three of the eight MDGs: Goal 2 on achieving 
universal primary education, Goal 3 on promoting gender equality and empowering women, and 
Goal 6 on combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases (ECA et al., 2015). 
 
The continent’s socio-economic advancement has been supported by strong international support 
and prudent macroeconomic management. Over the period 1990–2014, Africa accounted for 42 
per cent on average of total net official development assistance (ODA) disbursements, which also 
makes the continent the largest recipient of the ODA.92 Africa is also benefitting from the World 
Trade Organization Bali packages, particularly the Trade Facilitation Agreement, which seeks to 
promote global trade competitiveness. Furthermore, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) have contributed to significant reductions 
in Africa’s debt burden.93 
 
However, trends in Africa’s socio-economic and environmental indicators raise questions about 
the sustainability of the continent’s development trajectory. At the socio-economic level, Africa’s 
growth performance has not been associated with significant reductions in poverty or 
improvements in employment opportunities. The growth elasticity of poverty in sub-Saharan 
 
92  Analysis based on the OECD International Development Statistics Database (2016). 
93  According to the UNSD (2015), 30 African countries reached completion point and received significant debt 
relief under the enhanced HIPC initiative. Other three African countries, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan 
reached pre-decision point under the initiative. The MDRI, which was provided a 100 per cent debt cancellation to 
low-income African countries, has further mitigated the effects of external debt burden, amounting cumulatively 
US$31.7 billion in end-2013 net present value terms. 
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Africa is estimated at −1.57 which is relatively low compared to other regions (ECA and AUC, 
2012). As a result, the continent has the highest rate of extreme poverty globally and the number 
of poor people is on the rise despite reductions in the poverty rate. Extreme poverty (measured at 
US$1.25 per day) in sub-Saharan Africa declined 14.2 per cent over a 22-year period from 56.9 
per cent in 1990 to 42.8 per cent in 2012. Meanwhile, the number of poor people swelled to 389 
million from 280 million during the same period owing to Africa’s rapid population growth 
(UNSD, 2015) (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1. Proportion of population living below US$ 1.25 purchasing power parity per day 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the WDI (2016). 
 
A contributing factor to the limited impact of growth on poverty is the fact that Africa’s growth 
acceleration has not been associated with commensurate increases in decent employment 
opportunities. Approximately 70 per cent of jobs in sub-Saharan Africa are classified as vulnerable, 
and youth unemployment rates are high averaging 21.08 per cent. Unemployment and 
underemployment are particularly pervasive among the youth. Using the International Labour 
Organization’s Trends Econometric Models (2014), the overall unemployment rate in 2015 for the 
continent was 12 per cent, with the highest unemployment rates in Southern Africa (18.0 per cent), 
North Africa (13.9 per cent), East Africa (10.7 per cent), West Africa (9.1 per cent), and Central 





































for their male counterparts in all regions, highlighting gender disparities in access to jobs. The 
disconnect between growth and employment creation can be attributed to the primary commodity 
dependence of most African economies which renders them vulnerable to external shocks and 
undermines prospects for job creation through value-addition and beneficiation. Indeed, the 
continent has experienced a prolonged era of De-industrialisation as evidenced by the stagnation 
in manufacturing value-added at around 11 per cent of GDP. On the other hand, service sector 
value-added has increased substantially over the same period (see Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2. Sectoral contributions to GDP in Africa 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the WDI (2016). 
 
The lack of inclusive growth has contributed to social exclusion in Africa. Social exclusion is 
manifested by high-income inequalities and disparities in access to social services. With an 
average Gini coefficient of 43.9 per cent over the period 2000–2009, income inequality in Africa 
is second only to Latin America which averaged 52.2 per cent over the same period (AfDB, 2012). 
In 2010, six out of the ten most unequal countries worldwide were in Africa; the Southern Africa 
subregion exhibits the highest level of inequality in the continent (Armah et al., 2014). 
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Disparities in access to social services are also pervasive and pronounced in the rural areas. Births 
to women in the top wealth quintile group are nearly three times more likely to be attended by a 
trained professional than births to women in the poorest quintile. Ninety per cent of women living 
in urban areas have at least one antenatal care visit during pregnancy, compared to 71 per cent of 
women living in rural areas (ECA et al., 2011). Children and adolescents from the poorest 
households are at least three times more likely to be out of school than children from the richest 
households; and the poorest households are more than twice as likely to be stunted as children 
from the richest households, leading to further school dropouts (ECA et al., 2014). 
 
At the level of the environment, the continent has the lowest greenhouse gas emissions globally; 
however, like the rest of the world, the continent’s emissions are closely related to the rate of 
PCGDP growth (see Figures. 4.3 and 4.4). Carbon dioxide emissions peaked with per capita 
income growth in 2004, declined sharply in 2005, and resumed an upward trend thereafter. These 
trends suggest that at current rates, Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions will rise with accelerated 
growth. 
 
Figure 4.3. Carbon dioxide emissions and per capita GDP growth trends in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the WDI (2016). 
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Figure 4.4. Carbon dioxide emissions and per capita GDP growth trends globally 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the WDI (2016). 
 
In effect, on current trends, Africa’s growth performance can be described as unsustainable due to 
excessive dependence on a narrow range of primary commodities, high levels of income inequality 
and disparities in access to social services, and the close association between growth and 
greenhouse gas emissions. Recognising the importance of sustainability to the development 
discourse, the 2030 Agenda as well as Africa’s Agenda 2063 include several goals, targets, and 
indicators that capture the three dimensions of sustainability. 
 
They also underline the importance of factoring economic, social, and environmental sustainability 
into national planning frameworks (AUC, 2014; UN, 2015b). Furthermore, the climate agreement 
reached in Paris during the 21 Conference of the Parties calls on countries to commit to actions 
that are consistent with maintaining temperature levels to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above 
preindustrial levels. 
 
The development initiatives cited earlier call for a paradigm shift in the development discourse 
and refute the practice whereby countries initially focus on growth and address issues of inclusion 
and environmental degradation later. Attempts to integrate sustainability into the development 
discourse can be traced to the Rio conference or earth summit in 1992 (UN, 1992). Subsequently 
in 2012, Rio+20 reaffirmed the commitment of countries to the implementation of a sustainable 
development agenda. Specifically, member states agreed to establish an inclusive and transparent 
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intergovernmental process on SDGs that should ‘incorporate in a balanced way all three 
dimensions of sustainable development and their interlinkages’ and ‘should be coherent with and 
integrated into the UN development agenda beyond 2015’.94 
 
The implication of the 2030 Agenda is that Africa’s structural transformation must be anchored by 
the principles of sustainable development. This raises the question of how efforts to advance 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability will relate to Africa’s structural transformation 
agenda. What is the likely relationship between the 2030 Agenda and structural transformation in 
Africa? 
 
The theory of the relationship between sustainable development and transformation can be gleaned 
from the seminal work of Simon Kuznets (1955) who hypothesised that the relationship between 
inequality and transformation is U-shaped, with inequality increasing in the early stages of 
development as capital holders become relatively more wealthy due to new opportunities to invest, 
and subsequently decreasing as the benefits of transformation trickle down to the population 
allowing an average level of income to be achieved through notably better wages. Incidentally, the 
Kuznets theory is in line with the ‘Grow First and Redistribute Later’ school of thought. In reality, 
the process of structural transformation observed in some Asian countries such as South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore was actually contrary to the Kuznets theory. The rapid economic growth 
which was achieved mainly through substantial increases in the manufacturing and export sectors 
during the 1960s–1990s period resulted in declines in absolute poverty without corresponding 
increases in inequality. According to Stiglitz (1996), this outcome was due to the fact that these 
countries immediately re-invested the benefits from rapid growth into land reform and universal 
education all of which supported an inclusive growth process. 
 
A contrasting theory on the relationship between growth and social inclusion thought which is 
consistent with the sustainable development thinking argues that addressing inequalities promotes 
growth for at least three reasons. First, inequality in resource endowments affects the ability of 
poor but competent agents to borrow in order to carry out productive investments because they 
 
94  The UN General Assembly Resolution 66/288. “The future we want,” July 27, 2012, paragraph 246, accessed 
November 18, 2015, from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%20A/RES/66/288 
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lack collateral (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Piketty, 1997). As a result, 
inequality results in misallocation and underutilisation of resources, slower economic growth, and 
possibly a weaker industrialisation and structural transformation process. Second, inequality 
affects growth through its impact on human capital and fertility. Poor parents with relatively low 
level of education often fail to invest in the education of their children, partly because of inadequate 
resource endowments. Low income also affects decisions about fertility (Ehrhart, 2009). Parents 
with low income tend to have more children with the hope of increasing the aggregate household 
income. However, high fertility further curtails the ability of the parents to invest in quality 
education for their children (Perotti, 1996) thus contributing to intergenerational poverty and 
inequality. Third, inequality affects the size and composition of aggregate demand and hence 
reduces the market for industrial production (Nurkse, 1953). 
 
Grossman and Krueger’s (1995) Environmental Kuznets curve concept provides theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the relationship between growth and the environment. The authors 
hypothesise that industrial development initially leads to greater emissions of greenhouse gases; 
however, net emissions eventually decline as the increase in income associated with further 
development leads to technological innovations to curb such emissions. Once again, this theory is 
at odds with the current thinking on sustainable development which requires countries to integrate 
or decouple greenhouse gas emissions from their growth process even in the initial stages of 
development. In line with the sustainable development paradigm, there is a growing body of 
research that suggests that relative to other continents, the potential for economic greening is 
higher in Africa (Collier and Venables, 2012; Simon, 2013). These authors argue that Africa’s vast 
untapped water resources and location gives it a competitive edge in the production of renewable 
energies such as hydro and solar power. Furthermore, as a latecomer, Africa can leapfrog fossil 
fuels to clean energy by immediately benefitting from advanced countries’ greening experiences 
and associated technologies. In this context, synergies between environmental and economic 
development are likely even at the early stages of the development process. Indeed, some Africa 
countries are among the global front runners in terms of greening their economies (UNEP, 2015). 
 
In addition to issues of social inclusion and environmental degradation, institutions can play an 
important role in fostering growth and sustainable transformation. The ‘institutional quality 
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hypothesis’ contends that sustainable growth is significantly influenced by the institutions within 
which agents interact. In effect, institutions can play a mutually reinforcing role in supporting 
structural transformation (Rodrik et al., 2002; Veeman and Politylo, 2003; Osman et al., 2012). 
 
The foregoing analysis of the literature suggests that in theory, structural transformation and 
growth can be achieved without necessarily sacrificing social inclusion or the environment. In 
effect, countries need not adopt a ‘Grow First and Achieve Social Inclusion and Environmental 
Conservation Later’ approach. On the contrary, promoting inclusion and addressing environmental 
degradation as part of a development strategy can lead to growth and sustainable transformation. 
Does the evidence support this theory in Africa? To gain insights to this question, this study 
empirically analyses the relationship between institutional quality and selected indicators of 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability and structural transformation in Africa. 
 
4.2. Methodology and data 
 
Using a balanced data set for a group of 29 African countries95 spanning the period 1995–2011, 
this study employs a panel data econometric model to investigate the empirical link between 
selected indicators of sustainable development and structural transformation. 
 
 
95  Of 53 African countries in total, 24 countries were excluded in order to obtain a balanced data set covering 
all four economic, social, environmental, institutional and structural transformation measurements within the same 
timeframe. Unbalanced panel data set with extended coverage of countries and timeframe can be employed in this 
study as most statistical software is able to handle such unbalanced data set. However, we decided to stick to using a 
balanced data set that is informed by data availability so as to both capture the structural transformation dynamism in 
Africa as a whole (although South Africa can possibly be considered an outlier given its level of development) and to 
compare the synergies between indicators in the process of structural transformation, while attempting to avoid any 
unnecessary complication of our analysis such as potential selection bias of geographical or income pattern. The 
countries for analysis are thus: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, 
the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and 
Zambia. 
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4.2.1. Selection of indicators 
 
The choice of appropriate indicators to measure economic, social, and environmental sustainability 
is a complex one given the variety of interpretations of sustainable development. At the 
international level, measurement indicators have been developed by various agencies, notably the 
UN. Similarly, most European countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and 
Switzerland have developed their own measurement indicators that are linked to national 
development frameworks (UN, 2008). 
 
For the purposes of this study, the choice of indicators is based on the methodology adopted by 
the Commission on Sustainable Development (UN, 2001), to define the three dimensions of 
sustainable development. The economic dimension comprises indicators of growth, investment, 
green economy, and energy use. Indicators of social sustainability comprise poverty, access to 
improved sanitation, life quality, and maternal health. The environmental dimension consists of 
climate change, agriculture land, forest cover, and access to improved water sources. Institutional 
quality is measured by indicators of government stability, socio-economic conditions, corruption, 
and democratic accountability. 
 
The number of indicators chosen was small enough to be manageable but sufficiently large in 
number to ensure that the three dimensions of sustainable development were adequately captured 
in the analysis. The choice of variables was also informed by data availability (Osman et al., 2012). 
 
4.2.2. Economic dimension 
 
GDP growth is one of the most widely used indicators for measuring progress towards economic 
growth (Giddings et al., 2002). Related to GDP growth is per capita income which takes into 
account the population size. Second, the investment to GDP ratio performance reflects the infusion 
of capital to accelerate economic development. However, not all growth or investments are 
sustainable especially if they deplete a nation’s natural capita. For this reason, we include two 
additional indicators: renewable energy consumption and the efficiency and intensity of energy 
use. Renewable energy consumption can be a catalyst for economic growth while minimising 
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environmental stress (Bugaje, 2006). Energy efficiency and intensity levels are also important 
indicators of sustainability (Vera and Langlois, 2007). For this study, the energy supply to GDP 
ratio is a proxy for energy efficiency; lower ratios imply greater efficiencies in the use of energy. 
 
4.2.3. Social dimension 
 
The unemployment rate, life expectancy, access to improved sanitation, and the adolescent fertility 
rate are used as proxies for social sustainability, with particular focus on social inclusion in this 
study. Social inclusion can be defined as the process of improving citizen participation in socio-
economic activities, especially for marginalised or disadvantaged groups. In this respect, the 
unemployment rate is one of the key determinants of the poverty level that could broadly measure 
the degree of inclusion although we acknowledge that employment can coexist with poverty when 
jobs are insecure and underemployment is prevalent (Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998). As being very 
closely associated with quality of life, life expectancy is an important component and has 
implications for social inclusion, particularly due to demographic transition such as ageing 
population.96 Additionally, access to basic socio-economic services such as sanitation provides 
effective measure of social inclusion and indeed a globally accepted indicator for this dimension 
(Katukiza et al., 2010). Furthermore, the adolescent fertility rate or unintended pregnancies is a 
significant cause of school dropout, which in turn undermines productive capacities and 
contributes to poverty thus social exclusion97 (Klima, 1998; McQueston et al., 2012; Kibret et al., 
2014; Akbarzadeh et al., 2016). 
 
4.2.4. Environmental dimension 
 
 
96  Indeed, it has been widely applied to various globally accepted measures such as the physical quality-of-life 
index (PQLI) and the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Index (UNDP-HDI) (Morris, 1979; Ray, 
2008). 
97  Meanwhile, infant mortality measure could possibly reflect the dimension of social inclusion but is more 
powerful measure to capture society’s dual capability in terms of intergenerationality as well as quality health services. 
In this respect, this can be a critical factor to incorporate the intergenerational transmission of human capital for the 
structural transformation process (Jain, 1985; Fayissa, 2001). 
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Indicators of environmental conservation comprise carbon dioxide emissions, forest cover, access 
to improved water sources, and access to arable land. Carbon dioxide emissions are the leading 
cause of global warming and environmental hazards that adversely affect output and productivity, 
and this undermine the development process through their destructive effects on infrastructure and 
the health of citizenry. Such environmental hazards are often forming of externalities which result 
in shifts in one’s production and utility due to those of others (Christiansen and Smith, 2012). In 
fact, due to the intangible nature of environmental externalities and the geographical diversity of 
the sample, cross-border effects cannot be captured effectively and consistently in the current 
country-level analysis. Forest cover on the other hand constitutes a carbon sink that mitigates 
environmental hazards by strengthening capacity to adapt to climate change (Foody, 2003). 
Meanwhile, access to improved water sources is influenced by extreme weather conditions 
including droughts but it is important for energy production. Access to water further influences 
industrial output through its impact on the agricultural sector which is an essential input into 
manufacturing. Hectares of arable land per capita can inform the quality of land management 
practices (Zander and Kächeleb, 1999). It should, however, be noted that most agricultural land in 
developing countries tends to be household farms that could have an excess of domestic farms -
labour supply relative to other factor inputs (World Bank, 2012). 
 
4.2.5. Institutional dimension 
 
In addition to the three dimensions, the role of institutions for Africa's structural transformation 
have widely been recognised as the concept of endogenous institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012; Nissanke, 2015). In a broader concept, institutions themselves, which essentially pertain to 
the governance of society, its formal distribution of authority, use of force, and its relationships to 
other societies and political units, can influence to shape national development trajectory and 
social change (Harris, 1997). In the colonised nations of Africa, where natural resources were 
abundant and climatic conditions were favourable for growing crops, but not for European 
settlement, the colonisers established extractive institutions to benefit their citizens back home 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Such institutions lead to less progressive outcomes, due to the 
high barriers to economic participation, limited opportunities for innovation and exploitation of 
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talent by the less privileged and small holders. The overall effect is thus retarded growth and 
limited transformation in Africa.  
 
In contrast, effective and inclusive institutions are key to unlocking the continent’s potential for 
industrialisation, technological advancement and thus structural transformation (Nissanke, 2019). 
African countries can easily bet on institutions for such transformation because designing and 
nurturing institutions is in the control of the people and their representatives. But struggles exist 
between reformers and conservative leaders who benefit from exclusive institutions through 
corruption and extraction and the corrupt tend to win because of their connections with the political 
leadership, control of the judiciary and military (Collier, 2007). This is why most sub-Saharan 
African countries have not built strong and inclusive institutions yet where non-state actors have 
weak engagement, which increases government’s (organized interest groups) institutional power 
not to implement any necessary reforms. Thus, developing fully inclusive economic, political and 
social institutions should be understood as a long-term and learning process in Africa. 
 
In this context, institutional quality indicators capturing the aforementioned dimensions of 
government stability, socio-economic pressures, corruption, and accountability, all of which are 
systematically interconnected each other to influence the process of structural transformation, are 
included in the analysis. Government stability with legislative strength reflects the government's 
ability to carry out its declared development programme, while socio-economic conditions can 
relate to constraining government's policy action or fuelling social dissatisfaction. Corruption 
continues to be the most serious risks to Africa's development as for instance, Africa is estimated 
to have lost in excess of US$1 trillion from illicit financial flows (i.e., aggressive tax avoidance 
practices of multinational companies) over the last sixty years (Baek, 2019). Democratic 
accountability means to promoting shareholder participation towards more inclusive 
transformation process. In short, the process of structural transformation can be accelerated by 
inclusive institutions as a function of government stability, the pervasiveness of corruption, 
democratic accountability and socio-economic conditions 98  (Veeman and Politylo, 2003; 
 
98  Based on the methodology of the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Services Group, 2015), 
government stability is measured by the sum of three sub-components (government unity, legislative strength and 
popular support), each with a maximum score of four points (very low risk) and a minimum score of 0 points (very 
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Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Osman et al., 2012). The quality of property rights institutions 
could additionally be incorporated in this analysis as Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) empirically 
found the robustness to various economic outcomes such as income per capita. Nonetheless, we 
decided not to do so in this study because of less clear linkage between property rights institutions 
and the process of structural transformation. 
 
4.2.6. Measuring structural transformation 
 
Measuring structural transformation remains controversial as it is considered new development 
thinking as a process- and outcome-driven context-dependent national development priority for a 
majority of developing countries (Dabla-Norris et al., 2013). Traditionally it has been defined as a 
process by which the relative importance of different sectors and activities of an economy change 
over time, particularly sectoral share from agriculture to industry and services (Herrendorf, 
Rogerson and Valentinyi, 2013), while also improving agricultural productivity (Christiaensen, 
Demery Kuhl, 2011). This shifts in sectoral shares can be captured by the respective shares of 
manufacturing and services sector value-added, whereas agricultural productivity can be measured 
by agriculture production indicator supported by higher cereal yield. Furthermore, such sectoral 
shift can be accelerated by well-functioning financial markets that facilitate the reallocation of 
economic resources and activities from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors (Calderon 
and Liu, 2003; Wampah, 2013). 
 
From a more dynamic perspective, structural transformation can further be understood in relation 
to the need for an economy to be flexible enough to adapt its national context to the recent 
 
high risk), thus totally 12-point score. The pervasiveness of corruption is measured primarily concerning actual or 
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favour-for favours’, secret party 
funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business, thus totally 6-point score. Democratic 
accountability is measured on the basis of the type of governance enjoyed by the country in question (Alternating 
Democracy, Dominated Democracy, De Facto One-Party State, De Jure One-Party State, and Autarchy) The highest 
number of risk points (lowest risk) is assigned to Alternating Democracies, while the lowest number of risk points 
(highest risk) is assigned to Autarchies, thus totally 6-point score. Socio-economic conditions are measured by the 
sum of three sub-components (unemployment, consumer confidence and poverty), each with a maximum score of four 
points (very low risk) and a minimum score of 0 points (very high risk), thus totally 12-point score. 
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accelerating pace of change in the global environment effectively (Killick, 1995; Hassink, 2010). 
This perspective is firmly in line with development thinking of the New Structural Economics 
school of thought who emphasises the importance of upgrading factor endowments, and such 
endowments can be altered in the long term through upgrading and technological innovation (Lin, 
2012). In this development idea, greater potential in using internet penetration data for Sub-
Saharan Africa was studied by Asongu, Le Roux and Biekpe (2018). African countries may not 
necessarily develop new technology themselves but rather have the flexible process of adapting it 
from existing technology transfer mechanisms available to them (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014). 
In this respect, Internet users data as its proxy indicator is applied in this study. It should, however, 
be noted that without effective intergenerational transmission of human capital, technological 
possibilities cannot be materialised (Jones and Romer, 2009). Therefore, infant mortality data is 
included into the data set as a proxy indicator that reflects society’s dual capability in terms of 
intergenerationality as well as quality health services. This is indeed a critical factor to incorporate 
the inclusiveness of the structural transformation process (Jain, 1985; Fayissa, 2001).  
 
In his ‘Mathematics of structural transformation sector’ (Timmer et al., 2012), Peter Timmer 
defined structural transformation with the multiple processes which are (a) a declining GDP share 
of agriculture accompanied by increasing productivity in the sector, (b) a rapid increase in the pace 
of urbanisation, (c) rising relative GDP shares of the manufacturing and service sectors, and (d) a 
demographic transition from high to low rates of births and deaths. In line with Timmer’s definition, 
the UN-led ‘Istanbul Programme of Action (IPoA) for the LDCs 2011-2020’ 99  identified 
specifically “improvement of health services by decreasing the infant mortality rate” as one of the 
essential driving factors of structural transformation (LDC IV Monitor, 2015, p.61). In sum, the 
study constructs a structural transformation index comprising the above seven variables to move 
towards a balanced multi-dimensional structural transformation. The list of variables is provided 
in Table 4.1.  
 
 
99  The IPoA, adopted in Istanbul on 9-13 May 2011, charts out the international community’s vision and 
strategy for the sustainable development of LDCs for the next decade with a strong focus on developing their 
productive capacities. Its implementation is led by the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least 
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS). 
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Using annual balanced data set from 1995–2011 with 29 African countries, however, may remain 
controversial concerning the potential sample bias. For example, the 24 countries left out due to a 
lack of data could have been included as a control group – e.g. showing how individual indicators 
actually did not contribute to the process of structural transformation. Geographical grouping can 
be another area of concern in this regard. Despite such concerns, our sample selection process was 
unbiased to be transparent in order to compare the synergies and/or trade-offs between indicators 
in the process of structural transformation, while ensuring that structural transformation dynamism 
is comprehensive enough to be captured in African continent as a whole. As shown in Table 4.2, 
five indicators, including renewable energy consumption, adolescent fertility rate, sanitation 
facilities, forest area and improved water source are considered fast changing while institutional 
factors appear not to vary much within a country over time. It should be acknowledged that the 
difference between “fast changing” versus “slow changing” could affect the average variance 
extracted, thereby influencing our interpretations of the modelling results.100 Nonetheless, the 17 
year-time period would be a reasonable compromise in terms of length of time to capture changes 
in slow with fast changing variables, while a breakdown between the two types of variables could 




100  The average variance extracted (AVE) is discussed in a detail in the structural equation modelling employed 
in the chapter 5.  
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Table 4.1. Classification and variable description 
  
Dimension Area of Importance Proxy Indicator and description Source 
Independent 
variable 
Economic Economic growth per capita GDP (annual %) WDI 
Investment Total investment (% of GDP) WEO 
Green economy Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy 
consumption) 
WDI 
Energy use Energy intensity level of primary energy WDI 
Social Poverty Unemployment rate (% of total labour force) WDI 
Sanitation Sanitation facilities (% of population with access) WDI 
Life quality Life expectancy at birth (years) WDI 
Maternal health Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15−19) WDI 
Environmental Climate change Emissions of carbon dioxide (metric tons per capita) WDI 
Agriculture land Arable land (hectares per person) WDI 
Forests Forest area (square km) WDI 
Water Improved water source (% of population with access) WDI 
Institutional quality Government stability Government’s ability to carry out its declared program and policy ICRG 
Socio-economic conditions Socio-economic pressures at work in society that could constrain 
government action or fuel social dissatisfaction 
ICRG 
Corruption Corruption within the political system ICRG 
Democratic accountability How responsive government is to its people in terms of widespread 






Higher agricultural productivity by 
achieving a higher cereal yield 
Cereal yield (kg per hectare) WDI 
Agriculture gross per capita production index (2004−2006 = 100) FAOSTAT 
Higher share of manufacturing in 
value-addition 
Manufacturing value-added (% of GDP) WDI 
Increases in the share of ICT in 
services exports 
Services value-added (% of GDP) WDI 
Better telecommunications 
infrastructure 
Internet users (per 100 people) WDI 
Improving health services by 
decreasing infant mortality rate 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) WDI 
More developed financial market Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) WDI 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
Note: WDI stands for the WDI (2015); WEO stands for the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (2015); FAOSTAT stands for the FAO’s Statistics Division 




Table 4.2. Summary statistics 
 
   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Probability  Sum  Obser. 
PCGDP 2.0189 2.0142 30.342 -29.634 4.0355 -0.1395 17.365 4240.71 0.0000 995.3 493 
INV 20.605 20.169 49.524 2.3230 8.1231 0.3545 3.2013 11.1579 0.0038 10158.4 493 
REC 64.676 78.988 96.737 0.1799 29.644 -0.9233 2.3648 78.3387 0.0000 31885.5 493 
EIL 8.7599 7.1263 37.668 2.5609 5.3680 1.6358 7.3849 614.823 0.0000 4318.7 493 
UEMPL 9.5594 7.6000 37.600 1.6000 6.5523 1.2224 3.8738 138.457 0.0000 4712.8 493 
SANIT 34.401 28.800 94.700 5.2000 24.107 0.8696 2.6956 64.0342 0.0000 16959.7 493 
LIFE 54.819 53.588 74.602 35.820 7.9649 0.5542 2.9612 25.2661 0.0000 27025.8 493 
AFR 119.03 129.19 221.51 6.0430 53.115 -0.3619 2.5626 14.6909 0.0006 58683.5 493 
CO2 0.9563 0.2678 9.5455 0.0487 1.7067 3.4549 15.923 4411.71 0.0000 471.5 493 
ARAL 0.2843 0.2468 1.4938 0.0330 0.1911 3.6255 19.1913 6465.18 0.0000 140.1 493 
FORE 124307 67960 603520 515 151878 1.7965 5.2886 372.782 0.0000 61283110 493 
WATS 67.303 65.400 98.600 34.000 17.185 0.1118 1.7905 31.0789 0.0000 33180.7 493 
GOVS 8.8306 9.1667 11.083 3.3333 1.6798 -0.7905 2.9104 51.5094 0.0000 4353.5 493 
SOCIO 4.0107 4.0000 8.0000 1.5000 1.3735 0.1175 2.1903 14.6022 0.0007 1977.3 493 
CORR 2.3370 2.0000 5.0000 0.0000 0.8079 0.3571 3.4604 14.8326 0.0006 1152.1 493 
DEMO 3.2478 3.0000 5.5000 0.0000 1.1119 -0.1127 2.4181 7.9998 0.0183 1601.2 493 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the Eviews 8.0 statistical package. 
Note: PCGDP stands for per capita GDP, INV stands for investment; REC stands for renewable energy consumption; EIL stands for energy intensity level of 
primary energy; UEMPL stands for unemployment rate; SANIT stands for sanitation facilities; LIFE stands for life expectancy at birth; AFR stands for adolescent 
fertility rate;CO2 stands for emissions of carbon dioxide; ARAL stands for arable land; FORE stands for forest area; WATS stands for improved water source; 
GOV stands for government stability; SOCIO stands for socio-economic conditions; CORR stands for corruption; and DEMO stands for democratic accountability. 
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4.3. Modelling approaches 
 
The study uses factor analysis to construct a structural transformation index which is regressed 
against proxies for the three dimensions of sustainable development as well as indicators of 
institutional effectiveness 
 
4.3.1. Factor analysis 
 
The methodological approach to constructing the multi-dimensional index is similar to that of the 
UNDP-HDI. We use factor analysis to group the seven components of the structural transformation 
variable into a single index. The composite index retains as much information as possible from the 
seven underlying variables. Each factor is estimated using the maximum likelihood method to 
identify a set of strongly associated indicators (Dempster et al., 1977). 
 
Constructing a weighted composite indicator of structural transformation enables cross-country 
comparisons of the status of structural change and collapses several proxies of structural change 
from one dependent variable into one variable while retaining most of the underlying information 
(Saltelli, 2007; Kelbore, 2014). 
 
The use of factor analysis to construct a weighted multi-dimensional structural transformation 
indicator involves the following five steps: the first is to check for the correlation structure of the 
underlying variables; the next step identifies and retains the sub-set of the factors that explain the 
largest amount of variance in the underlying variables (based on the estimated eigenvalues); the 
third step is to rotate the eigenvalues of the retained factors using the Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalisation method in order to determine the contribution of each of the underlying variables 
to each of the retained factors; the fourth step aggregates the contribution of each underlying 
variable to all the retained factors, these weights are then normalised to arrive at the contribution 
of each variable to the structural transformation index; and based on the latter weights, the final 
step is to compute a weighted average per country of each variable’s contribution to the structural 




4.3.2. Panel data modelling 
 
The panel model approach facilitates control for unobserved heterogeneity in the adjustment 
dynamics between countries (Bond, 2002). A critical consideration when employing such models 
is whether or not to use a lagged dependent variable. A growing body of researchers, including 
Baltagi (2013) and Hsiao (2014), argues that longitudinal panel data with lagged values cause 
critical estimation problems including biased coefficients. This study does not apply a lagged 
dependent variable. It should, however, be recognised here that any structural break in the 
individual series due to an external shock such as a pandemic would certainly affect the standard 
errors in several country-based variables. There is a cross-border element not captured by the 
country dummies. Other shocks in the series that are purely country-based would be captured by 
the country dummy. Furthermore, reverse causality would need to be addressed when investigating 
causality in our panel data modelling. In fact, there are a number of alternative solutions suggested 
in the methodological literature (e.g. a lagged independent variable or a time trend) and it still 
remains controversial among scholars (Leszczensky and Wolbring, 2019). While potential risk 
with regard to reverse causality is acknowledged, the present analysis primarily looks at the 
relationships and synergies/trade-offs between variables, rather than impact from one to another. 
 
The model specification is as follows: 
 
yit = β0i + β1ECONit + β2SCOit + β3ENVit + β4INSTit + εit 
 
where i is country dimension (i = 1,…,N), t represents the time dimension (t = 1,…,T); yit 
is the composite structural transformation index; ECONit is a vector of indicators 
representing the economic dimension of sustainability; SOCit represents a vector of 
indicators of social sustainability; ENVit is a vector of variables reflecting the 
environmental dimension of sustainable development; and INSTit is a vector of variables 
representing institutional quality. 
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4.4. Empirical results and discussions 
 
4.4.1. Composite structural transformation index 
 
The first step in constructing the structural transformation index is to understand the underlying 
relationships among the variables used to construct the index. For this purpose, we estimate the 
correlation between the variables used to construct the composite index. The correlation matrix 
reveals that the most highly correlated variables are services value added and the infant mortality 
rate (−0.559) followed by service value-added and manufacturing value-added (0.552) (see Table 
4.3). Variables that exhibit low levels of correlation are less likely to share common factors. 
 
Table 4.3. Correlation matrix 
 
CREY APIN SERVA INTU MANVA CREDIT MORTI 
CREY 1.000 
      
APIN .085 1.000 
     
SERVA .137 .159 1.000 
    
INTU .245 .216 .243 1.000 
   
MANVA .352 -.026 .552 .175 1.000 
  
CREDIT .484 -.068 .376 .390 .521 1.000 
 
MORTI -.311 -.223 -.559 -.468 -.339 -.353 1.000 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: CREY stands for cereal yield; APIN stands for agriculture gross per capita production index; SERVA 
stands for services value-added; INTU stands for Internet users; MANVA stands for manufacturing value-
added, CREDIT stands for domestic credit provided by financial sector; and MORTI stands for infant 
mortality rate. 
 
Using factor analysis, we employ a set of generally accepted criteria to identify factors in which 
the seven structural transformation variables with high correlations form one underlying variable. 
(Kelbore, 2014). They are factors with eigenvalues closer to or greater than 1, factors with 
individual contributions to the overall variance that exceed 10 per cent, and factors with cumulative 
contributions to the overall variance that are greater than 70 per cent. 
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Based on the aforementioned criteria, we retain three factors with the following characteristics: 
statistically significant at 0.001 per cent level; goodness-of-fit, Chi-Square (31.471), Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (0.680), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (953.938). 
Factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 2.887 and individual and cumulative contributions of 41.240, which 
implies that this factor group explains approximately 41 per cent of the overall variance of the 
seven structural transformation indicators. Factor 2 has an eigenvalue of 1.214, an individual 
contribution of 17.349 per cent and a cumulative contribution of 58.589 per cent. Factor 3 has an 
eigenvalue of 0.959 which is very close to 1 and an individual contribution of 13.695 per cent. 
Overall, these three factors cumulatively explain 72.284 per cent of the overall variance (see Table 
4.4). Factors 4, 5, 6, and 7 are not used for constructing composite index because they fail to meet 
the criteria outlined earlier. 
 
Table 4.4. Eigenvalues of structural transformation data set 
 
Eigenvalues % of Variance explained Cumulative % 
Factor 1 2.887 41.240 41.240 
Factor 2 1.214 17.349 58.589 
Factor 3 .959 13.695 72.284 
Factor 4 .753 10.764 83.048 
Factor 5 .531 7.579 90.627 
Factor 6 .371 5.305 95.932 
Factor 7 .285 4.068 100.000 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: Extraction method is maximum likelihood. The eigenvalue is a measure of how much of the variance 
of the observed variables a factor explains. The eigenvalue of 2.8 for factor 1 means that factor explains as 
much variance as 2.8 of the observed variables 
 
In the next step, we rotate the three factors using the Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation method 
in order to estimate the relative contribution of each variable to each of the retained factors. We 
use the Oblimin method because unlike other methods, it assumes the underlying variables are 
correlated which is normally the case in the field of social science. In contrast, orthogonal rotation 
methods such as Varimax assume that factors in the analysis are uncorrelated; however, this 
assumption is only valid in the field of physics or natural science (Gorsuch, 1983). The resulting 
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factor loadings represent the strength of association between a factor and a variable. By squaring 
and scaling the factor loadings, we are able to evaluate the importance of a variable to a factor 
(Field, 2000). 
 
Table 4.5 shows the rotated factor loadings for each indicator as well as the three retained factors. 
Factor 1 contains two variables: services value added (0.996) and manufacturing value-added 
(0.517). The other five variables have relatively smaller factor loadings (i.e. less than 0.500). 
Factor 2 contains only two variables with factor loadings exceeding 0.500: domestic credit (0.763) 
and cereal yield (0.618). The two variables have a correlation coefficient of 0.484. Factor 3 
contains relatively lower factor loadings since their eigenvalue do not exceed 1. Hence, although 
none of factor loadings are greater than 0.500, we can retain the three variables that are closer to 
0.500: infant mortality rate (−0.499), Internet users (0.493), and agriculture production index 
(0.450). The other four variables cannot be retained in Factor 3 since their factor loadings are 
smaller than 0.200. Nonetheless, these variables are already allocated to Factors 1 and 2 with 
higher factor loadings. 
 
Table 4.5. Factor and weight analysis 
 
Factor loading Squared factor loading 
(scaled to sum to unity) 
Weight 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
SERVA .996 -.127 .170 .703 .012 .038 .292 
MANVA .517 .356 -.160 .189 .092 .034 .118 
CREDIT .205 .763 -.118 .030 .425 .018 .180 
CREY -.048 .618 .028 .002 .278 .001 .109 
MORTI -.323 -.243 -.499 .074 .043 .326 .116 
INTU -.055 .445 .493 .002 .144 .318 .125 
APIN .028 -.088 .450 .001 .006 .265 .059 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: Extraction method is maximum likelihood. Rotation method is Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation. 
Rotation converged in seven iterations. CREY stands for cereal yield; APIN stands for agriculture gross 
per capita production index; SERVA stands for services value-added; INTU stands for Internet users; 
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MANVA stands for manufacturing value-added; CREDIT stands for domestic credit provided by financial 
sector; and MORTI stands for infant mortality rate. 
 
To estimate the relative weight or contribution of each variable to a factor, we square the factor 
loadings and scale them to unity to facilitate comparison among the variables. The results reveal 
three intermediate indicators. The first intermediate indicator includes service value-added (with 
a weight of 0.703) and manufacturing value-added (with a weight of 0.189). The second 
intermediate indicator includes domestic credit (with a weight of 0.425) and cereal yield (with a 
weight of 0.278). The third group includes mortality rate (with a weight of 0.326), Internet use 
(with a weight of 0.318), and agricultural production (with a weight of 0.265). These weights are 
not used for the calculation of the index but simply for illustration purposes. The weights or relative 
contribution of each of the seven variables to the structural transformation index, presented in the 
last column of Table 4.4, are computed as follows: 
 
Wj = ∑ STIij
2 / (∑ STIi1
2 + ∑ STIi2
2 + ∑ STIi3
2 + ∑ STIi4
2 + ∑ STIi5
2 + ∑ STIi6
2 + ∑ STIi7
2) 
 
where: W is estimated weight; STI represents the variables that comprise the structural 
transformation index; i is the factor dimension (i = 1, 2, 3); and j is variable dimension (j 
= 1 represents services value-added, 2 is manufacturing value-added, 3 is domestic credit 
provided by financial sector, 4 is cereal yield, 5 is infant mortality rate, 6 is internet users 
and 7 is agriculture gross per capita production index) 
 
Services value-added contributes the largest weight to the structural transformation index (29.2), 
followed by domestic credit (18.0 per cent), Internet use per 100 inhabitants (12.5 per cent), 
manufacturing value added (11.8 per cent), infant mortality rate (11.6 per cent), cereal yield (10.9 
per cent), and agriculture gross per capita production index (5.9 per cent). The composite structural 
transformation index (CSTI) is then computed as follows: 
 
CSTIit = ∑ Wcit ∙ STIcit 
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where c is indicator dimension (c = 1 … C), i is country dimension (i = 1 … N), t is time 
dimension (t = 1 … T); Wcit is estimated weight; STIcit represents the variables that 
comprise the structural transformation index; and CSTIit is composite structural 
transformation index. 
 
Figure 4.5 displays evolution of structural transformation for 29 African countries for the period 
1995–2011 based on our estimated composite index for each country. Overall, structural 
transformation in the selected countries has improved by 41.4 per cent on average with the 
exception of the Gambia and Tanzania. 
 
In the Gambia, cereal yield was down by 15 per cent for the period 1995–2011 and agriculture 
gross per capita production index declined from 85.27 to 72.97. It is important to note that the 
country has virtually no natural resources and is highly dependent on development assistance. 
During the period under study, country was significantly affected by external shocks, including 
massive cuts in external aid by the international community that had an adverse impact on 
investments and tourism activities. 101  These may have been contributing factors to De-
industrialisation as its share of manufacturing value-added declined from 8.15 per cent to 5.48 per 
cent over the same period. 
 
The decline in Tanzania’s structural transformation index can be attributed to a significant fall in 
cereal yields (from 1702 to 1390 kg per hectare) over the period. Meanwhile, the country 
experienced only a marginal increase (1 percentage point from 7.1 per cent to 8.1 per cent) in the 
share of manufacturing value-added over the 16-year period. 
 
Morocco experienced the greatest improvement in structural transformation (199.2 per cent) 
followed by South Africa (150.8 per cent). Both countries experienced substantial increases in 
cereal yield (261 per cent in Morocco and 83 per cent in South Africa), gross per capita agriculture 
production (93 per cent in Morocco and 25 per cent in South Africa) and domestic credit (112 per 
cent in Morocco and 26 per cent in South Africa). 
 
101  Analysis based on the WDI (2015). 
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It should, however, be acknowledged that despite its advantage of capturing multi-dimensional 
feature of structural transformation for comparison analysis between countries, composite 
indicator analysis could be exposed to limitation concerning sensitivity and volatility of sub-
indicators, which could mislead non-robust policy implications (Freudenberg, 2003). The main 
reason of high volatility observed in Figure 4.5 is that we have applied our generalised weights 
(from 29 countries) to each of country’s structural transformation formula. Therefore, this analysis 
would have less explanatory power of structural transformation performance by individual country 
but can be interpreted better for the performance comparison among countries. 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: Grey line is the best-fitting regression line. 
 
4.4.2. Individual effects by fixed effect model 
 
The composite structural transformation index is used as a dependent variable in a panel regression 
model. The model can be constructed based on three standard approaches, pooled ordinary least 




The pooled regression pools all the data series to avoid the cross section and country-specific 
effects that may exist among 29 African countries. The random effect analysis assumes that 
individual effects are uncorrelated with observed predictors by applying common mean value for 
the intercept (Akbar et al., 2011; Osman et al., 2012). Based on the findings of the Hausman and 
Wald specification tests, we use the fixed effect analysis (Hsiao, 2014). This is appropriate because 
it allows for heterogeneity among selected 29 African countries with 16 dependent variables. 
Differentiating intercepts for each country the model controls for country variations in achieving 
structural transformation (see Figure 4.5). The comparison of the pooled regression, the fixed 
effect and the random effect models are presented in Appendix 4, while the results of the fixed 
effect model and Hausman and Wald test results are presented in Table 4.6. We first use the 
Hausman test (correlated random effects) and, based on the result of Chi-sq. Statistic we reject the 
null hypothesis (random effect model is appropriate). We then move on to additional check by 
using the Wald test whether all dummy variables are zero or not, and finally reject the null 
hypothesis (all dummy variables will be zero thus pooled regression model is appropriate). 
According to the results of the Hausman test and Wald test F-Statistics, both informs that the fixed 
effect model is the most appropriate for our analysis. 
 
By looking at the differences of coefficients between the pooled regression, the fixed effect and 
the random effect models, we could identify the pooled regression coefficients are likely to account 
more for cross-borders effects while the fixed effect model coefficient are relatively not. Moreover, 
the difference of goodness of fit between the pooled regression (0.6370) and the fixed effect model 
(0.9200) in the Model 5 informs us that: 1) the Model 5 of course is our best model and 2) given 
that all of the fixed effect models (1 through 5) have similar R-squares, and relatively higher t-
statistics (probability value) for each explanatory variable is due to the presence of high 
multicollinearity among explanatory variables rather than due to omitted variables. 
 
Being focused on the results of the fixed effect models, we observe that the three dimensions of 
sustainable development have significant relationship to African structural transformation. In 
Model I that focuses only on the economic dimension, investment and the energy intensity level 
are found to be statistically significant at 1 per cent level, which means that higher levels of 
investment have a positive relationship to the process of structural transformation. Furthermore, 
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lower energy intensity level or more efficient use of energy also has a positive and significant 
relationship to the structural transformation process. 
 
The findings however highlight potential trade-offs between clean energy, as proxied by the 
renewable energy indicator, and structural transformation. The coefficient on renewable energy 
consumption carries negative sign indicating the relative short-term cost-effectiveness of 
traditional energy in the production process. Nevertheless, this variable is weakly significant at 10 
per cent level suggesting that it may not be a binding constraint to structural transformation. 
However, rising per capita incomes do not have a statistically significant relationship to structural 
transformation. 
 
In Model II, only the social dimension was tested, and three independent variables are highly 
significant except unemployment rate. To be more specific, the provision of good sanitation 
services and related infrastructure supports a country’s structural transformation efforts. Similarly, 
longer life expectancy is positively associated with the structural transformation process while 
rising adolescent fertility rates have a negative and a statistically significant relationship to 
structural transformation. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies (Klima, 1998; 
McQueston et al., 2012). But our analysis does not confirm the hypothesis that the unemployment 
level has a statistically significant relationship to structural transformation. 
 
Model III that focuses on indicators of environmental efficiency reveals that structural 
transformation is enhanced by increased carbon dioxide emissions and improved access to water. 
However, access to arable land has a significantly negative relationship to transformation while 
forest cover has no significant relationship as well. 
 
Unlike the other models, Model IV, which takes into account the economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development, reveals the positive and significant 
contribution of per capita incomes to structural transformation. However, renewable energy now 
has a positive and significant relationship to on structural transformation while carbon dioxide 
emissions no longer have a significant relationship when the economic and social dimensions are 
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taken into account. This points to the potential role of renewable energy in facilitating 
transformation in Africa. 
 
Including institutional variables in Model V further improves the explanatory power of the model 
as evidenced by increased value of both the adjusted R-squared and log likelihood estimates. 
However, the level of significance of per capita incomes and renewal energy consumption are 
lower implying a weaker relationship to transformation when institutional factors are taken into 
account. Democracy and accountability and socioeconomic conditions have a positive and 
statistically significant bearing on structural transformation. Government stability and corruption 




Table 4.6. Results (coefficients) of panel data analysis 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1; and robust t-statistics in brackets. 
 
Variable MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV MODEL V 
ECON PCGDP .0034 
  
.0038 (2.003)** .0035 (1.863)*  
INV .0060 (4.369)*** 
  
.0038 (2.851)*** .0039 (2.962)***  
REC -.0043 (-1.766)* 
  
.0049 (1.983)** .0047 (1.878)*  
EIL -.3031 (-4.942)*** 
  




















-.4074 (-3.993)*** -.4303 (-4.220)*** 
ENV CO2 
  
.0881 (2.614)*** .0302 .0095  
ARAL 
  
-.2895 (-4.766)*** -.1824 (-2.857)*** -.2179 (-3.365)***  
FORE 
  
.0000 .0000 .0000  
WATS 
  
.0138 (8.327)*** .0063 (2.848)*** .0064 (2.643)*** 
INST GOVS 
    
.0005  
SOCIO 
    
.0199 (2.027)**  
CORR 
    
-.0007  
DEMO 
    
.0229 (2.429)**  
C 5.8540 (36.236)*** 6.8667 (12.160)*** 3.7593 (14.894)*** 5.8918 (9.454)*** 5.5994 (8.593)*** 
Hausman Test      
Chi-Sq. Statistic 10.6523** 47.4023*** 14.0502*** 58.4661*** 55.5932*** 
Wald Test      
F-statistic 145.7811*** 136.6526*** 101.1344*** 61.7847*** 62.4995*** 
Chi-square 3936.091*** 3689.621*** 2730.628*** 1668.188*** 1687.487*** 
Appropriate Model Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8965 0.9120 0.9086 0.9187 0.9199 
Log likelihood 191.4405 231.3463 221.9623 255.1122 261.2915 
F-statistic 134.2430 160.3597 153.8327 139.9591 129.5693 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Akaike info criterion -0.6428 -0.8047 -0.7666 -0.8686 -0.8774 
Schwarz criterion -0.3616 -0.5235 -0.4854 -0.5193 -0.4940 
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.5324 -0.6943 -0.6562 -0.7314 -0.7269 




The most important insight and findings gained from our analysis are that an inclusive and 
sustainable structural transformation agenda requires tackling the economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development in an integrated way. A silo approach that 
focuses on one dimension at the expense of the other has a less optimal relationship to 
transformation. For instance, our results show that when the economic and social dimensions are 
ignored, structural transformation is likely associated with relatively slower changing emissions 
of carbon dioxide. An integrated approach could also appear to minimise potential trade-offs 
relationship between transformation and environmental preservation. The findings also likely 
reveal potential synergies relationship between transformation and fast changing variables such as 
adolescent fertility rates and access to social services (sanitation). 
 
An important policy implication of our analysis is that mainstreaming the three dimensions of 
sustainable development into national and regional planning frameworks is imperative for 
successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda. However, several African countries and 
governments tend to have weak capacities to mainstream such priorities and policies in their 
national planning frameworks and to analyse the trade-offs associated with their policy choices 
(UN, 2015a). Hence, strengthening capacities for development planning and evidence-based 
policymaking is imperative. However, this will require improved access to reliable data which can 
be achieved by strengthening the capacities of National Statistical Offices for data collection and 
analysis. 
 
Notwithstanding a number of important policy implications driven by this study, there are four 
areas of modelling limitations that should clearly be discussed and thus deserve further research. 
First of all, our econometric model may not effectively control for time/period fixed effects. It is 
therefore acknowledged that any structural break in the individual series due to an external shock 
would potentially affect the standard errors in several country-based variables. Potentially existing 
reverse causality can be another source of concern given all covariates are measured at time t, 
when investigating causality between the three dimensions of sustainable development and the 
process of structural transformation. In this respect, an explanatory power of our modelling 
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exercise may possibly be limited in claiming the impact flow from sustainable development to 
transformation and but rather capable of showing a positive/negative relationship between selected 
indicators in each of development dimensions. Addressing this would require a more advanced 
modelling exercise with a lagged independent variable and/or a time trend in order to tackle such 
development impact assessment on structural transformation. Third, reflecting the number of 
countries analysed in the study, future modelling exercise may need to take into consideration 
clustering of geographical neighbourhoods or level of structural transformation when adopting the 
pooled regression or the fixed effect model. By comparing between cluster-robust standard errors 
and conventional ones, such assessment will improve a precision and explanatory power of the 
modelling results (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Finally, further discussion on potential implication 
of slow and fast changing variables for our modelling exercise is worth revisiting as a single 
separate investigation. For instance, why and how do fast changing variables for each time-series 
country based one likely have a greater impact on the process of structural transformation. In so 
doing, such study needs to be informed by the strategic classification of variables between policy 
(innovation) variable, process variable and outcome variable, which could provide a more 
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5. Prioritising interventions for sustainable structural transformation in 
Africa: A structural equation modelling approach 
 
PREFACE 
In the preceding chapter, I found that an integrated approach to sustainable development that 
takes into account economic, social and environmental dimensions has the most beneficial 
impact on Africa’s structural transformation process, compared to a silo approach that focuses 
on one dimension at the expense of another.102 Such investigation did not, however, provide 
sufficient evidence on the trade-offs and synergies effects, thereby failing to provide sufficient 
evidence on strategies through which structural transformation minimising potential trade-offs 
can best be achieved. 
 
The central focus of Chapter 5 is therefore to identify the optimal sequence of social, economic 
and environmental conservation interventions that minimises trade-offs in advancing structural 
transformation. This can be achieved by employing a structural equation model to estimate the 
direct and indirect impacts of social, economic and environmental indicators on a composite 
index of structural transformation. This is pursued by quantifying the total (direct plus indirect) 
impact of economic, social and environmental interventions on structural transformation. 
Hence, this chapter addresses sub-question 4: “How do empirical trade-offs and synergies 
between economic growth, social inclusion and environmental conservation affect structural 
transformation outcomes?” 
 
102  Beyond the empirical findings obtained in Chapter 5, a simple mathematical simulation is conducted to 
explore an illustrative way of alternative structural transformation strategies. My policy simulations are simply run 
for 30 years based on five types of structural transformation: (1) dirty transformation, (2) green transformation, (3) 
zero transformation, (4) dirty transformation for 15 years, then zero transformation for the rest and (5) zero 
transformation for 15 years and then, dirty transformation for the rest. A detailed explanation on the simulation results 
along with the mathematical specifications are presented in Appendix 5. 
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In terms of the potential contribution that relates to the ISD framework, this chapter would 
share broadly the commonality that the previous chapter was linked to but should be viewed as 






In 2015, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development called on signatory 
countries to ensure that their development outcomes were socially, economically and 
environmentally sustainable. Furthermore, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that it set 
out were and are integrated and multi-sectoral implying that interventions in one sector can have 
catalytic impacts on other sectors and could thereby accelerate the achievement of the development 
goals. For developing countries, particularly in Africa, the SDGs are viewed as a means of 
structurally transforming their largely agrarian and commodity-dependent countries into 
manufacturing hubs. Indeed, in recent years Africa has made industrialisation a major policy 
priority in the context of its continental development framework and policy commitments (AUC, 
2015). 
 
However, given the large number of targets and indicators within the SDGs, policy prioritisation 
and sequencing are critical when it comes to resource optimisation and impact (Armah and Baek, 
2018; Baek, 2019). In this context, it is important for policymakers to identify catalytic 
interventions to drive the transformation process. However, studies of the drivers of structural 
transformation have disproportionately analysed economic factors ahead of the other two main 
factors (social and environmental). Besides, few studies have examined the combined effect of 
social, economic, and environmental determinants of structural transformation. This chapter thus 
seeks to determine the relative importance of economic, social and environmental interventions in 
catalysing structural transformation in Africa. 
 
Since 2005, several African countries have made significant progress in sustaining positive growth, 
improving their performance on social indicators, such as health and education, and maintaining 
relatively low levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Real GDP volume increased in this continent 
by 54 per cent between 2004 and 2014, which is more than twice the global average rate of 24 per 
cent (UNCTAD, 2016). However, growth in most African countries has not been inclusive and 
trends in socio-economic indicators have been mixed. For instance, primary enrolment has 
increased but drop-out rates are high and increasing at higher levels of education, perhaps 
suggesting that (secondary) education in these countries is still not of a sufficient quality. Rates of 
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maternal and child deaths have declined but remain the highest globally. Meanwhile, access to 
social services has been skewed in favour of high-income groups and urban dwellers. Indeed, 
according to the Gini coefficient, over the period 2000–2009, inequality in Africa (0.439) was 
second only to Latin America (0.522). The corresponding figures for Asia, North America and 
Europe were 0.375, 0.367 and 0.325, respectively. In 2010, 6 out of the 10 most unequal countries 
worldwide were in Africa (Armah et al., 2014). 
 
High dependence on primary commodity exports and limited value addition characterises much of 
Africa and has largely been associated with limited success in economic diversification. 
Unemployment (and underemployment) remains an enduring feature of the development 
landscape in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where nearly 70 per cent of jobs are 
considered vulnerable, and youth and female labour force participation remain very low (ECA et 
al., 2016). Extreme poverty (defined as earning less than US$1.25 per day) in sub-Saharan Africa, 
for instance, declined by a mere 14 per cent over the period 1990-2012. Meanwhile, 109 million 
more people were classified as extremely poor group (people living in extreme poverty) during 
same period (UNSD, 2016). 
 
With respect to the environment, greenhouse gas emissions in Africa are very low by global 
standards but have been rising at a rapid rate since 2010s. Meanwhile, adaption to climate change 
in Africa is weak and, importantly, the recent socio-economic activities in Africa have not led to 
industrial development. Few African countries have succeeded in increasing the contribution of 
their industrial sector to their GDP. On the contrary, unlike developed countries, most African 
countries have transitioned from agriculture to the service sector. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has located 
economic, social and environmental sustainability at the heart of the development process. In this 
context, this development initiative urges both advanced and developing countries to integrate 
environmental, social and economic sustainability in their development planning frameworks and 
to avoid the untenable ‘grow first and clean up later’ strategy pursued by the majority of the 
currently industrialised countries (UN, 2019). The obvious implication of this is that countries 
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have to not only achieve accelerated growth, but they must also ensure that such growth is inclusive 
and avoids or minimises environmental degradation. 
 
This raises important questions. First, is it feasible to simultaneously achieve economic, social and 
environmental sustainability? If not, in what order should these three types of sustainability be 
pursued? Moreover, would the successful implementation of such policies advance Africa’s 
transformation agenda? 
 
Few developed countries have been successful in simultaneously achieving rapid, green, and 
inclusive growth. Indeed, the experiences of industrialised and emerging countries highlight 
potential trade-offs between economic growth, social inclusion and environmental conservation. 
For instance, China’s transformation has been associated with rapid growth and steep declines in 
poverty, yet inequality and greenhouse gas emissions have increased markedly (Armah and Baek, 
2015). How different would the transformation outcomes have been had China prioritised social 
inclusion or environmental conservation over growth in the initial stages of its development 
process? As the sustainable development paradigm discourages the policy option of growing first 
and cleaning up later, the need for strategic policy prioritisation and sequencing to leverage 
synergies, minimise trade-offs and optimise resource use is greater now than ever before. 
 
The central objective of this chapter is therefore to identify the optimal sequence of social, 
economic and environmental conservation interventions that would minimise trade-offs and would 
advance structural transformation in Africa. This objective is achieved by employing a structural 
equation model to estimate the direct and indirect impacts of social, economic and environmental 
indicators of sustainable development on a composite index of structural transformation. The 
contribution of this chapter is that it provides a framework for policymakers to prioritise and 
sequence policy interventions aimed at achieving structural transformation. It does so by 
quantifying the total (direct and indirect) impact of economic, social and environmental 
interventions on structural transformation. 
 
In pursuit of this objective, the rest of the chapter is structured into five sections. We first review 
the literature on the social, economic and environmental drivers of structural transformation 
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(Section 5.2). This is followed by a section on indicators (Section 5.3) and then a discussion of the 
methodology (Section 5.4). Section 5.5 then interprets the modelling results before the chapter 
concludes with a summary and policy implications in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2. Literature review 
 
Theoretical evidence on the socio-economic and environmental drivers of structural change is 
scant compared to that of economic factors. The literature is also fragmented in the sense that there 
is no accepted theory on how the social, economic and environmental factors interact to influence 
structural transformation. Given the interlinkages existing between the social, economic and 
environmental factors that influence the transformation process, it is not enough to examine their 
impacts in isolation from each other. 
 
While some empirical studies have examined the synergies and trade-offs between the social, 
economic and environmental indicators of sustainable development, virtually none have linked 
their findings to structural transformation. For instance, in a recent study, Spaiser et al. (2017), 
conducted an empirical analysis of the underlying tensions and synergies between the social, 
economic and environmental dimensions of the SDGs using a structural equation model. To 
evaluate these interactions, the study categorised the SDGs into three latent constructs representing 
the economic (Goals 1, 2, 3, 6, and 11), social (Goals 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 16), and environmental 
(Goals 12, 13, 14, and 15) dimensions of sustainable development. The findings suggested that 
economic growth-focused strategies can promote socio-economic development while hindering 
the achievement of environmental goals. These findings are however not linked to structural 
transformation. 
 
One of the few studies that link the three dimensions (economic, social, and environmental) to 
structural transformation was conducted by Armah and Baek (2015) using panel data for 29 
African countries for the period 1995-2011. They found that an integrated approach to sustainable 
development that takes into account the economic, social and environmental dimensions has the 
most beneficial impact on Africa’s structural transformation process. 
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In effect, with few exceptions, the collective impact of economic, social and environmental 
interventions on structural transformation has largely been overlooked in the literature. Adopting 
a holistic approach is nevertheless important, since the synergies and potential trade-offs among 
the social, economic and environmental drivers can have a net positive or adverse impact on 
structural transformation (Baek, 2018). The conceptual framework of this study is presented in 
Figure 5.1. The rest of this section reviews the relevant literature on the economic, social and 
environmental drivers of structural transformation. 
 





While there is broad consensus that structural transformation is associated with economic growth 
and development, there has been considerable debate about what drives transformation. Traditional 
notions of structural transformation emphasise sectoral shifts from agriculture to industry and 
services, underpinned by differences in inter-sectoral productivity. Timmer (2017) invoked a 
broader definition, capturing rural-urban migration. He defined structural transformation as being 
composed of the following features: a relative decline in the sectoral shares of low-productivity 









International Commitment Integrated Development Development Outcome 
155 
high-productivity services; a decline in the relative share of agricultural employment in GDP; 
increasing rural-to-urban migration that stimulates the process of urbanisation; and the rise of a 
modern industrial and service economy. 
 
5.2.1. Economic drivers of structural transformation 
 
Overall, there is broad agreement among scholars that structural transformation is positively 
related to economic development but there is no scholarly consensus on the economic drivers of 
structural transformation, and there is considerable debate about the direction of causality 
(Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi, 2013). 
 
On the one hand, structural transformation stimulates growth by reallocating resources from low- 
to high-productivity activities. In particular, the manufacturing sector is a source of growth and 
productivity because the sector embodies technology and innovation (Shen, Dunn and Shen, 2007). 
The alternative view that growth causes transformation is based on the neoliberal premise that 
export-led development based on the principle of comparative advantage stimulates growth which, 
over time, causes structural transformation by accelerating the transition from an emphasis on 
agriculture to an emphasis on industry and services (Teignier, 2018). Rising income growth also 
influences structural transformation because preferences are non-homothetic; as incomes rise, 
households spend relatively less on agricultural goods and more on manufactured goods and 
services thereby promoting industrial sector development (Swiecki, 2017). 
 
The empirical studies of the relationship between growth and structural transformation have 
however yielded mixed results. For instance, structural transformation in South Korea has been 
associated with the role of international trade in accelerating the transition from agriculture into 
industry and services (Sposi, 2019). Similarly, Ungor (2017) found that differences in sectoral 
productivity growth rates accounted for the different sectoral reallocations in Latin America and 
East Asia. However, other studies using Granger causality analysis have found that the causal 
relationship is country-specific, implying that there is no universal relationship between the two 
variables (Elliott, 1998). Furthermore, a cross-country analysis of 53 African countries found a U-
shaped relationship between income growth and the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP; 
156 
below a threshold of US$943 (current value), an increase in per capita GDP is accompanied by a 
decrease in manufacturing share of GDP, but beyond this level incomes are positively associated 
with the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP (Mijiyawa, 2017). 
 
5.2.2. Social drivers of structural transformation 
 
The relationship between growth and social development has also generated scholarly interest with 
a focus on inequality and human capital as potential drivers of structural transformation (Baek, 
2017). Studies that have focused on the relationship between inequality and structural 
transformation have yet to agree on the direction of causality. Some scholars (e.g. Deutsch and 
Silber, 2004; Martorano, Park and Sanfilippo, 2017) focused on the impact of structural 
transformation on inequality, influenced by the work of Kuznets (1955). Meanwhile, others (e.g. 
Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Piketty, 1997) have emphasised the impact of inequality on growth, 
while a third school of thought (Deaton, 2013) maintains that the relationship is bidirectional. 
 
Regarding the impact of structural transformation on inequality, Kuznets (1955) postulated an 
inverted U-shaped curve relationship arguing that, overall, inequality is likely to initially rise as 
industrial transformation takes hold. This process is driven by the transfer of labour from the low-
wage, low-inequality agricultural sector to a relatively high-wage, high-inequality industrial sector. 
However, unlike developed countries, developing countries have experienced an agriculture to 
service-sector transition which should lead to different distributional outcomes between the two 
country groups. 
 
The empirical findings on the relationship between social development and structural 
transformation suggest that the outcome depends on the nature of the transformation. For instance, 
Dastidar (2012) found that where structural change is characterised by a transition from agriculture 
to industry, inequality did not increase in developing countries. On the other hand, inequality was 
found to rise in developing countries experiencing an agriculture-service transformation. In the 
latter case, the increase in inequality is more pronounced when the initial levels of inequality are 
already higher than average. 
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The level of inequality influences the size and composition of aggregate demand and thereby 
influences the market for industrial production (Nurkse, 1966). In a similar vein, more recently 
scholars have highlighted misallocation and underutilisation of resources as outcomes of inequality 
which further hinder economic growth (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017). 
 
But inequality can influence structural transformation and growth by undermining household 
investments in human capital development (Stiglitz, 1996). Specifically, inequality undermines 
the capacity of vulnerable groups to invest in the education of their children and adversely 
influences decisions about fertility as poor groups ‘invest’ in childbirth with the hope of increasing 
the aggregate household income. However, high fertility rates actually curtail the ability to invest 
in quality education for their children (De La Croix and Doepke, 2003). In line with these findings, 
Basu and Guariglia (2008) found that, in addition to differences in agricultural productivity, 
differences in initial years of schooling can explain why some countries industrialise later than 
others. 
 
Angus Deaton (2013) popularised the notion of the negative impact of inequality on structural 
transformation. He acknowledged that inequality may be both a by-product of growth and an 
incentive for growth but stressed that high levels of inequality could stifle growth when inequality 
derives from rent-seeking. Besides, high-levels of inequality undermine the efficient allocation of 
resources, aggravate corruption, and promote favouritism as the rich protect their vested interests. 
 
5.2.3. Environmental drivers of structural transformation 
 
Little is known about the environmental drivers of structural transformation as most of the 
literature has focused on the environmental impact of structural transformation as opposed to the 
effects of environmental policies on structural transformation. The environmental Kuznets curve 
provides theoretical insights about the environmental impacts of structural transformation. It 
postulates an inverted ‘U curve’ relationship between growth and environmental degradation 
(López-Menéndez, Pérez and Moreno, 2014). Others have rejected this argument by highlighting 
the role of technological innovation and advancements in renewable energies in decoupling 
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degradation, particularly greenhouse gas emissions, from the growth process (Collier and Venables, 
2012; Simon, 2013). 
 
Causal evidence regarding the environmental drivers of structural transformation is limited. The 
empirical findings have so far supported the theoretical hypothesis of trade-offs between growth 
and environmental degradation but have highlighted the mediating role of policy in this 
relationship. One strand of research has centred on the role of the Green Revolution in influencing 
transformation through increases in agricultural productivity. In this context, Moscona (2018) 
found that agricultural productivity impeded structural transformation during the Green 
Revolution. 
 
Other studies have focused on the relationship between the environment and development. For 
instance, Qizilbash (2010) found that countries that perform well in indicators of well-being and 
poverty had the highest levels of environmental degradation. He found Costa Rica to be an 
exception in this case and concluded that policies were vital to addressing the potential trade-offs 
between economic, social and environmental objectives. Beyond the productivity and welfare 
effects of environmental policies, environmental hazards, amplified by climate change, can have 
adverse impacts on productivity through their destructive impact on infrastructure. Furthermore, 
efforts to adapt to climate change could result in regulations that restrict industrial development. 
 
5.3. Selection of indicators 
 
To evaluate the collective contributions of the social, economic and environmental drivers of 
structural transformation, we identify proxy indicators for each of the drivers as well as structural 
transformation. We then construct a panel (balanced) data set comprising 29 African countries103 
for the period 1995-2011 using data from various sources, including the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database (2016), the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database (2016); and the FAO Statistics Division database (2016). 
 
103  They are: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, the Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. 
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The study employs commonly used sustainable development indicators on the basis of the SDGs. 
In this process we avoid indicators that are transversal or transcend the economic, social and 
environmental drivers of structural transformation. However, it is important to note that the 
selection of indicators for each of the four groups of indicators is constrained by a lack of reliable 
data (Osman, Alexiou and Tsaliki, 2012). The rationale behind the proxy indicator selection is 
discussed below and then summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
5.3.1. Economic growth indicators104 
 
According to the majority of economic transformation literature, growth promotes structural 
transformation by altering sectoral productivity rates. Hence, taking into account data availability, 
the economic drivers of structural transformation comprise the following indicators of growth and 
productivity: per capita income growth (GDP per capita); investment (investment/GDP ratio); 
energy use (energy intensity level of primary energy); and green growth (renewable energy 
consumption as share of total energy consumption). 
 
GDP per capita measures the quantitative expansion of the economy and is indeed one of the most 
widely used measures of economic development, but it has been criticised as an inappropriate 
measure of well-being by some scholars (Giddings, Hopwood and O’Brien, 2002).105 Investments 
 
104  Economic growth has four selected areas of importance: output (proxied by annual growth rates of per capita 
GDP from the WDI), investment (proxied by total investment as per cent of GDP from the WEO), green economy 
(proxied by renewable energy consumption as share of total energy consumption from the WDI) and energy use 
(proxied by energy intensity level of primary energy from the WDI). 
105  Per capita GDP is admittedly controversial indicator of well-being. Despite its merit as a widely used measure 
of economic performance across countries it can be a misleading metric since it tells us little about the utility of the 
goods and services produced by a country. For instance, going to war increases GDP and destroying infrastructure 
and re-building it also increases GDP. Alternative measure of well-being includes the Genuine Progress Indicator and 
‘Beyond GDP’ under the System of Environmental-Economic Accounts. For the purpose of this study it would be 
hard to see clearly the trade-offs or synergies effects between social inclusion and economic growth (using the Genuine 
Progress Indicator), and between environmental conservation and economic growth (using ‘Beyond GDP’ indicator) 
since these two indicators tend to be multi-dimensional in nature. Most importantly, lack of data availability in these 
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can fuel growth by increasing capital stock and also improving factor productivity. Investments in 
infrastructure in particular can unlock binding constraints to development and enhance total factor 
productivity. Energy efficiency and intensity determines productivity and growth (Vera and 
Langlois, 2007). The energy supply to GDP ratio is thus used to capture energy efficiency; lower 
ratios imply greater efficiencies in the use of energy. Lastly, renewable energy consumption 
reflects the intergenerational sustainability of economic growth (Dincer, 2000). 
 
5.3.2. Social inclusion indicators106 
 
Social inclusion can be defined as the process of improving citizen participation in socio-economic 
activities, particularly for marginalised or disadvantaged groups. Enhancing inclusion can spur 
structural transformation by creating opportunities for these groups to enhance their productive 
capacities. Inequality is a powerful measure of social exclusion, however, the data and period 
coverage are very limited for several African countries. 
 
An alternative proxy measure is unemployment rates. Low unemployment rates are a broad 
measure of inclusion. While this measure can also serve as a determinant of the poverty level 
(Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998), we acknowledge that employment can coexist with poverty when jobs 
are insecure and underemployment is prevalent. 
 
In addition to unemployment, access to basic socio-economic services such as sanitation provides 
an effective measure of social inclusion (Katukiza et al. 2010). In sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 70 
per cent of individuals do not have reliable access to basic sanitation services. We, therefore, use 
data on the share of population with access to sanitation services as an additional proxy for social 
 
relatively new measures remain a challenge in Africa. In fact, per capita GDP indicator is ultimately excluded from 
the analysis since it not statistically significance in the measurement model. 
106  Social inclusion has four selected areas of importance: poverty (proxied by unemployment rate from the 
WDI), sanitation (proxied the share of population with access to sanitation facilities from the WDI), life quality 
(proxied by the number of years of life expectancy from the WDI) and maternal health (proxied by adolescent fertility 
rate at births per 1000 women ages 15-19 from the WDI). 
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inclusion. The other indicators of social inclusion used are adolescent fertility rates and life 
expectancy. 
 
Adolescent fertility rates are associated with maternal deaths and access to health services. 
According to the World Fertility Patterns report (UN, 2015), the average adolescent fertility rate 
in Africa over the period 1990-2015, was more than double the rate for all other continents except 
Latin America. High adolescent fertility rates undermine access to education, health and 
employment opportunities as unintended pregnancies adversely impact on maternal and child 
health, school dropout rates, productivity, all of which contributes to higher poverty rates (Kibret, 
Bayu and Merga, 2014). 
 
Life expectancy is associated with quality of life and has implications for social dynamics, 
including demographic transitions (ageing population), related changes in consumption patterns, 
and industrial production dynamics. Life expectancy has indeed been widely applied to various 
globally accepted social development index formulations such as the Physical Quality of Life 
Index and the Human Development Index.107 
 
5.3.3. Environmental conservation indicators108 
 
Environmental hazards including those induced by climate change (e.g. floods, droughts, and air 
pollution) can adversely affect output and productivity and thus undermine the transformation 
process through their destructive effects on infrastructure and the health of the citizenry. 
 
107  The Physical Quality of Life Index is an equally weighted measure on well-being. It is based on: the basic 
literacy rate; infant mortality; and life expectancy. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index of life 
expectancy, education and income per capita. A variant of the HDI is the Inequality-adjusted Human Development 
Index, regularly published by the United Nations Development Programme. These are the two most popular measures 
of social development, particularly emphasising human physical performance as a core element (Ray, 2008; Chang 
and Baek, 2011). 
108  Environmental conservation has four selected areas of importance: climate change (proxied by emissions of 
carbon dioxide at metric tons per capita from the WDI); agricultural land (proxied by arable land at hectares per person; 
WDI); forest cover (proxied by forest area (square km); WDI); and water (proxied by the share of population with 
access to improved water sources; WDI). 
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Enhancing resilience to climate change and environmental hazards can improve agricultural 
productivity, and mitigate damages and losses stemming from environmental disasters. To capture 
the environmental factors that are likely to impact on structural change, this study uses carbon 
dioxide emissions (metric tonnes per capita), arable land (hectares per person), forest area, and 
access to improved water sources as proxy indicators. 
 
Carbon emissions tend to rise with industrial production and, hence, structural transformation. In 
the absence of appropriate technologies, initiatives to curb environmental degradation through the 
adoption of renewable energies can undermine industrial development by increasing production 
costs. 
 
Environmental hazards such as floods and droughts negatively affect the number of people using 
improved water sources (Zander and Kächele, 1999). Meanwhile, water is an important input into 
energy production and consequently industrial output. Hence, limitations on access to water can 
have serious adverse consequences for industrial development. Access to water also influences 
industrial output through its impact on the agricultural sector which is an important input into 
manufacturing. 
 
Increased forest cover supports the planet’s carbon sinks and is essential in sustaining Earth’s 
ecosystem and strengthening its capacity to adapt to climate change (Foody, 2003). Efforts to curb 




5.3.4. Structural transformation indicator109 
 
To evaluate the impact of economic, social and environmental policy interventions on structural 
transformation, this study develops a composite index of structural transformation. The choice of 
indicators comprising the composite index is informed by the definitions of structural 
transformation discussed above. 
 
Shifts in sectoral shares are captured by the respective shares of manufacturing and service sector 
value-added (Christiaensen, Demery and Kuhl, 2011). Cereal yields per kilogram and gross 
agricultural output per capita are included in the index to reflect agricultural productivity. 
Indicators of technological (internet access per 100), financial sector development (domestic credit 
provided by financial sector, per cent of GDP) and human capital (infant mortality per 1000 live 
births) development are all included to reflect broader aspects of structural transformation. Access 
to quality health services promotes social development and reflects the inclusiveness of the 
structural transformation process (Fayissa, 2001). Well-functioning financial markets facilitate the 
reallocation of economic resources and activities from low-productivity to high-productivity 
sectors (Wampah 2013). The inclusion of technology indicators is justified on the grounds that 
technology and innovation facilitate structural transformation by enhancing factor productivity. 
The empirical evidence suggests that, across countries, structural transformation is associated with 
the adoption of capital-embodied technology (Araujo and Teixeira, 2010). Other studies have 
found that technology promotes inclusive development, via the diffusion of information and 
knowledge (Chang and Baek, 2010), while minimising the potentially negative effect of 




109  Structural transformation has five selected areas of importance: agriculture (proxied by cereal yield (kg per 
hectare) from the WDI and by per capita gross agricultural production index from the FAO); manufacturing (proxied 
by manufacturing value added as a per cent of GDP from the WDI); ICT (proxied by services value added as a per 
cent of GDP and by internet users per 100 people from the WDI); health (proxied by infant mortality rate per 1,000 
live births from the WDI); and financial market (proxied by domestic credit provided by financial sector as a per cent 
of GDP from the WDI). 
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Table 5.1. Classification and variable description 
 
Dimension Area of Importance Proxy Indicator and description Source 
Economic 
Development 
Economic growth GDP per capita (annual %) WDI 
Investment Total investment (% of GDP) WEO 
Green economy Renewable energy consumption (% of 
total final energy consumption) 
WDI 
Energy use Energy intensity level of primary energy  WDI 
Social 
Inclusion 
Poverty Unemployment rate (% of total labour 
force) 
WDI 
Sanitation Sanitation facilities (% of population with 
access) 
WDI 
Life quality Life expectancy at birth (years) WDI 
Maternal health Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 








Agriculture land Arable land (hectares per person) WDI  
Forests Forest area (square km) WDI  






productivity by achieving 
a higher cereal yield 
Cereal yield (kg per hectare) WDI 
Agriculture gross per capita production 
index (2004-2006 = 100) 
FAOSTAT 
Higher share of 
manufacturing in value 
addition 
Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) WDI 
Increases in the share of 
ICT in services exports 




Internet users (per 100 people) WDI 
Improving health services 
by decreasing infant 
mortality rate 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) WDI 
More developed financial 
market 
Domestic credit provided by financial 





5.4. Modelling approach 
 
Based on 19 indicators,110 this study adopts a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach, 
similar to the one employed by Spaiser et al. (2017), to evaluate the impact of social, economic 
and environmental interventions on structural transformation. However, unlike Spaiser et al., who 
investigated the trade-offs and synergies among socio-economic and environmental indicators of 
sustainability, this study extends the analysis by exploring how the interactions among the 
dimensions of sustainable development influence the processes of structural transformation in 
Africa. Employing an SEM model allows us to estimate direct and indirect effects of the three 
factors based on our path specifications (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). 
 
For this modelling technique, sample size requirements are controversial because complexity of 
models varies, thereby often relying on a traditional rule-of-thumb of: (1) a minimum sample size 
of 100; and (2) five observations per estimated parameter (MacCallum et al., 1999). Meanwhile, 
Wolf et al. (2013) applied a Monte Carlo simulation technique to determine the sample size 
requirements for SEM modelling in general. They investigated the parameters dynamics with 
respect to statistical power, bias of parameter estimates and overall solution of propriety and 
concluded that sample size requirement within a range from 30 to 460 and above to convey 
meaningful patterns of association under the SEM setting. More recently, however, Kline (2011) 
and Barrett (2007) recommended samples in number with at least 200, while depending on 
complexity of a model as well as other factors such as normality111 of the data. Kline has further 
advanced a rule of thumb on the relationship between sample size and model complexity, which 
has empirically been supported by Jackson (2003) into namely N:q rule, the ratio of cases (N) to 
the estimated parameters (q). Ideal N:q rule is 20:1, while 10:1 at least to ensure  the 
trustworthiness of the results. Mindful of this, our study will employ 18 estimated parameters 
(discussed later) with 493 samples, satisfying the proposed sample requirements, while also 
acknowledging that our sample may not be large enough given the complexity of hypothetical 
 
110  Thirteen of the 19 indicators are used to construct the social, economic and environmental drivers of structural 
transformation and they are transformed into the natural logarithm for modelling that show a positive skew to 
normalise their distributions. 
111  This will be explored in a detail later during measurement model analysis. 
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models. Concerning the applicability of longitudinal design into the SEM setting, two modelling 
approaches could widely be used. The first is the latent growth curve modelling, which estimates 
two unobserved variables (an intercept and a slope) that permit them to have a different trajectory 
over time (Fan, 2003). Reflecting our modelling purposes (trade-offs and synergies), which would 
require an ability to control for unobserved, time-invariant, the second econometric approach 
should be more appropriate for our study, that is the fixed effect in the SEM setting (Bollen and 
Brand, 2008). Choice of estimation method is then important in this regard. Allison, Williams and 
Moral-Benito (2017) showed that this application is better estimated by employing maximum 
likelihood with the SEM software (ML-SEM). They have further demonstrated that the ML-SEM 
would have superior capability over others with respect to handling of missing data and allowing 
for non-normal data. 
 
In general, the two most commonly adopted methodologies of estimates of dependence in the SEM 
exercises are: the maximum likelihood; and the partial least squares (Maydeu-Olivares, 2017). The 
study benefits from a covariance approach by adopting the maximum likelihood specification 
because it is not only better suited for larger sample analysis but is also likely to be applicable to 
the analysis of a multivariate time-series in which the compositional data are transformed to follow 
the normal distribution (Crisci, 2012). 
 
Specifically, this covariance-based SEM technique involves minimising the difference between 
observed and predicted variance-covariance matrices, which is based on the calculation of the 
covariance structure of the maximum likelihood method. It is also considered a relatively advanced 
approach that deals with unobserved heterogeneity whereas the partial least squares method 
appears to have limited control capacity, which further requires an extension of mixture regression 
(e.g. finite mixture partial least squares) (Becker et al., 2013). 
 
In essence, the SEM exercise requires the validity of a measurement model before starting 
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The measurement model uses confirmatory factor analysis to 
model the latent variables and then test the robustness of the model under hypothetical constructs. 
If the measurement model is statistically significant in its tests, we then move on to a structural 
equation model in order to quantify the direct and indirect relationships among the latent variables. 
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The direct effects exclusively measure the independent impacts of economic, social and 
environmental interventions on structural transformation. The indirect effects take into account the 
interactions of each intervention with other interventions. The sum of these direct and indirect 
effects constitutes the total impact of each latent construct on structural transformation. 
 
Our hypothetical model comprises four latent dimensions representing an index of structural 
transformation and its social, economic, and environmental drivers. Each of the latent dimensions 
are explained by a group of sub-indicators. The four latent dimensions can be specified as: 
 
∏eco ∋ ecoIJT, ∏soc ∋ socIJT, ∏env ∋ envIJT, ∏st ∋ stIJT, for all I, J, T         (5.1) 
 
where i represents the observed indicators that comprise each of the latent variables (i = 1,…, 
N), j is country dimension (j = 1,…, J); t is time dimension (t = 1,…, T); eco is the latent 
economic dimension; soc is the latent social inclusion dimension; env is the latent 
environmental conservation dimension; st is the latent structural transformation proxy and ∏ 
simply identifies a variable as latent. 
 
The following standardised regression coefficients are estimated: 
 
∏eco-soc, ∏eco-env, ∏eco-st, ∏soc-eco, ∏soc-env, ∏soc-st, ∏env-soc, ∏env-eco and ∏env-st       (5.2) 
 
Where:  
∏eco-soc estimates the impact of economic growth interventions on social inclusion;  
∏eco-env estimates the impact of economic growth interventions on environmental conservation; 
∏eco-st measures the impact of economic growth interventions on structural transformation;  
∏soc-eco measures the impact of social inclusion interventions on economic growth;  
∏soc-env measures the impact of social inclusion interventions on environmental conservation  
∏soc-st represents the impact of social inclusion interventions on structural transformation;  
∏env-sco estimates the impact of environmental conservation interventions on social inclusion;  
∏env-eco measures the impact of environmental conservation interventions on economic growth; 
and 
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∏env-st is the impact of environmental conservation interventions on structural transformation. 
 
Based on the latent and path specifications, the direct and indirect effects as well as total 
structural effects can be estimated as follows: 
 
Total structural effects of economic growth interventions on structural transformation (I): 
Teco-st ∋ {Deco-st, Ieco-st} = {∏eco-st, (∏eco-soc*∏soc-st + ∏eco-env*∏env-st)},         (5.3) 
 
Total structural effects of social inclusion interventions on structural transformation (II): 
Tsoc-st ∋ {Dsoc-st, Isoc-st} = {∏soc-st, (∏soc-eco*∏eco-st + ∏soc-env*∏env-st)},        (5.4) 
 
Total structural effects of environmental conservation interventions on structural 
transformation (III): 
Tenv-st ∋ {Denv-st, Ienv-st} = {∏env-st, (∏env-eco*∏eco-st + ∏env-soc*∏soc-st)},        (5.5) 
 
Where: T is the total structural effect, D is the direct effect, I is the indirect effect, which can 
further be measured by the sum of standardised regression weights of two different indirect 
pathways. There is a synergy effect if T > D or a trade-off effect if T < D. 
 
Our three hypothetical models with the above-defined specifications are presented in Figure 
5.2 and their analyses are conducted using SPSS-AMOS 23. 
 





5.5. Empirical results and discussions 
 
Initially, the measurement model reveals that the relationships between the observed predictors 
and underlying constructs are statistically significant except for six indicators with coefficient 
values below 0.2 (per capita GDP in the economic growth construct, unemployment rate in the 
social inclusion construct, forest area in the environmental conservation construct, and agriculture 
production index, internet users and infant mortality rate in the structural transformation construct). 
They are thus excluded from further analysis (Jöreskog, 1993). 
 
The empirical results from our measurement model show that each of the standardised regression 
weights (Sλ) exceed the critical value at the 0.01 significance level. In more detail, investment 
(0.327) and lower energy intensity levels (-0.648)112 are estimated to have a positive impact on 
structural transformation. The results also highlight potential trade-offs (-0.790) between the 
renewable energy indicator and structural transformation in the African context, which is 
consistent with previous research (e.g. Armah and Baek, 2015; Spaiser et al., 2017). Regarding the 
social inclusion dimension, the provision of basic sanitation facilities (0.773), lower adolescent 
fertility rates (-0.784) and longer life expectancy (0.589) are all estimated to positively contribute 
to the process as expected (Kibret, Bayu and Merga, 2014; Armah and Baek, 2015). Meanwhile, 
the environment-related indicators reveal that increased carbon dioxide emissions (0.872) and 
improved access to water (0.803) will foster Africa’s transformational initiative. However, arable 
 




























land (-0.292) has a negative impact, which implies that industrialisation is associated with 
increased agricultural productivity and not the total size of available arable land. 
 
However, having a significant reliability coefficient does not automatically guarantee an 
accurately measured construct (Hsu, Chen and Hsieh, 2006). Although there has been some 
development of the robustness testing methodology for the SEM, the most widely used three-step 
tests for assessing robustness are: (1) convergent validity; (2) discriminant validity; and normal 
distribution of the data. 
 
The first and arguably most essential of these is the test of convergent validity, which gives a 
critical understanding of the quality measures best designed to assess the level of correlation of 
multiple indicators of the same construct. In this context, each of the four constructs can then be 
confirmed by two types of tests for convergent validity: average variance extracted (AVE) and 
Construct Reliability (CR). As shown in Table 5.2, the AVEs for the four latent constructs far 
exceed the recommended level of 0.500 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In addition, the CR, which 
measures the extent to which the construct is free from random error, is computed to be: 0.882 for 
the economic construct; 0.792 for the social construct; 0.941 for the environmental construct; and 
0.962 for the structural construct. All the values exceed the recommended threshold of 0.700 and, 
hence, meet the reliability test (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). 
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Table 5.2. Robustness test for measurement model: (1) convergent validity 
 Λ1 S.E. C.R.2 Sλ3 AVE4 C.R.5 
∏eco     
.87461 .88208 
     Investment jt 1 − − .327 
     Renewable Energy jt -5.805 .771 -7.525 -.790 
     Energy Intensity jt -2.452 .319 -7.697 -.648 
∏soc     
.94657 .79151 
     Sanitation jt 1 − − .773 
     Life Expectancy jt .153 .011 13.740 .589 
     Adol. Fertility jt -1.079 .054 -20.081 -.784 
∏env    
.92548 .94096 
     Acc. Water jt 1 − − .803 
     CO2 Emission jt 5.362 .245 21.881 .872 
     Arable Land jt -.586 .092 -6.381 -.292 
∏st    
.86931 .96219 
     Services VA jt 1 − − .420 
     Cereal Yield jt 2.663 .449 5.933 .493 
     Manufacturing VA jt 2.998 .343 8.730 .625 
     Domestic Credit jt 6.880 1.038 6.628 .735 
Notes: 1 = factor loading; 2 = construct reliability of each indicator; 3 = standardised factor loading; 4 = 
average variance extracted, computed based on ∑ Sλ2 / (∑ Sλ2 + ∑ variance); 5 = construct reliability of 
each construct, computed based on (∑ Sλ)2 / [(∑ Sλ)2 + ∑ variance]. 
 
The second test is based on discriminant validity criteria, which can indicate the extent to which 
one construct is differing from another in an empirical manner, while also estimating the degree 
of difference among the overlapping constructs. In this regard, the results of the discriminant 
validity test should meet the two-specific criteria as follows. 
 
One of the criteria is that the AVE for the four latent constructs must be greater than any squared 
value of the correlation coefficient, which can be evaluated by using cross-loading of indicators, 
known as the Fornell and Larcker criterion (Henseler, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2015). Table 5.3 shows 
that the largest squared value of the correlation coefficients is 0.26214, which falls between the 
social and structural transformation constructs. In other words, the square root of each construct’s 
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AVE (calculated in Table 5.2) has a greater value than any correlation with other latent constructs, 
meeting the criterion of a latent construct being able to explain better the variance of its own 
variable rather than the variance of other latent constructs. 
 
The other criterion is that the range between calculated values of the correlation coefficient 
(calculated by subtracting and adding the product of 1.96 and the associated standard error [SE]) 
must not include the value of 1 (Streukens and Leroi-Werelds, 2016). Meeting this criterion 
confirms that bootstrap confidence intervals with SEM derive from a precise calculation of the 
quantiles for the middle 95 per cent of a perfect normal distribution, which is the case for our 
measurement modelling results. In particular, the result of bootstrap confidence is critical and 
should be statistically valid when it comes to evaluating indirect effects. In other words, the 
validity of standardised indirect effects can only be evaluated based on a two-tailed bootstrap 
significance test (Li, Kang and Haney, 2017). 
 
Table 5.3. Robustness test for measurement model: (2) discriminant validity 
Correlations ∏eco ∏soc ∏env ∏st 
∏eco 1    
∏soc 0.01823 1   
∏env 0.14288 0.01988 1  
∏st 0.06760 0.26214 0.15840 1 
 
Bootstrap Intervals S.E. -1.96 +1.96 P-value 
∏eco ↔ ∏soc 0.003 0.1291 0.1409 0.004 
∏eco ↔ ∏env 0.001 0.3760 0.3800 0.004 
∏eco ↔ ∏st 0.001 0.2580 0.2625 0.008 
∏soc ↔ ∏env 0.002 0.1371 0.1449 0.004 
∏soc ↔ ∏st 0.001 0.5100 0.5140 0.004 
∏env ↔ ∏st 0.000 0.3970 0.3990 0.004 




Theoretically speaking in the SEM setting, non-normality of the sample data leads to an 
overestimation of the chi-squared statistic, thereby potentially resulting in false rejection of the 
model. A normality check is thus required in which the values of the skewness tend to be well-
controlled (Gao, Mokhtarian and Johnston, 2008). A rule-of-thumb in this normality assessment 
is that, in general, an absolute value of skewness lower than 2.0 means the data is normally 
distributed (George and Mallery, 2010). However, the maximum likelihood estimator for the SEM 
exercise is likely robust to skewness for cases greater than 2.0 (absolute value) if an absolute 
critical value does not exceed 10 in general (Awang, 2015). In this context, our data is acceptable 
in terms of either normality or moderate nonnormality (Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4. Robustness test for measurement model: (3) normal distribution 
Variables Min. Max. Skewness Critical Value 
Investment jt 0.40 1.70 -1.087 -7.851 
Renewable Energy jt -0.70 2.00 -1.830 -9.650 
Energy Intensity jt 0.40 1.60 0.160 1.450 
Sanitation jt 0.70 2.00 -0.007 -0.065 
Life Expectancy jt 1.60 1.90 0.395 3.581 
Adol. Fertility jt 0.80 2.30 -2.019 -8.298 
Acc. Water jt 1.50 2.00 -0.119 -1.074 
CO2 Emission jt -1.30 1.00 0.584 5.296 
Arable Land jt 0.03 1.49 2.626 9.864 
Services VA jt 1.11 1.83 -1.523 -13.804 
Cereal Yield jt 2.12 3.88 -0.013 -0.117 
Manufacturing VA jt 0.35 1.34 -0.595 -5.390 
Domestic Credit jt -0.44 2.28 -0.550 -4.985 
 
Since the measurement model is confirmed by the above validity tests, we now move on to 
specifying our hypothetical SEM models. The empirical results from the three hypothetical models 
presented in Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate three development scenarios. The first model 
represents a structural transformation agenda that is driven by economic growth interventions. The 
second depicts a structural transformation process that prioritises social inclusion-driven 
development while the third prioritises environmental considerations. All three models estimate 
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the direct and indirect impacts of the three dimensions of sustainable development on structural 
transformation in Africa. The t-values of all standardised regression weights for all three models 
are statistically significant. In so doing, we conduct modification indices techniques to improve 
the model fit if residuals (i.e. e1 through e13) among indicator variables are allowed to correlate 
(Barrett, 2007). 
 
In Model I, the direct effect of economic growth on structural transformation is estimated at 1.091 
(i.e. the standardised regression weight), which implies that structural transformation improves by 
1.091 standard deviations when measures to improve economic growth increase by one standard 
deviation. But the results also indicate that there are two indirect effects: one is through the social 
inclusion dimension; and the other effect is through the environmental conservation dimension. 
 
The first indirect pathway reveals that the impact of economic growth on structural transformation 
reduces when such efforts are accompanied by efforts to improve social inclusion. Specifically, 
social inclusion interventions reduce the direct impact of economic measures by approximately -
1.749 standard deviations. 113  Similarly, economic interventions that are mediated by 
environmental considerations tend to have a weaker, yet positive, impact (i.e. 0.811 standard 
deviations114) on structural transformation, than the direct effect. Nevertheless, this impact is 
greater than interventions mediated by social sustainability considerations. Cumulatively, the two 
indirect effects totalling -0.939 standard deviations, reduce the direct effect of 1.091 to a mere 
0.152 (a decline of ~86 per cent). 
  
 
113  This is calculated by multiplying the two indirect effects (i.e. 1.073 by -1.630). 
114  This is calculated by multiplying the two indirect effects (i.e. 0.933 by 0.869). 
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Models II and III follow the same estimation logic. Model II reflects a scenario where structural 
transformation is driven by social development priorities. It shows that social interventions have a 
positive but relatively weak direct effect of 0.021 on structural transformation. However, this 
outcome is leveraged when it is accompanied by measures to improve economic growth (2.787 
standard deviations115). Trade-offs are however observed when social inclusion interventions are 
mediated by environmental conservation objectives (-2.368 standard deviations116). Nonetheless, 
on net, the negative environmental conservation effect is offset by the positive economic growth 




115  This is calculated by multiplying the two indirect effects (i.e. 1.060 by 2.629). 
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Total structural effect = 0.152* 
Direct effect = 1.091** 
Indirect effect = -0.939** 
***  p < .01 
**  p < .05 
*  p < .1. 
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Unlike Models I and II, Model III reveals that environmental conservation programmes have a 
negative direct effect of -0.191 on structural transformation but this negative effect is reversed to 
0.269 standard deviations (by 245 per cent) when such measures are accompanied by economic 
growth (1.709117) and social inclusion (-1.250118) interventions. Conceivably, environmental 
conservation interventions boost economic growth by spurring investments in renewable energy 
and improving efficiencies in energy use. However, social interventions further reduce the 
environmental conservation impact by -1.250 resulting in the total indirect effect of 0.459. The 
negative social effects of environmental conservation interventions may reflect the tensions 




117  This is calculated by multiplying the two indirect effects (i.e. 1.039 by 1.645). 
































Total structural effect = 0.440*** 
Direct effect = 0.021 
Indirect effect = 0.419 
***  p < .01 
**  p < .05 




























e4 e5 e6 









The above interpretations of the modelling results should further be supported by evaluating 
model-fit indices to test whether the above three models can reflect underlying theory. The 
following two categories of model-fit indices are widely agreed as having the best interpretive 
value in assessing model fit: (1) absolute fit indices; and (2) incremental fit indices (McDonald 
and Ho, 2002). 
 
Absolute fit indices provide the most fundamental indication of how well our hypothetical models 
fit the sample data. For this purpose, this category has four most widely reported fit indices 
(Hooper, Coughlan and Mullen, 2008): the chi-square (χ2); the goodness-of-fit index (GFI); root-
mean-square residual (RMR); and standardised root-mean-square residual (SRMR). 
 
The χ2 value is considered the conventional measure for assessing overall model fit by calculating 
the magnitude of discrepancy between the data and fitted covariance matrices (Hu and Bentler, 
1999). Although we can confirm all estimated χ2 values are statistically significant, they may not, 
however, provide further detailed assessment information. That is why an alternative test is 









































Total structural effect = 0.268*** 
Direct effect = -0.191 
Indirect effect = 0.459 
***  p < .01 
**  p < .05 
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observed covariance matrix. For this index our model exceeds the minimum model-fit cut-off 
value of 0.7 or above (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  
 
Meanwhile, the RMR, the square root of the difference between the residuals of the covariance 
matrix and the hypothesised covariance model, is also considered for this purpose but it is 
somewhat difficult to interpret. On the other hand, the SRMR is preferred in terms of ease of 
interpretation. A value of the SRMR as high as 0.08 is deemed acceptable, although a value of less 
than 0.07 is considered well-fitting (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000). 
 
Another critical group of measures is the incremental fit indices, mostly composed of the normed-
fit index (NFI) and the comparative fit index (CFI) (Miles and Shevlin, 2007). The NFI compares 
the estimated χ2 value from our models with that of the null model (the worst scenario that assumes 
all measured variables are uncorrelated). Traditionally, values greater than 0.80 were interpreted 
as very good fits but this traditional guideline has been criticised because the NFI value can be 
quite sensitive to sample size and even the cut-off point (0.80) still remains controversial among 
SEM modellers.  
 
An alternative to the NFI is the CFI, which is not sensitive to sample size (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007). Similar to the NFI, it assumes that all latent constructs are uncorrelated and so compares 
the sample covariance with the null model. In fact, there is no clear cut-off value in this measure 
but a value greater than 0.70 is preferred. As shown in Table 5.5, the models employed in the study 
meet the test of fitness criteria regardless of the category of model-fit index adopted. 
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Table 5.5. Summary of model fit indices for structural equation models 
 Absolute fit indices Incremental fit indices 
 χ2 GFI RMR SRMR NFI CFI 
Model I 805.420*** 0.815 0.009 0.0944 0.769 0.781 
Model II 753.322*** 0.825 0.009 0.0920 0.784 0.795 
Model III 811.047*** 0.819 0.009 0.0937 0.767 0.779 
Note: χ2 = Chi-square; GFI = goodness-of-fit-index; RMR = root-mean-square-residual; SRMR = 
standard root-mean-square-residual; NFI = normed-fit index; CFI = comparative-fit-index; *** p < .01; 
** p < .05; and * p < .1. 
 
5.6. Concluding remarks 
 
In short, this chapter investigated synergies and trade-offs among the economic, social and 
environmental drivers of structural transformation and examined how these factors in turn impact 
on structural transformation in Africa. The chapter contributes in this regard to the literature by: 
identifying the appropriate sequencing of policies to achieve structural transformation in Africa; 
and quantifying the direct and indirect impact of environmental, social and economic policy 
interventions on structural transformation. 
 
We have found that indicators of social development (compared to those of economic and 
environmental development) tend to have the greatest total impact on structural transformation 
even though the direct effects of such indicators tend to be relatively weak. On the other hand, 
indicators of economic growth have the weakest total effects even though they have the largest 
direct impact. In contrast, environmentally-driven development programmes have negative direct 
impacts on structural transformation, but their total impact is positive and higher than the 
economically-driven approach but lower than the socially-driven approach. 
 
In particular, our findings have a number of important policy implications for the field of 
development planning. Notwithstanding valid concerns of policymakers about the trade-offs 
associated with environmentally-driven development agendas, the empirical results show that the 
total contribution of environmental initiatives to Africa’s structural transformation agenda (Model 
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III) is greater than that of a structural transformation agenda that is led by economic growth 
strategies (Model I). 
 
It is important to note that the findings do not suggest that a successful structural transformation 
programme requires an exclusive focus on the social dimension. What it does suggest is that a 
structural transformation initiative that is led-by social development is more catalytic in terms of 
its impact. This implies that prioritising social development in most African countries may be the 
most expeditious pathway to achieving structural transformation. Thus, this study provides 
policymakers with a useful framework for prioritising and sequencing policy interventions to 
achieve a global agenda for sustainable development and to advance their structural transformation 
objectives. 
 
With this in mind, there are several areas ripe for future research, which can build on this study. 
Our study raises the important question of whether the findings are robust to individual-country 
contexts. By answering this question, more concrete guidelines will be provided to countries that 
are in the process of implementing the SDGs and this will constitute an important step in making 
structural transformation a sustainable and operational reality in Africa. Furthermore, to the extent 
that the study is largely driven by outcome variables, including policy variables in the models 
could strengthen the policy-relevance of the findings. Finally, access to data on a broader range of 
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6. Three interventions to foster sustainable transformation in Africa 
 
PREFACE 
The most important insights and empirical findings gained from the previous two chapters are 
that: (1) an inclusive and sustainable structural transformation agenda requires tackling the 
economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in an integrated 
way, rather than utilising a silo approach focusing on one dimension at the expense of another; 
and (2) prioritising social development in African countries may be the most expeditious 
pathway to structural transformation. My empirical findings appear to be consistent with the 
results from a mathematical network analysis of all the linkages between seventeen goals of the 
SDGs conducted by Dawes (2019). His mathematical modelling provided evidence that 
prioritising some goals could mitigate trade-offs between others to generate virtuous circles, 
thereby achieving economic, societal and environmental objectives. 
 
The focus now moves on to a qualitative assessment in the African context regarding how to 
leverage synergies among the multiple dimensions of the SDGs in pursuit of sustainable 
structural transformation. This entails examining more specific policy components, including 
investment in renewable energy, human capital and financial inclusion. The chapter thus 
addresses sub-question 5: “What policy measures maximise the synergies to promote structural 
transformation in line with inclusive sustainable development?” 
 
Addressing this question can support an analytical explanation for the ISD framework, 
concerning: (1) how the combination of global force to mainstream the sustainable development 
idea and a country’s available resources and capability (initial conditions in Box 3) would 
appear to determine the pathway of structural transformation in an inclusive and sustainable 
fashion; and (2) whether the technological possibilities available to African countries not only 
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offer strategic options for national governments (in Box 1), for they also influence country 







For over a decade, Africa has made significant progress in sustaining positive growth while 
improving its performance on social indicators such as health and education. Real GDP increased 
by 54 per cent between 2004 and 2014, which is more than twice the global rate of 24 per cent 
(UNCTAD, 2016). Over the same period, maternal and child mortality halved, while several 
countries achieved universal primary enrolment as well as gender parity at the primary level of 
education (ECA et al., 2015). These developments transformed Africa’s narrative from a hopeless 
continent to a continent on the rise. 
 
Notwithstanding these positive developments, a number of countervailing trends raise doubts 
about the sustainability of the continent’s development trajectory. First, growth has been 
associated with limited employment opportunities and only marginal declines in poverty. Extreme 
poverty (measured at $1.25 per day) in Sub-Saharan Africa declined a mere 15 per cent over the 
23-year period from 1990 to 2013. Meanwhile, the number of people classified as extremely poor 
increased by 109 million during the period 1990 to 2012 (UNSD, 2016) while unemployment and 
underemployment remain enduring features of the development landscape. Approximately 70 per 
cent of jobs in Sub-Saharan Africa are classified as vulnerable and youth unemployment averaged 
21.1 per cent in 2014 (ECA et al., 2016). 
 
The continent is also characterised by high levels of income inequality and inequalities in access 
to social services. Measured by the Gini coefficient, Africa’s income inequality (0.439 over the 
period 2000– 2009) is second only to Latin America’s (0.522 per cent) (AfDB, 2012). In 2010, six 
out of the 10 most unequal countries worldwide were in Africa; Southern Africa is the most 
unequal sub-region of the continent (Armah et al., 2014). 
 
Income inequalities have translated into pervasive disparities in access to social services. Births to 
women in the top quintile are nearly three times more likely to be attended by a trained professional 
than births to women in the poorest quintile. Ninety per cent of women living in urban areas have 
at least one antenatal care visit during pregnancy, compared to 71 per cent of women living in rural 
areas (ECA, 2011). Children and adolescents from the poorest households are at least three times 
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more likely to be out of school than children from the richest households. And children from the 
poorest households are more than twice as likely to be stunted as children from the richest 
households, leading to further school dropouts (ECA, 2014). 
 
One school of thought attributes the limited inclusiveness of growth to the lack of structural 
transformation or the failure of most African countries to significantly transform their low 
productivity agrarian economies into high productivity industrial ones. Most African countries 
depend on a narrow range of primary commodities, which renders them vulnerable to external 
shocks and undermines prospects for job creation through value addition and beneficiation. Indeed, 
the current pattern of development in most African countries runs counter to the expected pattern 
in most emerging countries (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Growth has been driven largely by the 
services sector while the contribution (using the value-added approach to GDP estimation) of 
manufacturing, to GDP has declined since 2001, stagnating at around 11 per cent of GDP (see 
Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1. Sectoral contributions to GDP in Africa 
 
Source: Armah and Baek (2015) 
 
The environmental impact of growth depends on the indicator being examined. The impact of 
growth on the level of greenhouse gas emissions has been minimal but the growth of such 
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globally, however; like the rest of the world, the continent’s emissions are closely associated with 
GDP per-capita growth (Armah and Baek, 2015) (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.2. Carbon dioxide emissions and per 
capita GDP growth trends in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Figure 6.3. Carbon dioxide emissions and per 
capita GDP growth trends globally 
 
 
Source: Armah and Baek (2015) 
 
This relationship suggests that notwithstanding the relatively low share of manufacturing in GDP, 
the current growth pattern in Africa is environmentally unsustainable and inconsistent with the 
objectives of the SDGs, which call on countries to simultaneously achieve the triple objectives of 
economic, social and environmental sustainability. In this context, the experience of emerging 
countries like China, where steep reductions in poverty have been associated with substantial 
increases in inequality and greenhouse gas emissions, is instructive. China reduced poverty from 
over 60 per cent in 1990 to less than 10 per cent in 2010, lifting 566 million people out of extreme 
poverty, yet income inequality and greenhouse gas emissions increased substantially over the same 
period. 
 
In an effort to increase employment opportunities and reduce inequalities, African countries have 
prioritised commodity-based industrialisation as a strategy for structural transformation in a 
continental development strategy called Agenda 2063. At the global level, African leaders have 
also signed on to the 2030 Agenda, which also emphasises industrialisation and value addition as 
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countries, both agendas prioritise social inclusion and environmental conservation as integral 
components of structural transformation. 
 
These trends signal a paradigm shift from traditional notions of structural transformation which 
emphasise productivity improvements, sectoral shifts and demographic transitions but exclude 
issues of social inclusion and environmental sustainability (Timmer, 2007). Thus, integrating 
social and environmental sustainability considerations in the development paradigm requires a 
broader definition of structural transformation; however, it also raises questions about the 
appropriate policy measures required for its achievement (Dabla-Norris et al., 2013; Armah et al., 
2014; Armah and Baek, 2015). For instance, how can countries expand manufacturing output 
without damaging the environment or widening inequalities? 
 
This study identifies investments in human capital, renewable energy and financial inclusion as 
mutually reinforcing and catalytic interventions that can promote economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. For instance, investments in renewable energy foster growth and 
employment with limited environmental impact. Leveraging ICT, particularly mobile telephones, 
for financial inclusion fosters social inclusion by facilitating access to financial services by 
vulnerable segments of society. 
 
6.2. Achieving sustainable structural transformation 
 
Operationalising a structural transformation agenda that is anchored by economic, social and 
environmental sustainability requires an understanding of how the three dimensions interact. A 
substantial body of work on sustainable development has focused on the growth and environment 
nexus (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2009). For instance, the Brundtland Commission, which 
pioneered the concept of sustainable development, defined it as “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Agenda 21, the outcome document 
of the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, called for the integration of environmental 
and developmental concerns. Subsequently, in 2012, the Rio +20 Conference called on UN 
member States to “further mainstream sustainable development at all levels, integrating economic, 
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social and environmental aspects and recognising their interlinkages, so as to achieve sustainable 
development in all its dimensions.” (UN, 2012). However, the concept of sustainable development 
has been challenged on several grounds. One school of thought is that growth is inherently 
unsustainable because it is accompanied by a depletion of resources and environmental 
degradation (Repetto et al., 1989; Pearce and Atkinson, 1993; Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; 
Dasgupta, 2013). 
 
Concerns about the potential tensions between growth and environmental sustainability are 
mirrored in the structural transformation literature as well. A widely agreed definition of structural 
transformation refers to a process by which the relative importance of different sectors and 
activities of an economy changes over time. In the African context, this implies: a relative decline 
of low-productivity agriculture and low value-added extractive activities; a relative increase in 
manufacturing and high-productivity services; a decline in the relative share of agricultural 
employment in GDP; rural-to-urban migration that stimulates the process of urbanisation; and a 
rise of a modern industrial and service economy (Timmer, 2007). However, while structural 
transformation lays the foundation for high and sustained economic growth, it is likely to lead to 
deterioration in environmental quality, unless deliberate action is taken to ensure environmental 
sustainability during the transformation process (UNCTAD, 2012). 
 
The views expressed above are consistent with the Environmental Kuznets curve concept 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995; López-Menéndez, Pérez and Moreno, 2014) which provides a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the relationship between growth and the environment. 
According to this school of thought industrial development initially causes higher emissions of 
greenhouse gases; however, net emissions eventually drop as the increase in income level leads to 
technological advancements associated with curbing such emissions. 
 
However, the empirical validity of the Kuznets curve depends on the environmental good in 
question. For instance, while carbon dioxide emissions hardly decline with levels of development, 
sulphur dioxide119 emissions declined 74 per cent among European Union countries due to factors 
 
119  Sulphur dioxide is emitted when fuels or other materials containing Sulphur are combusted or oxidised. It is 
a pollutant that contributes to acid deposition resulting in changes in soil and water quality with adverse effects on 
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such as fuel-switching to low-Sulphur fuels such as natural gas and the impact of EU directives 
relating to the Sulphur content of certain fuels (European Environmental Agency, 2017). 
 
A contrasting school of thought argues that with current technological innovations newly 
developing countries can decouple green-house gas emissions from their developmental process. 
Indeed, the experiences of Norway and Sweden suggest that countries can achieve high levels of 
Human Development (measured by the HDI) while attaining low levels of carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita (Bhattacharjee and Iftikhar, 2011). Furthermore, some scholars (Collier and 
Venables, 2012; Simon, 2013) argue that relative to other continents, the potential for economic 
greening is higher in Africa because the continent has a geographical advantage for producing 
renewable energies, given its vast untapped water resources and abundant sunshine. Additionally, 
Africa could leapfrog fossil fuels to green energy if it were to benefit from the diffusion of green 
technology already developed in the global West. This would position the continent to leverage 
synergies between environmental and economic development at the early stages of the 
development process. In fact, some Africa countries (e.g. Ethiopia) are among the global front 
runners in this arena (UNEP, 2015). 
 
But the environment is only one aspect of sustainable development. What synergies or trade-offs 
exist between the pursuit of economic growth and social inclusion? One school of thought, which 
is in line with the “grow first and redistribute later” strategy (Kuznets, 1955; Smith, 1982/1759), 
hypothesises an inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and growth, with inequality 
increasing in the early stages of development as capital holders become relatively wealthier due to 
new opportunities to invest, and subsequently decreasing as the benefits of transformation trickle 
down to the population. 
 
In contrast to Kuznets, other scholars argue that reducing inequality promotes growth by ensuring 
a more optimal allocation of resources (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; 
Piketty, 1997), and enhancing human capital development (Perotti, 1996). The latter line of 
 
aquatic ecosystems in rivers and lakes and damage to forests, crops and other vegetation (European Environmental 
Agency website accessed May 25 2017: https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/eea-32-sulphur-
dioxide-so2-emissions-1/assessment-3). 
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thinking has implications for policy sequencing; countries must prioritise social inclusion if they 
are to accelerate growth. 
 
Other studies argue that the relationship between growth and inequality depends on other 
characteristics such as the structure of economies, political and social institutions and cultural 
heritage (Kaelble and Thomas, 1991). Hence, this school of thought emphasises the role of income 
transfer mechanisms in decoupling growth from income inequality (Palma, 2011). 
 
The country-level evidence on the nexus between growth and social inclusion is mixed and 
significantly depends on the policy approaches (Herzer and Vollmer, 2012). The structural 
transformation process observed in some Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore were mainly associated with substantial growth in the manufacturing and export sectors 
during the 1960–1990s period, which resulted in substantial reductions in absolute poverty while 
maintaining low (tolerable) levels of income inequality. This ideal outcome was possible because 
these countries immediately reinvested the benefits from economic growth into areas that 
supported an inclusive growth process, including land reform and universal education (Stiglitz, 
1996). 
 
The foregoing analysis of the literature suggests that the pursuit of economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability is a complex objective that requires active policy interventions to 
minimise trade-offs and leverage synergies. This raises the question of the appropriate policy 
choices that can leverage synergies and minimise trade-offs across the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of development? 
 
6.3. Perspectives from the New Structural Economics  
 
Recent perspectives by the New Structural Economics school of thought provide useful insights in 
this regard (Lin, 2012). This development paradigm emerged in response to the failure of structural 
adjustment programmes to stimulate growth in developing countries and the realisation that the 
emerging countries of East Asia succeeded in structurally transforming their economies without 
following the dominant neo-liberal market approach. The New Structural economists posit that the 
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structure of an economy and its comparative advantage depend on the structure and composition 
of its factor endowments. While factor endowments are given in the short term, they can be altered 
in the long term through upgrading and technological innovation. They argue that it is only by 
changing a country’s factor endowments, including through continual technological innovation, 
that a country can achieve sustained economic development and an optimal industrial structure. 
 
In several respects the New Structural Economics paradigm speaks to the development realities of 
most African economies, which tend to score relatively low on investment, savings and 
technological innovation indicators. Sub-Saharan African countries on average have lower savings 
and investment to GDP ratios than other regions of the world (see Figure 6.4) and the technological 
content of their manufactured exports is also relatively lower than the global average (see Figures 
6.4 and 6.5), due in part to limited investments in research and development (see Figure 6.6). It 
should however be noted that least developed countries may not necessary to have a very high 
share of research and development expenditure to GDP to get climbing technology ladder started 
since there are various technology transfer mechanisms available to them, including the 
Technology Facilitation Mechanism (UN, 2015, para 70) and the Technology Bank for the Least 
Developed Countries (TBLDC, 2017). What is needed for them instead is to make an effort to 
create a learning society underpinned by “learning by doing” mechanism (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 
2014; Nayyar, 2019). 
 
Figure 6.4. Regional comparisons of savings and high-tech exports, 2002–2015 
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Figure 6.5. Proportion of medium and high-tech industry value added in total value added 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNSD (2017) 
 
Figure 6.6. Research and development expenditure as a share of GDP 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNSD (2017) 
 
Nonetheless, such technology transfer mechanism with support of creating a learning society 
cannot be materialised without upgrading of corresponding human capital, particular for the areas 
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be commensurable with the industrial upgrading of the economy that generates skilled jobs for 
each sector to make full utilisation of its resources. 
 
The school of thought is, however, silent on the specific capital and technology investments that 
are needed and on the appropriate sequencing of the upgrading process. Appropriate sequencing 
requires an understanding of the sectoral interlinkages of policy actions and an appreciation of the 
potential impacts, trade-offs and synergies associated with specific policy actions. The question is 
what policy interventions are likely to have the greatest catalytic impact on factor upgrading in 
Africa without degrading the environment or compromising social inclusion. 
 
Using panel data for 29 African countries for the period 1995–2011 to analyse the contributions 
of economic, social and environmental sustainability to sustainable structural transformation in 
Africa, Armah and Baek (2015) find that an integrated approach to sustainable development that 
takes into account the economic, social and environmental dimensions has the most beneficial 
impact on Africa’s structural transformation process. Their following study (2019) employed 
structural equation modelling approach to explore the effects of trade-offs and synergies between 
multi-dimensions sustainable development and linking to the process of structural transformation 
and concluded that prioritising social development could deliver the best structural transformation 
impact. This implies that human capital upgrading should be considered most prerequisite for the 
appropriate sequencing of the upgrading process in an African country context. 
 
Equally importantly, industrial upgrading towards structural transformation requires 
corresponding infrastructure for linking synergies between technological advances and human 
capital. This is especially so for many parts of African countries who has vast untapped water 
resources and abundant sunshine (Collier and Venables, 2012). The infrastructure improvement 
with focus on energy industry would speed up the process to leverage synergies between industrial 
upgrading and environmental sectors if a learning society is embedded to benefit from the diffusion 
of technology. A promising potential for Sub-Saharan Africa has empirically been studied 




In this context, the main policy conclusion of the study is that countries should not prioritise one 
dimension over the other but should adopt a simultaneous approach that accords greater priority 
to interventions that unlock the most binding structural constraints. Investments in social 
development without appropriate investments in economic development will likely result in a 
brain-drain, as has been the case in several African countries. Similarly, investments in economic 
infrastructure without corresponding investments in human development will likely create 
domestic labour supply and demand mismatches necessitating the importation of skilled labour or 
resulting in inefficiencies. 
 
Incorporating the importance of the three strategic factors for industrial upgrading in line with the 
New Structuralist approach, this study emphasises an active role of governments an active role in 
“coordinating investments for industrial upgrading and diversification and in compensating for 
externalities generated by first movers in the dynamic growth process” (Lin, 2012) and thus 
highlights three key strategic areas of factor upgrading that are critical to Africa’s transformation 
process: human capital development (i.e. investments in health and education); investments in 
energy infrastructure; and leveraging mobile technology for financial inclusion and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
6.4. Human capital upgrading 
 
Without significant investments in human capital development, an economy cannot fully capitalise 
on investments in capital and technology. Indeed, the benefits of such investments will likely be 
captured by a small segment of the population, resulting in a widening of inequalities. 
Alternatively, skilled unemployed labour will seek better career opportunities in other countries, 
leading to a brain-drain. Furthermore, investments in human development can nurture 
environmental consciousness and promote buy-in for environmentally friendly technologies and 
policies. Indicators of human capital development in Africa are improving but fall short of the 
levels required to sustain growth and transformation. According to the Human Development 
Report 2019 (UNDP, 2019), Sub-Saharan Africa continues to rank last among the five continents 
in 2018 with a 0.541 of Human Development Index, a composite index of life expectancy, 
education and income per capita, while the world on average registered at 0.731. The continent’s 
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score was even far below the fourth ranked continent of South Asia with 0.642 (0.703 for Arab, 
0.741 for East Asia and the Pacific, 0.779 for Europe and Central Asia and 0.759 for Latin America 
and the Caribbean). This should be seriously taken into account for Africa as a whole given the 
greatest endowed resource is in fact its people, especially for young people (below the age of 15) 
that accounts for 43 per cent of more than 1.2 billion population in Africa (World Bank, 2019). 
Therefore, the continent would have the largest return on education.  
 
In reality, primary enrolment rates improved markedly during the era of the MDGs; however, 
enrolment at the tertiary levels remains low. Furthermore, enrolment is skewed towards the arts 
and humanities with disproportionately low enrolments in science and technology (Blom, Lan and 
Adil, 2016). This disproportion of enrolments may have resulted that Sub-Saharan Africa has only 
around 90 scientific researchers per million inhabitants, which was substantially lower than more 
than 1,000 researchers in the world on average (UNESCO, 2015). Besides, the quality of 
educational facilities as well as the alignment of skills to the requisite needs of the labour market 
are other areas of concern. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (2020) showed that a majority 
of African employers are citing inadequately skilled workforces as a major constraint to their 
business operation. This clearly implies the existence of mismatch between the availability of high-
quality employments and job seekers, especially for educated young people who may have 
inadequately been prepared for such roles. 
 
Moreover, for those with educational qualifications, porous social safety nets coupled with the 
lack of decent employment opportunities contribute to poverty among the working class. 
Approximately 60 per cent of jobs in Africa are considered vulnerable and less than 1 per cent of 
the unemployed receive unemployment benefits (ILO, 2016) (see Figure 6.7). By 2015, one-third 
of the working population in Sub-Saharan Africa lived in extreme poverty and the incidence of 
poverty is higher among the youth and women (UNSD, 2016). 
 
Figure 6.7. Proportion of unemployed receiving unemployment benefits (per cent) 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNSD (2016) 
 
Besides skills development, investments in health are also critical for human capital development. 
There have been marked improvements in health indicators in Africa, particularly in the area of 
child and maternal deaths, malaria and HIV/AIDS. However, the levels remain high and constitute 
constraints to human capital development. According to the UNICEF (2016), maternal mortality 
declined by 35 per cent between 2000 and 2015 while under-five mortality fell by 46 per cent over 
the same period in Sub-Saharan Africa. These developments are attributable in part to improved 
access to skilled birth attendants, vaccinations and a decline in adolescent fertility rates. The latter 
declined by 21 per cent between 2000 and 2015 even though as of 2015 Africa had the highest 
adolescent birth rate of 102 births per 1,000 women aged 15–19 globally. Notwithstanding these 
positive improvements, in 2015 there were 546 maternal deaths for every 100,000 live childbirths. 
In the same year there were 1.5 new cases of HIV/AIDS per 1,000 uninfected people. And for 
every 1000 live births 83 children did not survive their fifth birthday. In effect, poor health systems 
are taking a toll on Africa’s labour force. Without concerted efforts to improve healthcare, the 




Energy is the lifeblood of socio-economic activity, with implications for the environment as well. 
Limited and unreliable access to energy and inefficiencies in transmission and use of energy in 
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Sub-Saharan African households have no access to electricity (see Figure 6.8). As a result, power 
consumption per capita in Africa is estimated at 0.57 MWh/capita in 2014, which is a mere 19 per 
cent of the global per capita consumption of 3.03 MWh/capita (IEA, 2016b). 
 
Figure 6.8. Proportion of population with access to electricity (Megajoules per constant US$ 2011 
PPP GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNSD (2016) 
 
Energy inefficiencies (measured by energy intensity or megajoules per US$), particularly in 
Africa’s least developed countries, are almost twice the global average. Inefficiencies stem from 
the fact that as much as 40 per cent of power generated is lost in transmission and distribution. 
Improving energy efficiency can provide social benefits such as reductions in the high energy cost 
burden faced by low income households and conservation of finite resources such as oil and natural 
gas. 
 
The economic costs of unreliable access to energy is estimated at 2 per cent of Africa’s GDP 
(AfDB, 2014). But the energy challenge has both social and environmental consequences. As of 
2013, only 13 per cent of the Sub-Saharan Africa population had access to clean fuels, compared 
to the world average of 58 per cent (see Figure 6.9). The main source of energy supply in Africa 
is solid fuels (i.e. charcoal) and the continent accounted for 29.3 per cent of the world’s solid 






























Figure 6.9. Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNSD (2016) 
 
The use of solid biofuels, however, has adverse implications for the continent’s forest cover. 
Furthermore, the time spent, particularly by women, in gathering solid fuels for household use 
decreases the time they spend on educational activities, thus potentially compromising their 
educational outcomes. 
 
Moreover, approximately 600,000 Africans (mostly women and children) die annually due to 
indoor air pollution associated with the use of wood fuel for cooking; and 30 per cent of health 
centres operate without electricity, rendering lives at risk in hospitals, as life-saving equipment 
and services lie unused because of lack of electricity (AfDB, 2014). 
 
Africa’s energy deficits also have adverse implications for the education sector. Over 90 per cent 
of Africa’s primary schools lack electricity, which in turn affects the quality of learning through 
its impact on access to training materials such as computers, lighting and basic administrative 
support systems. 
 
6.6. Opportunities for factor upgrading 
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Globally, renewable energy accounts for 13.8 per cent of the total energy supply, with hydro-
power constituting the largest (72.3 per cent) source of renewable electricity and 16.4 per cent of 
global electricity supply. Solid biofuels/charcoal comprise the largest (66 per cent) share of 
renewables followed by hydro-power (17 per cent) and other renewables (i.e. geothermal, liquid 
biofuels, biogases, solar etc.) which account for a much smaller share of the renewable energy 
supply. However, solar photovoltaic energy constitutes the fastest growing component of the 
renewable energy mix – it has grown over the period 1990-2015 at 37.3 per cent of compound 
annual growth rate, followed by wind with 24 per cent, (IEA, 2016a). 
 
The opportunities for addressing Africa’s energy deficits are huge in light of its resource 
endowments. The continent has a significant share of the world’s renewable energy: hydropower, 
bio-energy, geothermal, solar and wind power. Currently it is estimated that only 5 per cent of 
Africa’s vast hydropower resources are being tapped. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Ethiopia alone have the capacity to supply most of Africa’s energy needs. But this will require 
substantial investments in regional interconnection energy networks to enable the trading of 
electricity. For instance, the Grand Inga on the Congo river can generate 300TwH (Terawatt hours) 
of hydro-electricity per year, enough to supply 60 per cent of the continent’s energy needs (AfDB, 
2014). 
 
In addition to hydro-power, Africa has strong potential in geothermal energy. Besides Asia/Pacific, 
the east Africa rift valley has the greatest potential for geothermal energy, with Kenya leading in 
this area. 
 
Beyond boosting the energy supply, African countries must improve energy efficiency by 
addressing losses in the generation, transmission and distribution of energy. In Africa, regular 
maintenance and upgrading of electricity generating plants as well as investments in modernising 
transmission and distribution networks will be key to improving energy efficiency. 
 
The decline in energy intensity in developed countries has been driven largely by improved energy 
efficiency in key end-uses such as vehicles, appliances, and industrial processes. In addition, 
governments have implemented a wide range of policies and programmes, such as funding 
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research and development (R&D), energy efficiency standards, educational efforts, obligations on 
market actors and financial incentives to accelerate the development and adoption of energy 
efficiency measures. 
 
6.6.2. Leveraging ICT for financial inclusion and growth 
 
Inadequate infrastructure and the lack of financial inclusion are the two most commonly identified 
constraints that inhibit the expansion of sectors that have the potential to create ‘good jobs’ 
(McKinsey Report, 2012). Financial inclusion improves the range, quality and availability of 
financial services to the unserved and under-served segments of society by promoting access and 
usage of financial services. It does so by ensuring access by vulnerable and excluded groups to 
appropriate financial products and services at an affordable cost and in a fair, transparent manner. 
Beyond access, financial inclusion promotes the usage of such services through financial literacy 
programmes. 
 
However, most African countries lack adequate financial infrastructure (e.g. low numbers of bank 
branches and automated teller machines) to absorb the financially excluded, resulting in low levels 
of financial inclusion. For instance, the continent has the lowest population share of account 
holders despite a 10 percentage point increase (from 24 per cent to 34 per cent) over the 2011–
2014 period (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). It is noteworthy that account ownership improves with 
the level of education, reflecting a link between human capital development and financial inclusion 
(see Figure 6.10). 
 
Furthermore, at a coverage rate of less than 10 branches per 100,000 people, access to commercial 
banks is abysmally low. In addition, the cost of remittances in Africa is high and, in some cases, 
almost 5 times the 3 per cent target stipulated in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (World Bank, 
2016). 
 
Technological innovations that facilitate the use of mobile telephones for financial transactions, 
coupled with increased access to mobile telephones and the internet, have provided a unique 
opportunity for Africa to improve financial inclusion and promote inclusive growth despite its 
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weak financial infrastructure. Indeed, there is empirical evidence linking improvements in ICT, 
particularly mobile telephony, to increased financial inclusion and growth (Andrianaivo and 
Kpodar, 2011). 
 
The proportion of the population covered by a 3G mobile network rose exponentially from almost 
zero in 2007 to 65 per cent in 2015 (see Figure 6.11). This positive trend has contributed to Africa’s 
leading position in mobile money accounts: just 2 per cent of adults worldwide have a mobile 
money account only, versus approximately 12 per cent (or 64 million people) in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 6.10. Per cent share of the population with accounts (15yrs +), 2014 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the World Bank (2016) 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the UNSD (2017) 
 
Access to mobile accounts has been made possible by increased access to mobile phones and 
advances in mobile technology for financial transactions. For instance, Safaricom, which is mainly 
a mobile operator, is the founder of M-Pesa and is supported by Vodafone in its application process. 
M-Pesa provides the opportunity to transfer funds to both M-Pesa customers and non-customers, 
apply for a loan, pay bills, and perform other financial services. M-Pesa is being used to transfer 
the equivalent of 25 per cent of Kenya’s total GDP. 
 
Mobile money transfer is the preferred mechanism for the transfer of funds from urban to rural 
areas, although account ownership varies by gender, income and level of education; individuals 
with a secondary school or higher education are most likely to have a mobile account (see Figure 
6.12). The system has been a source of employment generation in Africa. For instance, Safaricom 
currently employs 40,000 agents in Kenya to serve 17 million of M-Pesa users. Safaricom has 
exported the system to Tanzania, Afghanistan and India. It recently introduced a version of M-
Pesa in Ethiopia called M-Birr. 
 


























Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the World Bank (2016) 
 
The use of mobile telephones for financial transactions circumvents the financial infrastructure 
deficit by facilitating wireless access by underserved groups in developing countries to financial 
services. By obviating the need for physical bank branches, mobile telephony reduces transaction 
costs and contributes to the emergence of branchless banking services, thereby improving financial 
inclusion (Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2011). In effect, innovations in the use of mobile telephones 
for financial transactions have lowered barriers to financial inclusion and crowded in large 




African countries have made substantial progress in advancing socio-economic development in 
the past decade, but progress has been uneven, and the benefits of rapid growth have not been 
broadly shared. As a result, several countries have prioritised structural transformation as a 
development objective. These objectives are reflected in the two internationally agreed 
commitments: Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda. 
 
This study examined the feasibility of achieving structural transformation in Africa while 
complying with the global and continental commitments to economic, social and environmental 
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economic, social and environmental sustainability. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence 
underscores the role of proactive government policies in minimising trade-offs and leveraging 
synergies among the three dimensions of sustainable development. Building on the New Structural 
Economics perspectives on transformation, we propose three catalytic and mutually reinforcing 
areas of intervention that can advance sustainable structural transformation in Africa: investments 
in human capital development; investments in renewable energy; and investments in financial 
inclusion. 
 
Sustainable transformation requires a healthy and skilled workforce. In Africa the evidence points 
to rising primary school enrolment; however, the skills profile of students is skewed towards the 
arts and humanities with disproportionately low representation in the fields of science and 
technology. The quality of educational facilities, as well as the alignment of skills to the requisite 
needs of the labour market, are other areas of concern. In particular, the existence of mismatch 
between the availability of high-quality employments and job seekers has been identified as one 
of the major constraints to Africa’s business expansion.  
 
Besides skills development, investments in health are also critical for human capital upgrading. 
Over the past decades, health indicators have improved markedly, with substantial declines in child 
and maternal mortality due in part to increased access to skilled birth attendants, vaccinations and 
a decline in adolescent birth rates. Nevertheless, overall, access to quality healthcare services is 
limited. A skilled and healthy workforce will likely emigrate for better career opportunities if the 
conditions for employment and livelihoods generation are limited.  
 
Despite its energy endowments, access to energy in Africa is abysmally low and poses a key 
constraint to industrialisation, enterprise development and employment creation. Leveraging the 
continent’s energy potential will be critical for promoting value addition and industrial growth and 
employment.  
 
The potential for such growth to be inclusive will be further enhanced through measures to promote 
financial inclusion by facilitating access to financial services by the currently unbanked and 
underserved segments of the population. The rapid increase in access to mobile phones, coupled 
211 
with innovations in ICT that make it possible for individuals to have wireless access to financial 
services, have made Africa a leader in mobile account holders. Policymakers can advance inclusive 
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The final chapter comprises five sections. Section 1 summarises the key findings from the four 
research chapters, by explaining how they answer each of the five sub-questions, and thereby, also 
addressing the overarching one (Section 1). The scholarly contributions to the existing literature 
are discussed in Section 2. This is followed by discussion of important policy implications, with a 
particular focus on the development planning aspects in the context of sustainable structural 
transformation (Section 3). My research project inevitably has a number of limitations, and these 
are identified in Section 4 along with suggestions for further research. Finally, the thesis ends with 
concluding remarks (Section 5). 
 
7.1. Summary of the key findings 
 
I began this study by trying to answer one central question, underpinned by five sub-questions as 
follows: 
 
In answering the first sub-question, “Is the inequality-growth nexus dominated by long-run or 
short-run relationships, and one-way or two-way causal relations?” I have learned from the 
analysis of a dataset consisting of a 143-balanced country sample. Based on this, 79 countries (55 
per cent of the total country sample) appeared to have had stable long-run equilibrium between 
inequality and growth by uni- and/or bi-directional causality, while 89 (62 per cent in total) were 
associated with at least short-run causation. Overall, countries were classified according to the 
combination of positive and negative one-way and two-way causal relations found to be 
statistically significant. One of the most important insights gained from this causal-oriented 
investigation was that the Kuznets hypothesis is still valid for contemporary policy debate. More 
importantly, another upswing curve was identified in addition to the ups earlier then the downs 
later of the Kuznets Curve, which implies some new inequality and growth dynamics that are likely 
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to have existed for industrialised societies in the post-modern period from the 1960s to the present. 
The findings were also consistent with the theory of an N-shaped relation between national income 
per person and inequality: in other words, it confirmed that for many high-income countries, 
growth is associated with rising inequality. 
 
My answer to the second one, “What is the historical and empirical relationship between 
inequality and growth at the country level?” was that more clear-cut patterns have emerged 
when countries are sub-grouped based on cluster analysis by groups of countries. The N-shaped 
hypothesis was firmly supported by the cluster analysis by income groups: (a) the developing 
economies are likely to be associated with a positive relationship between inequality and growth, 
mainly attributable to their ineffective (re)distribution practice of income and to the role of 
inequality functioning as an incentive for growth; (b) the developed economies appear to benefit 
from fair (re)distribution of income across their societies, but suffer from the detrimental role of 
inequality, commutatively resulting in a negative causal orientation; and (c) the advanced 
economies share a commonality of the inequality and growth dynamics observed in the developing 
economies in that growth benefits tend not to be effectively (re)distributed to the poor segments of 
society and that income inequality provides incentives for more effort to gain more, which are the 
two most common characteristics among the 11 clusters. My research methodologies involved 
exploring further nationally distinctive characteristics, confirming the main arguments of the 
varieties of (welfare) capitalism in a way that each group of countries may have largely been 
institutionalised by stronger (or weaker) (re)distribution systems and/or by inequality enabling (or 
restraining) growth potential. 
 
In answering the third, “How do efforts to promote inclusive sustainable development as a 
multi-dimensional concept influence a country’s structural transformation outcomes?” I 
have conducted factor analysis to construct a structural transformation index, which was regressed 
against proxies for the three dimensions of sustainable development as well as indicators of 
institutional effectiveness, using data for a group of 29 African countries spanning the period 1995-
2011. The modelling results show that when the economic and social dimensions are ignored, 
structural transformation is associated with statistically significant emissions of carbon dioxide, 
while an integrated approach also minimises trade-offs between transformation and environmental 
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preservation. My findings have also revealed synergies between transformation and adolescent 
fertility rates as well as transformation and access to social services, such as sanitation. In this 
context, the most important insights gained from the modelling was that an inclusive and 
sustainable structural transformation agenda requires tackling the economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development in an integrated way. 
 
Nonetheless, Chapter 4 could not provide enough guidance about the national development 
strategies through which structural transformation minimising potential trade-offs can be achieved. 
This led to the next sub-question, “How do empirical trade-offs and synergies between 
economic growth, social inclusion and environmental conservation affect structural 
transformation outcomes?” Employing the structural equation modelling approach, I built three 
models: the first represents a structural transformation agenda that is driven by economic growth 
interventions; the second depicts a structural transformation process that prioritises social 
inclusion-driven development; and the third prioritises environmental considerations. The 
modelling results suggest that the indicators of social development tend to have the greatest total 
influence (relationship) on structural transformation even though the direct effects of such 
indicators would appear to be relatively weak. Meanwhile, indicators of economic growth have 
the weakest total effects even though they have the largest direct relationship. In contrast, 
environmentally-driven development programmes have negative direct relationship to structural 
transformation, with their total relationship being positive and higher than the economic driven 
approach but lower than with the socially driven one. 
 
The final question, “What policy measures maximise the synergies to promote structural 
transformation in line with inclusive sustainable development?” was then addressed by using 
qualitative analysis. Examining policy interventions achieving Africa’s structural transformation, 
while complying with sustainable development commitments was the chief objective. My previous 
chapters documented potential trade-offs in achieving the triple objectives of economic growth, 
social equity and environmental sustainability. Moreover, the empirical evidence has underscored 
the role of proactive government policies in leveraging synergies among the three dimensions of 
sustainable development. Building on the New Structural Economics perspectives on structural 
transformation, I have proposed three catalytic and mutually reinforcing areas of intervention that 
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can advance sustainable structural transformation in Africa by prioritising investments in 
renewable energy, human capital and financial inclusion. 
 
My answers to all these sub-questions contribute to addressing the overarching research question 
of the thesis, “What is the nature of the relationship between ‘inclusive sustainable 
development’ and ‘structural transformation’ with particular reference to low-income 
countries?” Their combined theoretical and practical contributions are brought together through 
discussion of the ISD framework, which also leads to suggestions for potential areas of future 
study to further enrich this field of research. 
 
7.2. Theoretical contributions 
 
This thesis makes contributions to the existing literature in three ways. First, three research 
challenges have been addressed within the inequality-growth nexus literature, including the 
complexity of causality, the neglected time dimension and heterogeneities between groups of 
countries. My Granger causality test models have contributed to the literature on these topics by 
presenting the results of short-run and long-run tests in both directions. Also, the empirical findings 
have challenged universal theories by distinguishing between 11 clusters of countries according to 
the inequality-growth causal nexus they display over time: theory of an N-shaped relation between 
national income per person and inequality. 
 
In particular, the cluster analysis has empirically supported the existence of distinctive features of 
each of the groups of countries. These results are consistent with the competitive political economy 
discourse, particularly the typology of the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and 
Welfare Regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Each of the groups in terms of production systems 
have been institutionalised by their own unique inequality feature of enabling and/or restraining 
growth. Similarly, the effectiveness of the (re)distribution system also implies that unique 
institutions have been shaped through features of institutional complementarities in each country 
or group of countries. Hence, each of the groups of countries’ change processes that are associated 
with inequality dynamics are likely to affect the process of continuous development, eventually 
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directing some distinctive transformation pathways (Schmidt, 2002; Amable, 2003; Schröder, 
2013). 
 
A second original contribution has been to fill research gaps with respect to the nature and extent 
of the trade-offs and synergies among the three dimensions of sustainable development through 
the process of structural transformation. Investigating how the structural transformation process is 
affected by a comprehensive trinity of country change processes in relation to inclusive sustainable 
development discourse has far received almost no significant attention. Indeed, capturing all these 
features in a single study has not been conducted in the literature. In this vein, one critical 
contribution to the literature lies in the empirical evidence that a silo approach that focuses on one 
dimension at the expense of another has a less optimal relationship to structural transformation, 
which challenges the dominant development paradigm of the grow first and redistribute and clean 
later strategy. 
 
Third, each of the above two contributions feeds theoretically into the comprehensive framework 
for thinking about the ISD framework depicted in Figure 2.1.  My investigation using Granger 
causality testing has provided empirical evidence to explain the complexity of country change 
processes of inclusive sustainable development itself as one of the three important potential 
tensions. This component of the inequality-growth research also supports the idea that inequality-
reducing policy dynamics (country change processes in Box 2) can be influenced by the 
institutional feature of path-dependence (initial conditions in Box 3). Furthermore, the empirical 
results have confirmed that economic growth interventions (national development strategies in 
Box 1) interact with (re)distribution of income (country change processes in Box 2), although to 
varying degrees between income groups and across regions. All these inter- and intra-dynamics 
that were internalised in the study on the inequality and growth nexus explained the part of the 
ISD framework’s systematic flows. 
 
The greater contributions in explaining such systematic flows were made through Chapters 4, 5 
and 6, whereas the empirical findings in Chapter 3 were deemed an intermediate step towards the 
theoretical discussions that are consistent with these three chapters. Most of all, all of these 
chapters share the commonality that country change processes (in Box 2), measured through three 
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sets of sustainable development indicators, appear to be influenced by the normative idea of 
sustainable development, as represented by the SDGs (in Box 3). Together with the SDGs, 
doubling efforts to accelerate the process of structural transformation was identified as new 
development thinking mainly due to the countervailing trends facing most developing countries. 
These two competing development goals were translated into the normative frameworks (in Box 
1) that could be adopted by national governments to inform country-specific development 
strategies. 
 
In more detail, particularly for the case of African countries, the results of panel data econometrics 
supported the inter-dynamics between country change processes and specific development 
strategies (interacting between Box 2 and Box 1) in a way that an integrated approach that takes 
into account the three dimensions would have the most beneficial relationship to these countries’ 
structural transformation process. Moreover, these findings even emerged as being strongly valid 
when the structural effects (i.e. trade-offs and synergies between the three dimensions of 
sustainable development) were empirically identified in Chapter 5. In essence, the combination of 
global force to mainstream the sustainable development idea and a country’s available resources 
and institutional capability (initial conditions in Box 3) would appear to determine such observed 
structural effects. Meanwhile, the technological possibilities available to African countries not 
only offer strategic options for national governments (Box 1), for they also influence country 
change processes (Box 2). In this context, these systematic flows will most likely determine 
whether it is feasible to achieve economic, social and environmental sustainability in the course of 
structural transformation of low-income countries. 
 
7.3. Implications of the findings for practice 
 
What are then some of the important policy implications from this study? As discussed, African 
countries have made substantial progress in advancing socioeconomic development in the past 
decade, but this progress has been uneven, and the benefits of rapid growth have not been broadly 
shared. Partly as a consequence, many African countries now have their own long-term (50 years) 
development framework aimed at structurally transforming economies, and moving away from an 
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exclusive focus on economic growth, which is in line with Agenda 2063.120 Meanwhile, at the 
global level, the normative idea of sustainable development should encourage African 
governments to advance the economic, social and environmental dimensions of such development, 
which is consistent with the 2030 Agenda. It should be noted that central to Agenda 2063 is the 
structural transformation of the African continent, currently dependent on primary commodities 
and basic production policies, moving towards having more diversified economies with inclusive 
economic and political transformation. While the 2030 Agenda is a development plan of action for 
people, the planet and prosperity that is anchored by the principle of sustainable development in 
its three dimensions: social, economic and environmental. 
 
Following the global adoption of both agendas, African governments began the process of 
designing national development planning frameworks that are aligned with both development 
initiatives. The new development agendas are timely, but their implementation will be no easy task 
for African countries. In this context, understanding and analysing the root causes of these policy 
challenges are of key importance to policymakers, which I believe the ISD framework could be/is 
able to support effectively. Of the many policy implications, I have chosen to focus on the those 
related to the field of development planning, which can further be guided by the ISD framework, 
the criteria of which could then be referred to by policymakers. 
 
As discussed in the research chapters, mainstreaming the three dimensions of sustainable 
development into national planning frameworks is imperative for successful implementation of the 
2030 Agenda. Africa’s development planning capacity, however, appears substantially weak; 
several of its countries are struggling to mainstream development priorities and policies in their 
national planning frameworks (ECA, 2017b). This implies a need to break up institutional silos, 
thus strengthening sectoral (i.e. horizontal) and sub-national (i.e. vertical) coordination within and 
among implementing entities. Nonetheless, no analytical view on development planning would be 
 
120  “In January 2015, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union adopted Agenda 2063, a strategic 
framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development in Africa, and a strategy to optimise the use of the 
continent’s resources for the benefit of all Africans” (ECA et al., 2016, pp.29). 
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intelligible without improved access to data, the reliability of which depends on the capacity of the 
relevant national statistics office.121 
 
Notwithstanding valid concerns by policymakers about the trade-offs associated with 
environmentally driven development agendas, my empirical findings show that the total 
contribution of environmental initiatives to Africa’s structural transformation agenda is greater 
than that of a structural transformation agenda led by economic growth strategies. The results have 
also explained that prioritising social development in most African countries may be the most 
expeditious pathway to achieving structural transformation. It is important to note that my 
empirical evidence does not suggest that a successful structural transformation programme 
requires an exclusive focus on the social dimension. What it does imply is that a structural 
transformation initiative led by social development is more catalytic in terms of its impact. This 
thesis thus provided policymakers with a useful framework for prioritising and sequencing policy 
interventions to achieve the normative agenda for sustainable development and to advance their 
structural transformation objectives. 
 
From more of a policy standpoint, regarding African countries, my analysis has pointed to rising 
primary school enrolment; however, the skills profile of students is skewed towards the arts and 
humanities with disproportionately low representation in the fields of science and technology. The 
quality of educational facilities, as well as the alignment of skills to the requisite needs of the 
labour market, are other areas of concern. Health indicators have also improved markedly, with 
substantial declines in child and maternal mortality due in part to increased access to skilled birth 
attendants, vaccinations and a decline in adolescent birth rates. Nevertheless, overall, access to 
quality healthcare services is limited. A skilled and healthy workforce will most likely emigrate 
for better career opportunities, if the conditions for employment and livelihood generation are 
limited. Despite its energy endowments, access to energy in Africa is abysmally low and poses a 
key constraint to industrialisation, enterprise development and employment creation. Leveraging 
 
121  There have been a number of Africa’s statistical capacity improvement initiatives supported by development 
partners, e.g. SHaSA (launched in 2010 under the joint aegis of ECA, AfDB, and AUC), AFRISTAT, STATAFRIC, 
among others.  
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the continent’s energy potential will be critical for promoting value addition, industrial growth and 
employment. 
 
The potential for such growth to be inclusive will be further enhanced through measures to promote 
financial inclusion by facilitating access to financial services by the currently unbanked and 
underserved segments of the population. The rapid increase in access to mobile phones, coupled 
with innovations in ICT that make it possible for individuals to have wireless access to financial 
services, have made Africa a leader in mobile account holders. Policymakers can advance inclusive 
growth by further leveraging the opportunities provided by innovations in mobile telephony. 
Nonetheless, the importance of manufacturing sector development should not be underestimated, 
as it still offers the possibility of both job and income creation, particularly when countries are at 
a relatively low-income level (UNIDO, 2017). In fact, the potential of manufacturing sectors with 
the use of green technologies (e.g. renewable energy equipment) will be greater, particularly for 
countries richer in natural resources (IRENA and ESCWA, 2018). 
 
7.4. Limitations and future research 
 
There are a number of limitations I have encountered during the research that are also very closely 
related to my suggestion for future research, which can in turn extend or improve this study. 
 
First, despite substantive contributions to existing literature through contextualising the systematic 
flows reflected in the ISD framework, the two country change processes (i.e. the growth-
environment nexus and the inequality-environment nexus) have not been empirically explored yet, 
to which a similar methodology for the inequality-growth nexus can be applied. These empirically 
untold stories may limit a comprehensive attempt to explain the whole story embedded in the ISD 
framework. Furthermore, the scope of the study initially set may also restrain the ISD framework’s 
explanatory power on the complex dynamics in play: it was initially assumed that the role of 
technological progress was an exogenous variable mainly because endogenising it into the ISD 
framework would render empirical work far more complex. 
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Second, the financial aspect is not incorporated in the ISD framework, namely financing for 
development (FfD). However, this is indeed, one of the important elements that has been integrated 
into the development policy discourse at both global and national level. Notably, the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda (AAAA)122 offers a new global framework for FfD that aligns all financing flows 
and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities. This is aimed at ensuring that 
financing is stable and sustainable, while the AAAA particularly urges that the financial resources 
required for achieving the SDGs considerably exceeds what is currently available. UNCTAD 
(2018a) has also pointed out that the total investment needs for developing countries to realise the 
2030 Agenda are estimated at about US$3.9 trillion per year, with current investment levels falling 
short of that by some US$1.4 trillion. Given the additional need for financial resources to realise 
Agenda 2063, achieving these two normative agendas with a business-as-usual approach remains 
highly unlikely. In this context, further studies will be needed to provide more concrete guidelines 
to integrating the financial resources aspect into the ISD framework, so as to build the 
comprehensive theoretical framework that takes into account both the policymaking capacity and 
financial aspects together. 
 
On the technical side, there are a couple of issues that I strongly believe are areas for improvement 
that must be addressed. For instance, the limited number of observations for my several modelling 
exercises may have influenced the empirical results, e.g. the high number of lags would have 
reduced the degree of freedom during the Granger causality tests. Hence, more advanced 
robustness tests would need to be conducted, e.g. the clusters identified (Chapter 3), composite 
indictors (Chapter 4) and confirmatory factor analysis (Chapter 5). Additionally, many parts of the 
developing country group are restrained by the limited number of observations (due to data 
unavailability), which would have inevitably biased the sample and the results. In this regard, my 
attempt to advance some interesting generalisations that highlight empirical regularities can be 
effective value-added interventions to ongoing scholarly communications in this field, if such data 
challenges were substantially resolved. Again, access to data on a broader range of indicators 
would further enhance the quality and robustness of the latent constructs. 
 
 
122  This is the outcome document from the FfD conference held in Addis Ababa, from 13 to 16 July 2015. 
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As far as my analysis in Chapter 3 is concerned, various causal links identified with the 11 clusters 
could be explained in a more theoretical manner by allowing for the possibility that these identified 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive in explaining country patterns over time. Additionally, it 
should clearly be acknowledged that this chapter is largely empirical (or atheoretical), therefore 
further work is needed to theorise about the possible explanations for what has been observed from 
this investigation. In addition to these, whilst this chapter contributes to the literature by presenting 
the results of short- and long-run Granger causality tests in both directions, differentiating such 
short- and long-run causality should be further explored as a basis for explaining the complexity 
of nexus during upswings and downswings. This would provide more analytical information on 
country-specific trends over time. 
 
To reiterate a number of limitations (discussed in Chapter 2), the ISD framework could be extended 
to address the challenges of: balancing macroeconomic stability with structural transformation 
(Nissanke, 2019); mainstreaming the three dimensions of sustainable development into national 
planning frameworks (Fischer et al., 2015); and mutually reinforcing role of institutions in 
supporting sustainable transformation (Osman et al., 2012). Furthermore, the role of regional 
intervention in the national development framework deserves future study, because it would not 
only play the role of linking up national policies to the normative goals, for it would also speed up 
the process of interactions between the national and global dimensions. For instance, AUC, AfDB 
and ECA as far as the African context is concerned can offer capacity building assistance of 
policymaking and development planning to countries, especially poor and small ones. Filling all 
these gaps to advance the ISD framework would, however, require a completely different set of 
literature compared to that covered in this thesis.123 
 
7.5. Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis has involved drawing on a large area of scholarly work and broad ideas about 
development in a state of constant flux, with influential thinkers driving the never-ending 
 
123  e.g. Wannop and Cherry (1994), Simmons (1999), Counsell and Haughton (2003), Haughton and Counsell 
(2004), Elder, Bengtsson and Akenji (2016), Kapfudzaruwa et al. (2017), Perry and García (2017) 
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evaluation of the development discourse, incorporating theories of modernisation, endogenous 
growth, globalisation and neoliberalism, among others. Yet its basic premises are straightforward, 
being mainly concerned with how economic growth, equality/inclusion and environmental 
sustainability goals are, should be and can be jointly managed through the process of structural 
transformation, with particular reference to low-income countries.  
 
In so doing, I have explored an untold story in which many developing countries today, especially 
in Africa, are pursuing one or both of the following policy agendas in their policy mix as they 
strive towards sustainable transformation: (1) a global normative agenda moving away from 
traditional patterns of economic growth and towards a greater emphasis on sustainable 
development; and (2) a context-dependent national development policy agenda that entails the 
achievement of a more radical structural transformation that goes beyond economic growth based 
on the current international division of labour. Having identified these two overlapping policy 
agendas, this thesis was theoretically and empirically concerned how efforts to advance the three 
dimensions of sustainable development, namely the economic growth, inequality and 
environmental aspects, affect the process of structural transformation. 
 
My empirical findings suggested that a silo approach that focuses on one dimension at the expense 
of another does not deliver effective structural transformation, which challenges the dominant 
development paradigm of the grow first and redistribute and clean later strategy. Rather, an 
inclusive and sustainable structural transformation agenda would require tackling the economic, 
social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in an integrated way. These 
results were further supported by a structural equation modelling approach, pointing out that the 
total contribution of environmental initiatives to Africa’s structural transformation agenda is 
greater than that of a structural transformation agenda led by economic growth strategies. This 
econometric approach also explained that prioritising social development in African countries may 
be the most expeditious pathway to structural transformation. 
 
In short, under the normative idea of inclusive sustainable development largely impacting on low-
income countries, accelerating the process of structural transformation would substantially hinge 
upon policy interventions, especially a development planning framework for an integrated and 
229 
coherent approach to sustainable development. Mindful of this, a type of structural transformation 
that developing countries will most likely want will be determined not exogenously, but 
endogenously. In the next few decades, sustainable structural transformation of low-income 
countries will, thus, be shaped greatly by development planning strategies of integrating, 
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Appendix 3. Analytical presentation of modelling results in Chapter 3 
 
Appendix 3A. Summary statistics 
 
Coun. Time span 
INE   PCGDP 



















ALB 1996-2008 31.1 28.5 38.4 3.1 0.6 31.7 30.5 
 
1980 698 4371 1169 229 2210 1751 
DZA 1988-2005 32.6 29.2 35.5 2.1 0.4 33.0 32.2 
 
1926 1445 3102 448 88 2014 1838 
AGO 1995-2009 52.0 40.1 58.4 6.5 1.3 53.3 50.7 
 
1415 386 4242 1295 254 1669 1161 
ARG 1985-2013 40.9 32.7 47.5 3.9 0.8 41.6 40.1 
 
5403 845 14623 3631 712 6115 4691 
ARM 1990-2012 36.4 27.5 40.1 3.2 0.6 37.0 35.8 
 
1462 357 3920 1236 242 1704 1219 
AUS 1984-2014 29.4 18.4 33.4 3.5 0.7 30.1 28.7 
 
23870 2575 67512 18009 3530 27400 20341 
AUT 1987-2014 27.0 22.7 29.5 1.8 0.3 27.4 26.7 
 
32292 9514 51386 12355 2422 34713 29870 
AZE 1990-2008 30.7 18.1 41.3 7.4 1.4 32.2 29.3 
 
1268 397 5575 1384 271 1539 997 
BGD 1986-2010 36.1 29.6 40.9 3.6 0.7 36.8 35.4 
 
349 101 760 160 31 380 318 
BRB 1996-2010 43.6 37.1 48.7 3.3 0.6 44.3 43.0 
 
12354 2211 16570 3711 727 13081 11627 
BLR 1990-2012 24.3 22.5 31.3 1.9 0.4 24.6 23.9 
 
2896 1210 6722 1991 390 3286 2506 
BEL 1985-2013 24.9 22.2 28.0 1.6 0.3 25.2 24.6 
 
28037 8784 48561 12200 2391 30429 25646 
BOL 1989-2013 50.3 44.0 56.5 4.2 0.8 51.1 49.5 
 
1215 210 2942 648 127 1342 1088 
BIH 1994-2007 31.3 27.6 37.4 3.5 0.7 32.0 30.6 
 
1859 481 4021 1063 208 2068 1651 
BWA 1985-2005 51.7 49.9 56.2 1.7 0.3 52.0 51.3 
 
2898 942 5328 1041 204 3102 2694 
BRA 1976-2014 50.0 45.0 54.0 2.2 0.4 50.4 49.5 
 
4225 441 13042 3405 667 4893 3558 
BGR 1980-2014 26.2 18.8 33.7 4.7 0.9 27.2 25.3 
 
3278 1149 7713 2248 441 3719 2837 
BFA 1994-2009 44.9 39.7 51.2 3.5 0.7 45.6 44.2 
 
330 193 569 122 24 354 306 
BDI 1992-2006 35.3 32.2 38.5 2.0 0.4 35.6 34.9 
 
139 106 184 21 4 143 135 
CPV 1989-2005 52.1 49.9 54.6 1.5 0.3 52.4 51.8 
 
1293 800 2050 350 69 1361 1224 
KHM 1994-2009 41.4 39.3 42.5 1.1 0.2 41.7 41.2 
 
414 268 743 162 32 445 382 
CMR 1996-2007 41.3 37.8 47.4 2.4 0.5 41.8 40.9 
 
760 583 1071 156 31 790 729 
CAN 1971-2013 29.3 20.6 32.0 2.3 0.5 29.7 28.8 
 
21234 2740 52733 14253 2794 24027 18440 
CAF 1992-2008 48.6 42.2 55.2 3.9 0.8 49.4 47.8 
 
322 245 464 72 14 336 308 
CHL 1980-2013 49.6 43.6 51.4 1.8 0.4 50.0 49.3 
 
5447 770 15742 4259 835 6282 4612 
CHN 1980-2013 38.7 27.1 51.5 8.7 1.7 40.4 37.0 
 
1241 85 6992 1762 345 1587 896 
COL 1988-2014 50.8 46.4 60.9 2.3 0.5 51.2 50.3 
 
2938 322 8028 2347 460 3398 2478 
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CRI 1985-2014 43.4 39.4 47.7 2.2 0.4 43.8 42.9 
 
3917 355 10462 2780 545 4462 3372 
CIV 1985-2008 39.8 35.2 44.3 3.4 0.7 40.5 39.2 
 
841 596 1258 142 28 869 814 
HRV 1995-2013 28.2 25.4 31.1 1.8 0.4 28.5 27.8 
 
9705 4920 15887 4045 793 10498 8912 
CYP 1990-2013 27.5 18.3 32.8 3.5 0.7 28.1 26.8 
 
20168 9642 34950 8338 1634 21803 18534 
CZE 1990-2013 24.7 20.5 26.7 1.6 0.3 25.0 24.4 
 
11208 2867 22649 6804 1334 12541 9874 
DNK 1980-2014 23.2 18.3 28.3 2.3 0.4 23.7 22.8 
 
32734 1775 64182 18204 3568 36302 29166 
DJI 1995-2005 37.4 34.1 39.2 1.7 0.3 37.8 37.1 
 
786 733 910 58 11 797 775 
DOM 1986-2014 47.5 45.0 49.8 1.2 0.2 47.7 47.3 
 
3011 779 6147 1738 341 3352 2670 
ECU 1988-2014 48.0 33.8 52.2 4.0 0.8 48.8 47.2 
 
2835 451 6322 1579 310 3145 2526 
EGY 1990-2012 49.9 39.7 58.2 4.1 0.8 50.7 49.1 
 
1395 296 3068 716 140 1535 1255 
SLV 1989-2014 44.3 39.8 48.8 2.8 0.5 44.8 43.7 
 
2408 680 4129 1072 210 2619 2198 
EST 1995-2013 34.2 31.3 36.1 1.6 0.3 34.5 33.9 
 
10286 3348 18877 5895 1155 11442 9131 
ETH 1995-2011 31.0 28.4 39.2 3.4 0.7 31.7 30.3 
 
193 112 380 96 19 212 174 
FJI 1991-2009 37.4 33.0 43.0 2.7 0.5 38.0 36.9 
 
2570 335 4178 934 183 2754 2387 
FIN 1985-2014 23.5 20.1 26.4 2.2 0.4 23.9 23.1 
 
28182 2718 53401 14461 2834 31016 25347 
FRA 1989-2013 28.8 26.4 38.7 2.3 0.4 29.3 28.4 
 
24687 1586 45413 12918 2532 27219 22155 
GMB 1992-2003 43.3 39.1 49.8 3.5 0.7 44.0 42.6 
 
651 361 774 133 26 677 625 
GEO 1990-2014 38.9 24.7 43.8 4.1 0.8 39.7 38.1 
 
1602 517 3670 1095 215 1817 1388 
DEU 1983-2013 27.3 24.8 29.5 1.1 0.2 27.6 27.1 
 
25006 5028 46255 12626 2475 27481 22531 
GHA 1987-2013 37.0 34.3 39.2 1.4 0.3 37.2 36.7 
 
668 265 1857 481 94 762 573 
GRC 1985-2014 33.8 32.0 37.6 1.1 0.2 34.1 33.6 
 
15134 2839 31700 8120 1592 16726 13543 
GTM 1987-2014 49.9 47.6 52.0 1.3 0.2 50.1 49.6 
 
1860 831 3667 840 165 2025 1695 
GIN 1991-2007 38.5 33.4 46.1 3.1 0.6 39.1 37.9 
 
402 296 487 66 13 415 389 
GNB 1991-2005 41.2 34.2 50.1 5.3 1.0 42.2 40.1 
 
256 164 401 72 14 270 242 
GUY 1992-2006 41.4 35.3 47.3 3.9 0.8 42.1 40.6 
 
975 513 1961 318 62 1038 913 
HTI 1991-2001 54.1 53.8 54.5 0.2 0.0 54.2 54.1 
 
389 249 494 83 16 405 372 
HND 1988-2013 51.7 49.6 54.3 1.4 0.3 52.0 51.4 
 
1250 609 2395 604 118 1369 1132 
HKG 1986-2011 42.9 35.0 55.5 5.9 1.2 44.1 41.7 
 
19179 686 35142 10414 2041 21220 17138 
HUN 1991-2014 28.8 26.5 31.9 1.5 0.3 29.1 28.6 
 
8769 3714 15598 4287 840 9609 7929 
ISL 1992-2014 23.7 19.8 27.7 2.4 0.5 24.1 23.2 
 
39547 23849 68835 12512 2452 42000 37095 
IND 1986-2011 43.9 39.8 48.3 2.3 0.5 44.3 43.4 
 
423 87 1472 352 69 492 354 
IDN 1987-2013 35.8 32.0 42.3 2.6 0.5 36.3 35.3 
 
1213 84 3701 1004 197 1410 1016 
IRN 1993-2011 40.8 36.0 43.9 2.2 0.4 41.3 40.4 
 
2808 1022 7669 1843 361 3169 2446 
IRL 1987-2014 31.3 26.5 34.0 2.0 0.4 31.7 30.9 
 
31083 2422 61219 18407 3608 34691 27475 
ISR 1985-2013 34.1 30.4 37.6 2.5 0.5 34.6 33.7 
 
18527 4625 36051 8430 1652 20179 16874 
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ITA 1967-2013 33.4 29.7 37.4 2.0 0.4 33.8 33.0 
 
17207 1534 40660 12252 2401 19609 14806 
JAM 1988-2004 45.7 38.5 55.0 5.2 1.0 46.8 44.7 
 
2141 594 3494 906 178 2319 1963 
JPN 1967-2011 27.8 22.7 32.6 2.9 0.6 28.4 27.2 
 
19709 564 46204 15395 3017 22726 16691 
JOR 1986-2010 37.7 32.9 40.3 1.9 0.4 38.1 37.3 
 
2068 558 4371 875 171 2239 1897 
KAZ 1990-2012 30.4 25.1 33.5 2.5 0.5 30.9 29.9 
 
3902 1130 12120 3596 705 4607 3197 
KEN 1992-2007 49.7 42.7 61.5 5.9 1.2 50.9 48.5 
 
367 109 858 178 35 401 332 
KOR 1980-2013 30.7 24.7 35.4 2.1 0.4 31.1 30.3 
 
10115 129 25998 8009 1570 11685 8546 
KGZ 1990-2011 39.0 25.6 53.1 7.1 1.4 40.4 37.6 
 
526 258 1124 242 47 573 478 
LAO 1992-2008 35.3 30.6 37.4 1.9 0.4 35.7 35.0 
 
406 248 900 175 34 440 372 
LVA 1995-2014 34.9 31.3 37.5 2.1 0.4 35.3 34.5 
 
8870 2436 16383 5043 989 9859 7882 
LBN 1997-2005 40.5 40.0 40.9 0.3 0.1 40.5 40.4 
 
5373 5093 5539 137 27 5400 5346 
LSO 1986-2003 56.4 47.8 60.2 3.4 0.7 57.1 55.8 
 
388 194 510 89 18 405 370 
LTU 2004-2013 34.8 34.3 35.4 0.4 0.1 34.9 34.8 
 
11927 6707 15689 3095 607 12533 11320 
LUX 1985-2013 25.8 23.6 28.4 1.7 0.3 26.1 25.5 
 
60907 13007 113732 31243 6124 67031 54784 
MKD 1990-2013 29.5 23.6 35.4 3.8 0.8 30.3 28.8 
 
2911 1172 5195 1327 260 3171 2651 
MDG 1993-2010 40.5 36.3 43.6 2.2 0.4 41.0 40.1 
 
298 138 472 87 17 315 281 
MWI 1985-2011 48.4 37.5 60.7 7.9 1.5 49.9 46.8 
 
213 122 370 69 14 227 200 
MYS 1989-2012 40.9 36.9 45.1 2.2 0.4 41.3 40.5 
 
4568 353 10508 2651 520 5088 4049 
MDV 2002-2010 39.4 37.6 45.1 2.3 0.4 39.8 38.9 
 
4987 3139 7013 1498 294 5281 4694 
MLI 1989-2010 37.9 31.6 41.3 2.5 0.5 38.4 37.4 
 
345 188 621 137 27 372 318 
MLT 1999-2013 28.0 27.0 29.8 0.9 0.2 28.1 27.8 
 
16255 9968 22776 4710 923 17178 15332 
MRT 1987-2008 38.6 32.5 43.5 3.6 0.7 39.3 37.9 
 
623 459 1181 188 37 660 586 
MUS 1991-2006 37.7 36.3 38.8 0.6 0.1 37.8 37.6 
 
3730 1176 5455 1036 203 3933 3527 
MEX 1989-2014 47.8 43.0 55.3 2.7 0.5 48.3 47.3 
 
5504 404 10230 3157 619 6123 4886 
MDA 1990-2012 35.1 22.1 40.9 5.2 1.0 36.1 34.0 
 
876 321 2047 540 106 982 770 
MNG 1995-2010 34.0 32.7 35.2 0.8 0.2 34.1 33.8 
 
1008 445 2650 685 134 1142 874 
MNE 2000-2010 30.0 28.7 31.1 0.8 0.2 30.2 29.9 
 
4226 1627 7326 2104 412 4639 3814 
MAR 1984-2007 40.1 35.1 53.3 4.8 0.9 41.1 39.2 
 
1138 165 2390 555 109 1247 1029 
MOZ 1996-2008 41.1 38.9 43.2 1.2 0.2 41.3 40.9 
 
280 198 481 83 16 296 263 
NAM 1993-2010 63.3 58.0 67.2 2.1 0.4 63.7 62.9 
 
2881 1717 5139 1022 200 3081 2681 
NPL 1995-2010 40.7 27.2 46.8 4.9 1.0 41.6 39.7 
 
280 99 595 130 26 305 254 
NLD 1985-2014 25.3 22.3 30.1 1.4 0.3 25.6 25.1 
 
28024 1241 56629 16035 3143 31167 24881 
NZL 1982-2013 33.9 28.7 39.6 2.9 0.6 34.4 33.3 
 
18603 5937 42409 10195 1998 20601 16605 
NIC 1993-2009 49.5 42.1 53.4 3.6 0.7 50.2 48.8 
 
1051 397 1518 261 51 1102 999 
NER 1992-2008 41.4 33.8 45.9 3.4 0.7 42.0 40.7 
 
220 160 358 54 11 230 209 
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NGA 1985-2011 42.5 31.8 48.5 4.0 0.8 43.3 41.7 
 
625 153 2514 591 116 740 509 
NOR 1984-2013 23.7 18.2 25.9 1.3 0.2 23.9 23.4 
 
42116 1776 102832 30308 5940 48057 36176 
PAK 1985-2011 32.7 30.0 37.6 1.7 0.3 33.0 32.3 
 
525 104 1231 283 55 580 469 
PAN 1986-2014 48.6 43.0 50.5 1.8 0.4 48.9 48.2 
 
4371 640 11949 2930 574 4945 3797 
PNG 1995-2005 48.2 40.0 51.3 3.1 0.6 48.8 47.6 
 
751 531 1065 185 36 788 715 
PRY 1990-2014 47.4 37.5 51.0 3.3 0.7 48.0 46.7 
 
2217 1148 4729 1053 206 2423 2011 
PER 1985-2014 51.6 45.1 57.8 3.0 0.6 52.2 51.0 
 
2475 273 6621 1801 353 2828 2122 
PHL 1985-2012 42.2 39.7 44.7 1.4 0.3 42.4 41.9 
 
1053 187 2606 602 118 1171 935 
POL 1990-2013 29.9 25.4 31.8 1.7 0.3 30.2 29.6 
 
7140 2193 13906 4207 825 7964 6315 
PRT 1989-2014 32.9 20.7 36.9 4.1 0.8 33.7 32.1 
 
13680 719 24816 7095 1391 15070 12289 
PRI 1989-2011 35.3 26.5 37.2 2.5 0.5 35.8 34.9 
 
14798 932 27219 7890 1546 16345 13252 
ROU 1989-2013 28.6 20.1 33.0 3.9 0.8 29.3 27.8 
 
4004 1101 9949 3233 634 4637 3370 
RUS 1989-2014 36.5 23.6 44.8 4.2 0.8 37.3 35.7 
 
5879 1331 14487 4473 877 6756 5003 
RWA 1985-2011 40.2 21.9 50.0 9.1 1.8 42.0 38.4 
 
313 126 607 116 23 336 291 
SEN 1991-2011 38.7 34.9 44.2 2.7 0.5 39.2 38.1 
 
709 457 1095 212 41 751 668 
SRB 2002-2014 33.6 32.2 35.9 1.4 0.3 33.9 33.4 
 
4919 2149 6702 1528 300 5219 4620 
SLE 1989-2011 47.3 34.4 61.5 8.0 1.6 48.9 45.7 
 
274 135 496 106 21 295 253 
SGP 1974-2013 40.4 37.9 44.0 1.3 0.3 40.6 40.1 
 
19190 567 55980 15680 3073 22263 16117 
SVK 1990-2013 25.1 17.7 28.2 2.4 0.5 25.6 24.7 
 
10273 3089 18559 5651 1108 11381 9165 
SVN 1995-2013 23.7 21.3 27.2 1.6 0.3 24.0 23.4 
 
17587 10228 27502 6224 1220 18806 16367 
ZAF 1991-2012 57.1 54.9 59.7 1.4 0.3 57.4 56.8 
 
4460 1494 8081 1740 341 4801 4119 
ESP 1985-2014 31.8 19.0 35.3 3.5 0.7 32.5 31.1 
 
18170 775 35579 9803 1921 20091 16248 
LKA 1985-2013 35.8 29.1 39.6 2.7 0.5 36.3 35.3 
 
967 117 3281 831 163 1130 805 
LCA 1995-2006 48.3 43.4 53.2 3.2 0.6 48.9 47.6 
 
4751 3802 6320 767 150 4902 4601 
SWZ 1994-2009 50.8 46.3 59.0 3.9 0.8 51.5 50.0 
 
1894 1131 2691 544 107 2001 1788 
SWE 1960-2013 22.4 16.6 26.0 2.7 0.5 23.0 21.9 
 
23135 2147 60365 17316 3394 26529 19741 
CHE 1992-2013 28.9 26.9 30.9 1.3 0.3 29.2 28.7 
 
53071 17435 88003 18191 3565 56637 49506 
SYR 1997-2007 34.2 31.7 36.2 1.5 0.3 34.5 33.9 
 
1343 957 2080 354 69 1413 1274 
TJK 1990-2009 33.7 27.8 44.7 4.8 0.9 34.6 32.7 
 
324 139 712 171 33 358 291 
TZA 1991-2011 35.0 31.7 39.0 1.4 0.3 35.3 34.7 
 
371 156 746 193 38 409 333 
THA 1986-2011 40.7 37.0 43.4 2.0 0.4 41.1 40.4 
 
2184 187 5167 1278 250 2434 1933 
TTO 1988-2005 40.7 38.1 47.7 1.9 0.4 41.1 40.4 
 
5358 938 12323 2583 506 5864 4852 
TUN 1985-2010 38.0 34.7 41.7 1.8 0.4 38.4 37.7 
 
2281 772 4343 1010 198 2479 2083 
TUR 1987-2014 41.4 36.4 48.7 2.9 0.6 42.0 40.8 
 
5103 1246 10975 3383 663 5766 4440 
TKM 1987-2005 34.1 25.1 41.6 6.8 1.3 35.5 32.8 
 
855 551 1707 325 64 919 791 
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UGA 1989-2011 39.2 35.9 41.5 1.9 0.4 39.5 38.8 
 
310 154 567 117 23 333 287 
UKR 1987-2010 28.5 19.2 36.8 5.2 1.0 29.5 27.5 
 
1539 636 3891 866 170 1708 1369 
GBR 1961-2014 30.3 25.3 34.6 3.6 0.7 31.0 29.6 
 
17759 1453 48320 14953 2931 20690 14828 
USA 1960-2014 34.2 30.3 37.7 2.3 0.4 34.6 33.7 
 
23353 3067 54629 16597 3253 26606 20100 
URY 1986-2014 40.3 36.9 42.4 1.4 0.3 40.5 40.0 
 
6848 1940 16879 4227 829 7676 6019 
UZB 1990-2005 32.1 24.2 37.7 3.7 0.7 32.9 31.4 
 
564 383 702 93 18 583 546 
VEN 1976-2013 40.1 36.3 43.8 2.2 0.4 40.5 39.7 
 
4988 1123 13581 3313 649 5638 4339 
VNM 1992-2011 36.4 34.6 37.9 1.2 0.2 36.6 36.2 
 
624 144 1543 410 80 704 543 
YEM 1992-2005 35.4 31.9 38.5 2.2 0.4 35.8 35.0 
 
486 279 817 154 30 516 456 
ZMB 1991-2010 50.0 44.6 53.3 2.2 0.4 50.4 49.6 
 
602 330 1456 360 70 673 532 
ZWE 1990-2011 49.9 46.9 52.7 2.1 0.4 50.3 49.5   575 327 838 136 27 602 548 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the sampling exercise. 
Note: All the analysed countries are coded: ALB (Albania); DZA (Algeria); AGO (Angola); ARG (Argentina); ARM (Armenia); AUS (Australia); AUT (Austria); 
AZE (Azerbaijan); BGD (Bangladesh); BRB (Barbados); BLR (Belarus); BEL (Belgium); BOL (Bolivia); BIH (Bosnia and Herzegovina); BWA (Botswana); BRA 
(Brazil); BGR (Bulgaria); BFA (Burkina Faso); BDI (Burundi); CPV (Cabo Verde); KHM (Cambodia); CMR (Cameroon); CAN (Canada); CAF (Central African 
Republic); CHL (Chile); CHN (China); COL (Colombia); CRI (Costa Rica); CIV (Cote d'Ivoire); HRV (Croatia); CYP (Cyprus); CZE (Czech Republic); DNK 
(Denmark); DJI (Djibouti); DOM (Dominican Republic); ECU (Ecuador); EGY (Egypt); SLV (El Salvador); EST (Estonia); ETH (Ethiopia); FJI (Fiji); FIN 
(Finland); FRA (France); GMB (Gambia); GEO (Georgia); DEU (Germany); GHA (Ghana); GRC (Greece); GTM (Guatemala); GIN (Guinea); GNB (Guinea-
Bissau); GUY (Guyana); HTI (Haiti); HND (Honduras); HKG (Hong Kong); HUN (Hungary); ISL (Iceland); IND (India); IDN (Indonesia); IRN (Iran); IRL 
(Ireland); ISR (Israel); ITA (Italy); JAM (Jamaica); JPN (Japan); JOR (Jordan); KAZ (Kazakhstan); KEN (Kenya); KOR (Korea, Republic of); KGZ (Kyrgyz 
Republic); LAO (Laos); LVA (Latvia); LBN (Lebanon); LSO (Lesotho); LTU (Lithuania); LUX (Luxembourg); MKD (Macedonia, FYR); MDG (Madagascar); 
MWI (Malawi); MYS (Malaysia); MDV (Maldives); MLI (Mali); MLT (Malta); MRT (Mauritania); MUS (Mauritius); MEX (Mexico); MDA (Moldova); MNG 
(Mongolia); MNE (Montenegro); MAR (Morocco); MOZ (Mozambique); NAM (Namibia); NPL (Nepal); NLD (Netherlands); NZL (New Zealand); NIC 
(Nicaragua); NER (Niger); NGA (Nigeria); NOR (Norway); PAK (Pakistan); PAN (Panama); PNG (Papua New Guinea); PRY (Paraguay); PER (Peru); PHL 
(Philippines); POL (Poland); PRT (Portugal); PRI (Puerto Rico); ROU (Romania); RUS (Russian Federation); RWA (Rwanda); SEN (Senegal); SRB (Serbia); 
SLE (Sierra Leone); SGP (Singapore); SVK (Slovakia); SVN (Slovenia); ZAF (South Africa); ESP (Spain); LKA (Sri Lanka); LCA (St. Lucia); SWZ (Swaziland); 
SWE (Sweden); CHE (Switzerland); SYR (Syria); TJK (Tajikistan); TZA (Tanzania); THA (Thailand); TTO (Trinidad and Tobago); TUN (Tunisia); TUR (Turkey); 
TKM (Turkmenistan); UGA (Uganda); UKR (Ukraine); GBR (United Kingdom); USA (United States); URY (Uruguay); UZB (Uzbekistan); VEN (Venezuela); 
VNM (Viet Nam); YEM (Yemen, Republic of); ZMB (Zambia); and ZWE (Zimbabwe)
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Appendix 3B. Augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity test results 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
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Maximum eigenvalue test 
 
Lags  
Elgen. Trace stat. Crit. 5% Prob. 
 




0.95 43.15 15.49 0.00 
 





0.51 10.54 15.49 0.24 
 





0.75 29.88 15.49 0.00 
 





0.37 11.33 15.49 0.19 
 





0.29 11.10 15.49 0.21 
 





0.83 39.96 15.49 0.00 
 





0.59 17.85 15.49 0.02 
 





0.34 11.52 15.49 0.18 
 





0.91 41.16 15.49 0.00 
 





0.21 8.50 15.49 0.41 
 





0.39 9.68 15.49 0.31 
 





0.50 21.71 15.49 0.01 
 





0.60 25.80 15.49 0.00 
 





0.87 27.19 15.49 0.00 
 





0.36 8.10 15.49 0.45 
 





0.29 7.12 15.49 0.56 
 





0.40 18.65 15.49 0.02 
 





0.65 27.21 15.49 0.00 
 





0.51 19.68 15.49 0.01 
 





0.68 24.86 15.49 0.00 
 





0.56 19.53 15.49 0.01 
 





0.82 34.94 15.49 0.00 
 





0.83 30.93 15.49 0.00 
 





0.56 24.33 15.49 0.00 
 





0.51 16.11 15.49 0.04 
 





0.74 36.43 15.49 0.00 
 





0.79 46.65 15.49 0.00 
 





0.78 33.31 15.49 0.00 
 





0.96 54.63 15.49 0.00 
 





0.69 19.06 15.49 0.01 
 






0.54 11.58 15.49 0.18 
 





0.69 27.55 15.49 0.00 
 





0.25 7.02 15.49 0.58 
 





0.77 38.79 15.49 0.00 
 





0.72 31.60 15.49 0.00 
 





0.33 13.51 15.49 0.10 
 





0.82 38.50 15.49 0.00 
 





0.64 21.77 15.49 0.01 
 





0.83 45.43 15.49 0.00 
 





0.71 31.14 15.49 0.00 
 





0.72 35.83 15.49 0.00 
 





0.87 45.43 15.49 0.00 
 





0.74 28.60 15.49 0.00 
 





0.59 23.68 15.49 0.00 
 





0.93 60.00 15.49 0.00 
 





0.58 38.24 15.49 0.00 
 





0.78 21.29 15.49 0.01 
 





0.61 37.68 15.49 0.00 
 





0.59 19.71 15.49 0.01 
 





0.71 33.64 15.49 0.00 
 





0.35 6.08 15.49 0.69 
 





0.47 21.75 15.49 0.01 
 





0.47 12.63 15.49 0.13 
 





0.74 25.91 15.49 0.00 
 





0.86 35.37 15.49 0.00 
 





0.57 13.82 15.49 0.09 
 





0.68 32.41 15.49 0.00 
 





0.69 26.44 15.49 0.00 
 





0.74 28.61 15.49 0.00 
 





0.49 17.07 15.49 0.03 
 





0.66 17.19 15.49 0.03 
 





0.68 19.30 15.49 0.01 
 





0.90 49.42 15.49 0.00 
 





0.60 26.92 15.49 0.00 
 





0.74 12.40 15.49 0.14 
 






0.80 31.98 15.49 0.00 
 





0.81 27.95 15.49 0.00 
 





0.55 10.56 15.49 0.24 
 





0.44 15.68 15.49 0.05 
 





0.55 20.26 15.49 0.01 
 





0.68 22.66 15.49 0.00 
 





0.69 29.51 15.49 0.00 
 





0.36 12.73 15.49 0.13 
 





0.63 22.40 15.49 0.00 
 





0.77 27.99 15.49 0.00 
 





0.74 47.92 15.49 0.00 
 





0.58 20.81 15.49 0.01 
 





0.65 20.98 15.49 0.01 
 





0.56 21.77 15.49 0.01 
 





0.63 26.27 15.49 0.00 
 





0.57 18.44 15.49 0.02 
 





0.83 38.96 15.49 0.00 
 





0.22 6.19 15.49 0.67 
 





0.61 17.81 15.49 0.02 
 





0.42 10.92 15.49 0.22 
 





0.67 25.60 15.49 0.00 
 





0.61 35.06 15.49 0.00 
 





0.68 27.05 15.49 0.00 
 





0.67 23.16 15.49 0.00 
 





0.64 20.51 15.49 0.01 
 





0.83 43.58 15.49 0.00 
 





0.83 47.93 15.49 0.00 
 





0.15 7.71 15.49 0.50 
 





0.44 11.78 15.49 0.17 
 





0.70 21.89 15.49 0.00 
 





0.73 29.14 15.49 0.00 
 





0.54 18.56 15.49 0.02 
 





0.83 38.47 15.49 0.00 
 





0.87 38.83 15.49 0.00 
 





0.56 18.71 15.49 0.02 
 






0.59 16.06 15.49 0.04 
 





0.60 21.14 15.49 0.01 
 





0.56 23.32 15.49 0.00 
 





0.37 25.20 15.49 0.00 
 





0.32 28.75 15.49 0.00 
 





0.88 32.85 15.49 0.00 
 





0.41 19.76 15.49 0.01 
 





0.82 26.76 15.49 0.00 
 





0.60 15.75 15.49 0.05 
 





0.49 17.07 15.49 0.03 
 
0.49 12.05 14.26 0.11 
 
3 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results.
294 
Appendix 3D. Granger causality test results 
 









Coeff. t-stat. Prob. ECT 
 
χ2 stat. Prob. Imp. Resp. 
 
DZA   INE PCGDP   -115.83 -1.55 0.15 -0.01 
 
6.00 0.11 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.01 -1.55 0.15 -0.33 
 
1.47 0.69 Positive 
 
AGO   INE PCGDP   
     
1.11 0.29 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
18.85 0.00 Negative 
 
ARG   INE PCGDP   7.89 -3.62 0.00 -1.68 
 
18.07 0.01 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.13 -1.86 0.09 -0.16 
 
30.19 0.00 Negative 
 
ARM   INE PCGDP   
     
10.70 0.00 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
8.89 0.01 Negative 
 
AUS   INE PCGDP   
     
3.31 0.35 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
10.25 0.02 Positive 
 
AUT   INE PCGDP   -7.52 -2.43 0.02 -0.60 
 
8.66 0.12 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.13 -4.48 0.00 -1.12 
 
32.95 0.00 Positive 
 
AZE   INE PCGDP   2.76 -3.72 0.00 -0.27 
 
8.49 0.01 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.36 -1.83 0.08 -0.43 
 
2.04 0.36 Negative 
 
BGD   INE PCGDP   
     
3.36 0.50 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
13.54 0.01 Positive 
 
BLR   INE PCGDP   -11.14 -0.60 0.56 -0.70 
 
5.31 0.38 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.09 -4.59 0.00 -1.99 
 
21.61 0.00 Positive 
 
BEL   INE PCGDP   
     
7.09 0.01 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
0.16 0.69 Negative 
 
BWA   INE PCGDP   
     
4.43 0.04 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
0.04 0.84 Positive 
 
BRA   INE PCGDP   25.70 -3.73 0.00 -0.15 
 
32.03 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.04 -1.50 0.14 -0.15 
 
2.28 0.94 Negative 
 
BGR   INE PCGDP   -4.15 -2.73 0.02 -0.27 
 
7.13 0.52 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.24 0.04 0.97 0.00 
 
8.26 0.41 Negative 
 
BFA   INE PCGDP   4.71 -3.21 0.01 -0.71 
 
9.54 0.01 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.21 -4.95 0.00 -0.57 
 
3.25 0.20 Negative 
 
BDI   INE PCGDP   
     
1.74 0.19 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
13.64 0.00 Positive 
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KHM   INE PCGDP   12.02 2.77 0.01 0.21 
 
0.30 0.59 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.08 -3.16 0.01 -0.39 
 
0.02 0.88 Negative 
 
CAN   INE PCGDP   -11.51 -3.63 0.00 -0.10 
 
17.28 0.01 Mixed 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.09 -0.40 0.69 -0.03 
 
4.93 0.55 Negative 
 
CHL   INE PCGDP   -9.20 -3.11 0.01 -0.15 
 
22.97 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.11 1.53 0.14 0.08 
 
5.16 0.64 Negative 
 
CHN   INE PCGDP   -7.77 -0.95 0.35 -0.05 
 
4.18 0.65 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.13 2.84 0.01 0.39 
 
18.49 0.01 Negative 
 
COL   INE PCGDP   9.91 -0.86 0.40 -0.10 
 
2.53 0.64 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.10 -4.30 0.00 -0.39 
 
7.88 0.10 Negative 
 
CRI   INE PCGDP   -9.39 -2.12 0.04 -0.29 
 
11.51 0.04 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.11 -2.87 0.01 -0.35 
 
11.16 0.05 Negative 
 
CIV   INE PCGDP   -40.90 -4.13 0.00 -0.07 
 
33.76 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.02 -1.21 0.25 -0.27 
 
3.60 0.61 Positive 
 
HRV   INE PCGDP   13.50 -1.97 0.07 -0.16 
 
7.47 0.06 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.07 -2.47 0.03 -0.70 
 
3.83 0.28 Negative 
 
CYP   INE PCGDP   -9.37 2.05 0.05 0.13 
 
0.27 0.97 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.11 -2.54 0.02 -0.25 
 
7.19 0.07 Negative 
 
CZE   INE PCGDP   67.91 -0.66 0.51 0.00 
 
1.67 0.20 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.01 -4.29 0.00 -0.26 
 
13.04 0.00 Positive 
 
DNK   INE PCGDP   -3.30 -2.93 0.02 -0.17 
 
26.35 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.30 -1.93 0.08 -0.09 
 
11.87 0.22 Negative 
 
DOM   INE PCGDP   84.57 -0.11 0.91 0.00 
 
1.77 0.88 Mixed 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.01 -5.78 0.00 -0.22 
 
34.11 0.00 Negative 
 
ECU   INE PCGDP   3.16 -4.38 0.00 -1.60 
 
41.35 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.32 0.62 0.54 0.12 
 
0.83 0.99 Positive 
 
EGY   INE PCGDP   -179.00 3.83 0.00 0.04 
 
15.41 0.01 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.01 -3.27 0.01 -4.06 
 
12.30 0.03 Negative 
 
EST   INE PCGDP   15.99 3.68 0.00 0.38 
 
28.93 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.06 -3.36 0.00 -1.13 
 
4.97 0.08 Negative 
 
FJI   INE PCGDP   
     
3.25 0.36 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
4.53 0.21 Positive 
 
FRA   INE PCGDP   47.32 -4.62 0.00 -0.12 
 
29.07 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.02 -1.88 0.07 -0.49 
 
4.80 0.19 Negative 
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GEO   INE PCGDP   
     
15.07 0.00 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
0.17 0.92 Negative 
 
DEU   INE PCGDP   -6.87 -5.43 0.00 -1.26 
 
18.35 0.01 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.15 3.25 0.00 0.71 
 
11.43 0.08 Negative 
 
GHA   INE PCGDP   -51.08 -3.77 0.00 -0.12 
 
26.65 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.02 -0.68 0.51 -0.14 
 
3.41 0.76 Negative 
 
GRC   INE PCGDP   
     
6.30 0.01 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
0.03 0.87 Negative 
 
GTM   INE PCGDP   -41.67 0.14 0.89 0.00 
 
5.25 0.51 Mixed 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.02 -5.17 0.00 -0.25 
 
31.50 0.00 Positive 
 
HND   INE PCGDP   10.23 -1.87 0.08 -0.07 
 
9.30 0.10 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.10 -2.96 0.01 -0.12 
 
16.52 0.01 Positive 
 
HKG   INE PCGDP   -10.88 0.40 0.70 0.06 
 
2.33 0.89 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.09 -4.08 0.00 -1.23 
 
89.70 0.00 Negative 
 
HUN   INE PCGDP   11.89 -5.16 0.00 -0.27 
 
14.11 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.08 0.24 0.81 0.06 
 
0.88 0.83 Positive 
 
ISL   INE PCGDP   -1.16 -2.16 0.05 -0.78 
 
5.28 0.26 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.86 4.34 0.00 0.22 
 
12.37 0.01 Negative 
 
IND   INE PCGDP   -8.92 1.49 0.17 0.42 
 
5.37 0.50 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.11 -5.19 0.00 -1.39 
 
47.15 0.00 Positive 
 
IDN   INE PCGDP   -9.18 0.51 0.61 0.50 
 
8.72 0.12 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.11 -4.07 0.00 -2.52 
 
15.91 0.01 Positive 
 
IRL   INE PCGDP   9.69 -2.79 0.01 -0.66 
 
5.21 0.52 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.10 -1.10 0.29 -0.51 
 
2.27 0.89 Negative 
 
ISR   INE PCGDP   -8.30 2.24 0.05 0.47 
 
38.56 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.12 -2.24 0.05 -3.90 
 
7.01 0.43 Negative 
 
ITA   INE PCGDP   -16.48 -1.99 0.06 -0.07 
 
9.16 0.52 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.06 -3.22 0.00 -0.40 
 
14.22 0.16 Positive 
 
JAM   INE PCGDP   -2.64 2.83 0.01 0.53 
 
10.94 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.38 -3.15 0.01 -0.53 
 
1.41 0.49 Positive 
 
JPN   INE PCGDP   -7.27 -1.54 0.13 -0.14 
 
3.41 0.95 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.14 -4.49 0.00 -0.57 
 
22.70 0.01 Positive 
 
JOR   INE PCGDP   18.20 3.04 0.00 0.15 
 
12.94 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.05 -3.01 0.01 -0.29 
 
0.19 0.91 Negative 
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KAZ   INE PCGDP   9.60 -2.93 0.01 -1.00 
 
6.42 0.17 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.10 -0.46 0.66 -0.10 
 
2.18 0.70 Negative 
 
KEN   INE PCGDP   
     
14.89 0.00 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
0.00 0.98 Positive 
 
KOR   INE PCGDP   -12.03 -2.79 0.01 -0.18 
 
8.12 0.23 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.08 0.80 0.43 0.04 
 
13.95 0.03 Negative 
 
KGZ   INE PCGDP   
     
0.93 0.33 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
4.18 0.04 Mixed 
 
LAO   INE PCGDP   -7.03 3.81 0.00 0.70 
 
17.71 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.14 -3.05 0.01 -0.52 
 
3.63 0.16 Positive 
 
LVA   INE PCGDP   -6.69 -0.15 0.89 -0.06 
 
1.66 0.80 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.15 5.34 0.00 0.79 
 
20.67 0.00 Negative 
 
LSO   INE PCGDP   
     
4.93 0.03 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
1.31 0.25 Negative 
 
LUX   INE PCGDP   -7.92 -0.53 0.61 -0.14 
 
5.41 0.49 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.13 -3.37 0.00 -0.80 
 
16.83 0.01 Positive 
 
MKD   INE PCGDP   -6.88 -1.55 0.15 -0.13 
 
12.69 0.03 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.15 -3.18 0.01 -0.40 
 
9.59 0.09 Positive 
 
MYS   INE PCGDP   15.59 -1.47 0.15 -0.11 
 
0.54 0.76 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.06 -4.62 0.00 -0.71 
 
7.26 0.03 Negative 
 
MLI   INE PCGDP   3.86 -0.40 0.70 -0.19 
 
1.18 0.76 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.26 -2.92 0.01 -0.28 
 
12.06 0.01 Negative 
 
MLT   INE PCGDP   
     
0.14 0.70 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
6.57 0.01 Positive 
 
MRT   INE PCGDP   2.64 -1.34 0.20 -0.29 
 
5.37 0.25 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.38 -2.09 0.06 -0.33 
 
9.39 0.05 Negative 
 
MEX   INE PCGDP   15.02 -0.93 0.36 -0.25 
 
2.71 0.61 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.07 -6.89 0.00 -0.67 
 
157.05 0.00 Negative 
 
MDA   INE PCGDP   4.37 -1.26 0.23 -0.61 
 
2.01 0.73 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.23 -1.97 0.07 -0.71 
 
1.03 0.90 Negative 
 
MNE   INE PCGDP   
     
0.04 0.83 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
6.82 0.01 Negative 
 
MAR   INE PCGDP   -5.26 -0.46 0.65 -0.13 
 
2.47 0.65 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.19 -5.76 0.00 -0.61 
 
35.32 0.00 Positive 
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NAM   INE PCGDP   4.20 0.08 0.94 0.03 
 
0.15 0.93 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.24 -5.56 0.00 -0.28 
 
47.41 0.00 Negative 
 
NPL   INE PCGDP   
     
3.66 0.16 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
8.46 0.01 Negative 
 
NLD   INE PCGDP   -17.37 -1.35 0.19 -0.05 
 
9.70 0.02 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.06 -2.67 0.01 -0.40 
 
3.94 0.27 Positive 
 
NZL   INE PCGDP   -2.37 -3.08 0.01 -0.25 
 
3.91 0.79 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.42 3.08 0.01 0.60 
 
15.11 0.03 Negative 
 
NGA   INE PCGDP   7.45 3.00 0.01 0.71 
 
16.93 0.01 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.13 -3.23 0.01 -0.26 
 
10.84 0.09 Negative 
 
NOR   INE PCGDP   -2.39 3.62 0.00 0.24 
 
36.71 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.42 0.53 0.61 0.05 
 
2.06 0.96 Negative 
 
PAK   INE PCGDP   
     
11.47 0.01 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
13.58 0.00 Positive 
 
PAN   INE PCGDP   23.01 -3.07 0.01 -0.29 
 
14.52 0.02 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.04 0.43 0.67 0.08 
 
8.58 0.20 Negative 
 
PRY   INE PCGDP   16.23 -4.78 0.00 -0.94 
 
11.55 0.04 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.06 1.70 0.11 0.45 
 
2.60 0.76 Positive 
 
PER   INE PCGDP   20.29 4.37 0.00 0.42 
 
21.89 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.05 -1.27 0.22 -0.21 
 
28.83 0.00 Mixed 
 
POL   INE PCGDP   -17.38 -0.64 0.53 -0.05 
 
2.12 0.55 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.06 -4.01 0.00 -1.01 
 
0.95 0.81 Positive 
 
PRT   INE PCGDP   8.17 2.73 0.01 0.14 
 
15.61 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.12 -2.84 0.01 -0.17 
 
0.23 0.97 Negative 
 
PRI   INE PCGDP   -14.70 -4.24 0.00 -0.08 
 
2.24 0.13 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.07 -1.38 0.18 -0.11 
 
0.42 0.52 Positive 
 
ROU   INE PCGDP   -22.90 -2.51 0.02 -0.09 
 
12.63 0.01 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.04 -0.61 0.55 -0.10 
 
1.16 0.76 Positive 
 
RUS   INE PCGDP   10.82 -1.95 0.07 -0.57 
 
9.32 0.10 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.09 -4.86 0.00 -1.51 
 
14.63 0.01 Negative 
 
RWA   INE PCGDP   
     
1.29 0.26 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
20.25 0.00 Positive 
 
SEN   INE PCGDP   1.64 -3.04 0.01 -0.73 
 
9.87 0.04 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.61 0.65 0.53 0.05 
 
7.03 0.13 Negative 
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SRB   INE PCGDP   
     
0.34 0.56 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
5.55 0.02 Negative 
 
SLE   INE PCGDP   0.57 1.38 0.20 0.82 
 
3.78 0.58 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   1.76 -1.49 0.17 -0.05 
 
17.11 0.00 Mixed 
 
SGP   INE PCGDP   -50.55 -0.13 0.90 0.00 
 
8.11 0.23 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.02 -5.42 0.00 -0.59 
 
21.20 0.00 Positive 
 
SVK   INE PCGDP   13.24 0.54 0.60 0.06 
 
2.28 0.81 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.08 -3.35 0.01 -0.74 
 
10.99 0.05 Negative 
 
SVN   INE PCGDP   -14.07 -2.45 0.03 -0.52 
 
8.61 0.04 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.07 -1.72 0.11 -2.19 
 
3.54 0.32 Negative 
 
ZAF   INE PCGDP   -363.34 -0.26 0.80 0.00 
 
3.27 0.51 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.00 -2.95 0.01 -0.61 
 
21.91 0.00 Mixed 
 
ESP   INE PCGDP   26.01 -3.92 0.00 -0.36 
 
43.34 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.04 2.90 0.01 1.13 
 
28.45 0.00 Positive 
 
LKA   INE PCGDP   -18.29 -4.95 0.00 -0.11 
 
15.98 0.03 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.05 1.97 0.08 0.57 
 
18.49 0.01 Negative 
 
SWE   INE PCGDP   
     
11.27 0.02 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
4.87 0.30 Positive 
 
CHE   INE PCGDP   
     
0.20 0.65 Positive 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
5.35 0.02 Positive 
 
TJK   INE PCGDP   4.70 -0.61 0.55 -0.12 
 
3.76 0.15 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.21 -5.07 0.00 -0.60 
 
22.78 0.00 Negative 
 
TZA   INE PCGDP   -0.03 -2.54 0.03 -1.47 
 
10.03 0.04 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -32.31 -3.04 0.01 -0.32 
 
8.60 0.07 Positive 
 
THA   INE PCGDP   15.67 -0.53 0.60 -0.03 
 
0.74 0.69 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.06 -4.44 0.00 -0.62 
 
6.31 0.04 Mixed 
 
TTO   INE PCGDP   -15.30 3.16 0.01 0.66 
 
4.98 0.17 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.07 -2.93 0.01 -1.18 
 
4.80 0.19 Positive 
 
TUN   INE PCGDP   17.60 -4.25 0.00 -0.47 
 
42.30 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.06 -1.18 0.27 -0.58 
 
7.03 0.32 Negative 
 
TUR   INE PCGDP   9.06 0.35 0.73 0.16 
 
0.08 1.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.11 -3.42 0.00 -0.41 
 
9.90 0.04 Negative 
 
TKM   INE PCGDP   -6.68 -4.36 0.00 -0.06 
 
10.38 0.00 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.15 -0.89 0.38 -0.03 
 
0.51 0.47 Negative 
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UGA   INE PCGDP   -8.50 -0.29 0.78 -0.02 
 
0.99 0.32 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.12 -4.59 0.00 -0.40 
 
6.55 0.01 Positive 
 
UKR   INE PCGDP   -20.82 -0.73 0.47 -0.02 
 
1.04 0.90 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.05 -3.33 0.00 -0.62 
 
5.04 0.28 Negative 
 
GBR   INE PCGDP   43.81 -3.78 0.00 -0.01 
 
19.21 0.02 Mixed 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.02 -0.94 0.35 -0.02 
 
8.33 0.50 Positive 
 
USA   INE PCGDP   -8.92 0.17 0.86 0.00 
 
13.54 0.09 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.11 -3.59 0.00 -0.24 
 
22.95 0.00 Positive 
 
UZB   INE PCGDP   -1.20 -6.93 0.00 -0.55 
 
65.29 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.83 1.12 0.28 0.15 
 
3.91 0.14 Negative 
 
VEN   INE PCGDP   37.65 2.11 0.04 0.08 
 
10.43 0.17 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   0.03 -2.12 0.04 -0.13 
 
5.13 0.64 Positive 
 
VNM   INE PCGDP   -24.53 -4.08 0.00 -0.33 
 
16.09 0.00 Positive 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.04 -1.55 0.15 -0.21 
 
16.27 0.00 Mixed 
 
ZMB   INE PCGDP   -17.39 2.68 0.01 0.19 
 
4.95 0.08 Negative 
 
VEC 
  PCGDP INE   -0.06 -3.18 0.00 -0.81 
 
1.89 0.39 Positive 
 
ZWE   INE PCGDP   
     
0.23 0.97 Negative 
 
VAR 
  PCGDP INE   
     
7.29 0.06 Negative   




Appendix 3E. Impulse response test results 
 
Angola
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Argentina
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Argentina
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Armenia
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Armenia
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Australia
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Austria
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
 
Azerbaijan
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Bangladesh
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Belarus
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Belgium
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Botswana
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Brazil
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Burkina Faso
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation  
Burundi
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Canada
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Chile
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
China
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Costa Rica
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Costa Rica
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Cote d'Ivoire
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
 
Czech Republic
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Denmark
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Dominican Republic
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Ecuador
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Egypt
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Egypt
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Estonia
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
 
France
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Georgia
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Germany
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Ghana
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Greece
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Guatemala
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Honduras
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
 
Hong Kong
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Hungary
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Iceland
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
India
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Indonesia
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Israel
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Jamaica
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation  
Japan
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Jordan
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Kenya
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Korea, Republic of
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Kyrgyz Republic
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Laos
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Latvia
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation  
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Lesotho
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Luxembourg
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Macedonia, FYR
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Malaysia
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Mali
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Malta
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Mexico
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation  
Montenegro
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Morocco
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Namibia
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Nepal
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Netherlands
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
New Zealand
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Nigeria
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
 
Norway
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Pakistan
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Pakistan
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Panama
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Paraguay
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Peru
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Peru
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation  
Portugal
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Romania
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Russian Federation
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Rwanda
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Senegal
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Serbia
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Sierra Leone
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation  
Singapore
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Slovenia
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
South Africa
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Spain
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Spain
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Sri Lanka
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Sri Lanka
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation  
Sweden
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Switzerland
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Tajikistan
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Tanzania
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Thailand
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Tunisia
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Turkey
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation  
Turkmenistan
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Uganda
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
United Kingdom
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
United States
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation
Uzbekistan
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Viet Nam
Accumulated Response of GDPPC to
Cholesky One S.D. INE Innovation
Viet Nam
Accumulated Response of INE to
Cholesky One S.D. GDPPC Innovation  
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
  
303 
Appendix 3F Analysis of relationship and causality by 11-cluster groups 
 
Coun. Region Income 
 
INE Granger causes PCGDP 
 











AGO Sub-Saharan Middle 











ARM Eur. Cen. Asia Low 
 
Incentive 




AUS E. Asia Pac. High 











AZE Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
BGD South Asia Low 




BLR Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 




BEL Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
BWA Sub-Saharan Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
BRA Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
BGR Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 







BDI Sub-Saharan Low 




KHM E. Asia Pac. Low 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
CAN North America High 
 
Incentive Constraint 
    
Both GIC 
CHL Lat. Amer. Car. High 
 
Incentive Constraint 
    
Both GIC 
CHN E. Asia Pac. Middle 




COL Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 











CIV Sub-Saharan Low 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
HRV Eur. Cen. Asia High 




CYP Eur. Cen. Asia High 




CZE Eur. Cen. Asia High 
    
Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GUE 
DNK Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
DOM Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 




ECU Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 




Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GX 
EST Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 




FRA Eur. Cen. Asia High 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
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GEO Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
DEU Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
GHA Sub-Saharan Low 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
GRC Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
GTM Lat. Amer. Car. Low 




HND Lat. Amer. Car. Low 
    
Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GUE 
HKG E. Asia Pac. High 
    
Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GUE 
HUN Eur. Cen. Asia High 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
ISL Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 




IND South Asia Low 




IDN E. Asia Pac. Low 




IRL Eur. Cen. Asia High 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 







ITA Eur. Cen. Asia High 











JPN E. Asia Pac. High 




JOR M. East N. Afr. Middle 
 
Incentive 




KAZ Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
KEN Sub-Saharan Low 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
KOR E. Asia Pac. High 
 
Incentive 




KGZ Eur. Cen. Asia Low 
    
Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GUE 







LVA Eur. Cen. Asia High 




LSO Sub-Saharan Low 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
LUX Eur. Cen. Asia High 











MYS E. Asia Pac. Middle 




MLI Sub-Saharan Low 




MLT M. East N. Afr. High 




MEX Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 




MNE Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 




MAR M. East N. Afr. Low 




NAM Sub-Saharan Middle 




NPL South Asia Low 












NZL E. Asia Pac. High 
 
Incentive 




NGA Sub-Saharan Low 
 
Incentive 




NOR Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 







PAN Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
PRY Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 




Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GX 
POL Eur. Cen. Asia High 




PRT Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 




PRI Lat. Amer. Car. High 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
ROU Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
RUS Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 




RWA Sub-Saharan Low 




SEN Sub-Saharan Low 
 
Incentive Constraint 
    
Both GIC 
SRB Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 




SLE Sub-Saharan Low 
    
Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GUE 
SGP E. Asia Pac. High 




SVK Eur. Cen. Asia High 




SVN Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
ZAF Sub-Saharan Middle 
    
Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GUE 







LKA South Asia Low 
 
Incentive 




SWE Eur. Cen. Asia High 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
CHE Eur. Cen. Asia High 




TJK Eur. Cen. Asia Low 











THA E. Asia Pac. Middle 
    
Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GUE 
TTO Lat. Amer. Car. High 




TUN M. East N. Afr. Low 
  
Constraint 
    
Negative GC 
TUR Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 




TKM Eur. Cen. Asia Middle 
 
Incentive Constraint 
    
Both GIC 
UGA Sub-Saharan Low 




UKR Eur. Cen. Asia Low 




GBR Eur. Cen. Asia High 
 
Incentive Constraint 
    
Both GIC 
USA North America High 





UZB Eur. Cen. Asia Low 
 
Incentive 
     
Positive GI 
VEN Lat. Amer. Car. Middle 








Redist. extr. Redist. incl. 
 
Both GX 
ZMB Sub-Saharan Low 




Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
Note: GI denotes Group of Incentive; GU denotes Group of Unequal income (re)distribution; GIU denotes Group of Incentive & Unequal income (re)distribution; 
GC denotes Group of Constraint; GE denotes Group of Equal income (re)distribution; GCE denotes Group of Constraint & Equal income (re)distribution; GIC 
denotes Group of Incentive & Constraint; GIE denotes Group of Incentive & Equal income (re)distribution; GCU denotes Group of Constraint & Unequal income 




Appendix 4. Comparison of the pooled regression, the fixed effect and the random effect models in Chapter 4 
 
 


















































      







   







   







   







   















































Adjusted R-squared 0.0563 0.8965 0.1368 0.2369 0.912 0.2115 0.3923 0.9086 0.2464 
Log likelihood -368.04 191.44  -315.68 231.34  -259.59 221.96  
F-statistic 8.3441 134.24 20.489 39.194 160.35 33.983 80.389 153.83 41.221 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Akaike info criterion 1.5134 -0.6428  1.3010 -0.8047  1.0734 -0.7666  
Schwarz criterion 1.5560 -0.3616  1.3436 -0.5235  1.1160 -0.4854  
Hannan-Quinn criteria 1.5301 -0.5324  1.3177 -0.6943  1.0901 -0.6562  




MODEL IV MODEL V 
Pooled (prob.) Fixed (prob.) Random (prob.) Pooled (prob.) Fixed (prob.) Random (prob.) 
ECON PCGDP -.0009 (.8108) .0038 (.0457) .0036 (.0545) -.0016 (.6668) .0035 (.0630) .0033 (.0741) 
 INV -.0034 (.1013) .0038 (.0046) .0035 (.0074) -.0037 (.0772) .0040 (.0032) .0038 (.0044) 
 REC .0156 (.0000) .0049 (.0479) .0089 (.0000) .0161 (.0000) .0048 (.0610) .0086 (.0001) 
 EIL .1017 (.0126) -.1684 (.0121) -.1360 (.0173) .1086 (.0089) -.1053 (.1331) -.0990 (.0976) 
SOC UEMPL -.1555 (.0000) .0452 (.3214) -.0503 (.2023) -.1679 (.0000) .0873 (.0652) -.0111 (.7885) 
 SANIT .0108 (.0000) .0115 (.0060) .0075 (.0217) .0115 (.0000) .0121 (.0039) .0078 (.0209) 
 LIFE .0415 (.0000) -.0049 (.2387) -.0035 (.3469) .0402 (.0000) -.0042 (.3135) -.0032 (.3998) 
 AFR .1277 (.0010) -.4074 (.0001) -.2165 (.0073) .1167 (.0030) -.4303 (.0000) -.2393 (.0041) 
ENV CO2 .1705 (.0000) .0302 (.3997) .0474 (.0891) .1673 (.0000) .0095 (.7951) .0307 (.2956) 
 ARAL -.5149 (.0000) -.1824 (.0045) -.2684 (.0000) -.5178 (.0000) -.2180 (.0008) -.2917 (.0000) 
 FORE .0000 (.0002) .0000 (.6475) .0000 (.7588) .0000 (.0005) .0000 (.9178) .0000 (.7933) 
 WATS -.0002 (.9131) .0063 (.0046) .0083 (.0000) -.0002 (.8924) .0064 (.0085) .0081 (.0003) 
INST GOVS    -.0030 (.7458) .0005 (.9155) .0022 (.6578) 
 SOCIO    .0165 (.2451) .0199 (.0432) .0154 (.1034) 
 CORR    -.0058 (.7747) -.0007 (.9571) -.0066 (.6240) 
 DEMO    .0240 (.0995) .0230 (.0155) .0222 (.0174) 
 C .2207 (.5526) 5.8918 (.0000) 4.7800 (.0000) .2075 (.6149) 5.5994 (.0000) 4.5738 (.0000) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6369 0.9187 0.2956 0.6370 0.9200 0.3048 
Log likelihood -128.54 255.11  -126.43 261.29  
F-statistic 72.917 139.96 18.204 54.957 129.57 14.481 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Akaike info criterion 0.5742 -0.8686  0.5819 -0.8775  
Schwarz criterion 0.6850 -0.5193  0.7267 -0.4940  
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.6177 -0.7314  0.6387 -0.7269  
Durbin-Watson stat 0.3813 1.5991 1.3795 0.3907 1.6295 1.4252 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the modelling results. 
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Appendix 5. Illustrative policy simulations of alternative structural 
transformation strategies in Chapter 5 
 
To demonstrate the concept of ‘transformation strategies with endogenous long-term growth 
performance possibilities,’ my simulations simply assume that there are three types of structural 
transformation: (D) dirty transformation; (G) green transformation; and (Z) zero transformation. 
The first type is defined as being unsustainable development, where the economy is transformed 
without consideration of environmental quality. The second type is realised through the synergy 
effect between economic value and environmental conservation. Meanwhile, the third strategy 
targets an improvement to environmental quality, which crucially offsets the economic 
transformation process (trade-offs effect). Finally, the dotted line represents a unit of time, which 
is one year and hence, this is an annualised concept, such that every year a country should design 
its targeted intervention for what types of transformation it wants to pursue. 
 
Transformation strategies with endogenous long-term growth performance possibilities 
 
 
For the vertical axis, αt is defined as structural transformation outcome in year t, whilst ∆αt are the 
changes in structural transformation outcomes between αt and αt-1. Hence, αt can be specified as 
follows: 
 





























G: green transformation (synergies) 
D: dirty transformation (unsustainable) 
Z: zero transformation (trade-offs) 
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αt = αt-1 + (αt-1 × ∆αt) 
 
As for the environment aspect (horizontal axis), carbon dioxide emissions as per cent of αt can be 
defined to be ∏βt, which is the baseline carbon dioxide emissions required to support the size of a 
transformative economy. Furthermore, additional carbon dioxide emissions (or reduction of the 
emissions) that depend on the type of policy intervention are included as (∩βt). The sum of both 
the baseline and policy-driven carbon dioxide emissions can be the accumulated carbon dioxide 
emissions in year t. 
 
Therefore, ∆βt can be expressed as: 
 
∆βt = (αt × ∏βt) × (1 + ∆∩βt) 
 
This formula can be rearranged for cumulative carbon dioxide emissions in year t as:  
 
βt = (αt × ∏βt) × (1 + ∆∩βt) + βt-1 
 
Now, five policy simulations are run for 30 years: the above three transformation types: (1) dirty, 
(2) green and (3) zero transformations along with (4) dirty transformation for 15 years, then zero 
transformation for the rest as well as (5) zero transformation for 15 years and then dirty 
transformation for the rest.125  
 
The simulation results show that the dirty transformation policy interventions over 30 years 
generate the greatest transformative outcomes, while posing the biggest environmental risk. In 
contrast, the zero transformative policy is associated with the minimal impacts on transformation, 
whilst also promoting the greatest environmental conservation. In the middle stage, the green 
transformation is placed as being in between transformative outcomes and environmental 
degradation. This can be considered as minimising trade-offs effects. 
 
 
125  Even though appearing to be extreme cases, two mixed policy interventions are simulated for the purpose of 
comparison. 
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When zero interventions are implemented for the first half of the simulated period, followed by 
dirty transformative ones for the remaining years (represented by a dotted black line), whilst the 
structural transformation level is simulated to being a similar level to that generated by the dirty-
zero transformation policy, its carbon dioxide emissions level is far below and even below that of 
the green transformation interventions. This result implies that the law of accelerating returns 
(Kurzweil, 2005) could play a role in this simulation case or in other words, it can be interpreted 
as a path-dependence feature in the sense that a country tends to choose its previously implemented 
policies. 
 
In this regard, the sooner an environmental programme is implemented, the greater the synergy 
effects that will be captured. In other words, policymakers may need to take into account that clean 
first and grow later can be a better strategic stance than grow first and clear later, and more 
critically, that development planning for prioritising and sequencing policy interventions at this 
point in time will determine what types of transformation will be achieved in the future. 
 
Simulations results on five structural transformation strategies 
    Structural transformation (αt) 
 
          Carbon dioxide emissions (βt) 
 
Notes: ∆αt for dirty, green and zero transformation is assumed to be 10 per cent, the root square of 
100 per cent and zero per cent, respectively; ∏βt is assumed to be 10 per cent for all the policy 
scenarios; and finally, ∆βt for dirty, green and zero transformation is assumed to be zero per cent, 











Dirty (half) + Zero (half)









Dirty (half) + Zero (half)
Zero (half) + Dirty (half)
